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ABSTRACT 
Network interdiction problems consist of games between an attacker and an in-
telligent network, where the attacker seeks to degrade network operations while the 
network adapts its operations to counteract the effects of the attacker. This problem 
has received significant attention in recent years due to its relevance to military prob-
lems and network security. When the attacker 's actions achieve uncertain effects, the 
resulting problems become stochastic network interdiction problems. In this thesis, 
we develop new algorithms for the solutions of different classes of stochastic network 
interdiction problems. 
We first focus on static network interdiction games where the attacker attacks 
the network once, which will change the network with certain probability. Then the 
network will maximize the flow from a given source to its destination. The attacker is 
seeking a strategy which minimizes the expected maximum flow after the attack. For 
this problem, we develop a new solution algorithm, based on parsimonious integration 
of branch and bound techniques with increasingly accurate lower bounds. Our method 
obtains solutions significantly faster than previous approaches in the literature. 
In the second part , we study a multi-stage interdiction problem where the attacker 
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can attack the network multiple times, and observe the outcomes of its past attacks 
before selecting a current attack. For this dynamic interdiction game, we use a 
model-predictive approach based on a lower bound approximation. We develop a new 
set of performance bounds, which are integrated into a modified branch and bound 
procedure that extends the single stage approach to multiple stages. We show that 
our new algorithm is faster than other available methods with simulated experiments. 
In the last part, we study the nested information game between an intelligent 
network and an attacker, where the attacker has partial information about the net-
work state, which refers to the availability of arcs. The attacker does not know the 
exact state, but has a probability distribution over the possible network states. The 
attacker makes several attempts to attack the network and observes the flows on the 
network. These observations will update the attacker 's knowledge of the network and 
will be used in selecting the next attack actions. The defender can either send flow 
on that arc if it survived, or refrain from using it in order to deceive the attacker. For 
these problems, we develop a faster algorithm, which decomposes this game into a 
sequence of subgames and solves them to get the equilibrium strategy for the original 
game. Numerical results show that our method can handle large problems which 
other available methods fail to solve. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 
1.1 Network Interdiction Problems 
The problem of network interdiction arises when an attacker, using limited resources , 
tries to reduce the functionality of an intelligent network (also called the defender) 
that can observe the attack and adapt its operations to preserve functionality. Such 
problems have received much attention in recent years due to the interest in many 
contexts such as cyber security, military logistics, anti-drug operations, power distri-
bution and communication networks. In military deployment , the attacker destroys 
the enemy's supply network with physical attacks involving aerial sorties, ground 
troops or cruise missiles . For communication networks , other mechanisms such as 
jamming of receivers or software attacks would be used to reduce functionality. In 
anti-smuggling operations, border police would like to attack the cross-country smug-
gling network to thwart the illegal drugs transportation. The study of this problem 
also helps the prevention of the infection within hospitals (Assimakopoulos, 1987). 
People have been studying network interdiction problems for decades. The famous 
max-flow min-cut problem (Ford and Fulkerson, 1962) can be viewed as the simplest 
version of network interdiction problem where the attacker wants to use least resource 
to cut off the network flow entirely from a source to a destination. Since then, people 
have developed many network interdiction models to emphasize different aspects of 
the problem. These models vary in the objectives of the attacker and the intelligent 
network as well as the ways that the attack can affect the network. 
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One class of models is the minimum detection problem, where the attacker can 
place sensors on arcs to increase the probability of detection while the defender selects 
the path with minimal detection probability after observing the attacker's action. 
Washburn and Wood (Washburn and Wood, 1994) formulated this problem as a two-
person zero-sum game. They showed that the equilibrium mixed strategies for both 
players can be found by solving a minimum-cut problem. Pan et al. (Pan et al. , 
2003) studied an extended model where the source and destination are unknown to 
the attacker. They reformulated it as a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer program 
with recourse and showed the problem is strongly NP-Hard. Morton et al. (Morton 
et al. , 2007) developed a stochastic version of this problem to thwart nuclear smuggling 
where the defender is aware of only a subset of the sensor locations. 
Another class of models is the shortest path network problem, where the defender 
wants to travel on the shortest path between a source and a destination while the 
attacker wants to make this path as long as possible by interdicting network arcs 
using limited resources. Fulkerson and Harding (Fulkerson and Harding, 1977) found 
that when the lengths of arcs can be changed linearly to the interdiction cost, this 
problem is equivalent to a minimum cost flow problem. Israeli and Wood (Israeli and 
Wood, 2002) studied the same problem with binary interdiction and extended it by 
allowing unknown source/ destination pairs. Held et al. (Held et al., 2005) extended 
the model for random networks where the objective is to maximize the probability that 
the minimum path length from a source to a destination exceeds a given threshold. 
They implemented a scenario decomposition method to solve this problem. They also 
described and compared heuristic solution methods for multi-stage versions in (Held 
and Woodruff, 2005). 
In the minimum max-flow problem, the attacker seeks to minimize the maximum 
flow between source(s) / destination(s) by interdicting arcs in the network. An early 
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version was studied in (Wollmer, 1964), where the attacker was allowed to remove 
a fixed number of arcs from the network. Another extension of this model to allow 
removing a fixed number of nodes was considered in (Corley and Chang, 1974). Wood 
(Wood, 1993) showed that under a cardinality constraint on the number of arcs that 
can be interdicted, this problem is NP-Complete in a strong sense. 
Cormican et al. (Cormican et al., 1998) extended the problem from deterministic 
interdiction to stochastic interdiction with binary outcomes after arcs are attacked. 
In this formulation, attacked arcs are destroyed with known probabilities, and the 
defender observes the outcomes of the attack, and then sends flow over the network. 
They developed upper and lower bounds to the value function achieved by the at-
tacker, which were used to construct a sequence of solutions that approach optimal 
attack performance. 
Lim and Smith (Lim and Smith, 2007) studied two multi-commodity problem-
s: one with discrete interdiction and the other with continuous interdiction. They 
proposed an optimal partitioning algorithm along with a heuristic procedure for esti-
mating the optimal objective function value. Akgiin et al. (Akgun et al. , 2011) con-
sidered a deterministic interdiction problem between a set of nodes. They developed 
an exact method, which solves a mixed-integer problem converted from the bi-level 
min-max interdiction problem. They also provided an approximation method that 
partitions the nodes into disjoint subsets such that each node group is in a different 
subset and minimizes the sum of the arc capacities crossing between different subsets. 
The approximation is good in terms of similar post-interdiction flow capacities. 
Many of the above stochastic interdiction problems can be formulated as stochastic 
mixed integer programs. Thus, some randomized algorithms like (Sanchez and Wood, 
2006), (Mak et al., 1999), (Verweij et al., 2003), (Rocco and Ramirez-Marquez, 2009) 
can be used to solve these network interdiction problems. 
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1.2 Problems of Interest 
In many applications, the maximum flow between a source and a destination is more 
important than whether there is a flow between them. For example, in anti-drug 
smuggling, the border police want to reduce the quantity of smuggled drugs. In mili-
tary deployment, we want to decrease enemy's supply as much as possible. Therefore 
we fo cus on minimum max-flow interdiction problems. 
In this thesis, we are investigating three types of network interdiction problems. 
The first problem we consider is the stochastic network interdiction problem where 
an attacker chooses a set of arcs to attack with limited resources, to minimize the 
maximum flow that the network will be able to support after the attack. The outcome 
of the attack is random and binary, i.e., each arc being attacked is either removed 
with a given probability or remains in the network with full capacity. We assume that 
the outcomes are independent across arcs . This stochastic model is more suitable 
for problems where the interdiction result cannot be completely controlled by the 
attacker. 
Numerous methods have been developed to solve this model, like the Sequential 
Approximation Algorithm in (Cormican et al. , 1998) and the Sample Average Ap-
proximation in (Janjarassuk and Linderoth, 2008). However, owing to their compu-
tational complexity, they do not scale well to large problems. Therefore we develop 
a new solution method that integrates the branch and bound techniques with in-
creasingly accurate lower bounds to find the optimal interdiction strategy. Numerical 
experiments show that our method is about two orders of magnitude faster than 
the Sequential Approximation Algorithm. Notice the underlying network in the basic 
model is directed and has a single source and a single destination. To incorporate 
different aspects of real applications, we also extend the model to interdiction prob-
lems on undirected networks, multi-source/ destination networks and networks with 
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uncertain source/ destination. 
The second class of problems that we address is the multi-stage network inter-
diction problem where an attacker can attack multiple times and observe the results 
of its attacks. This is an extension of the previous stochastic network interdiction 
problem which allows the attacker to adapt its next attack(s) based on the observed 
outcomes of previous attacks. There was little work in the literature to emphasize the 
impact of the updated information on sequential attacks. Cormican et al. (Cormican 
et al. , 1998) studied a multiple attack problem in their extended model, but they did 
not allow the attacker to observe the outcomes of its previous attacks, and thus did 
not generate adaptive strategies. 
Our problem formulation is similar to the stochastic resource allocation model 
studied in (Castanon and Wohletz , 2009). We develop a model-predictive approach 
as in (Castanon and Wohletz, 2009). Instead of solving the exact model, we first 
solve a lower bound approximation which allows for non-integer attack allocations in 
the second and subsequent waves, but requires integer allocations in the first stage. 
The optimal solution to the lower bound problem is a binary strategy for the first 
attack. After carrying out that strategy and observing the result, the attacker has 
an interdiction problem with one less stage . . By doing this iteratively, one can gen-
erate binary strategies for all stages. We focus on the two-stage interaction problem 
and develop a new set of performance bounds, which are integrated into a branch 
and bound procedure that extends the single stage approach to multiple stages. We 
extend the model to incorporate the interdiction problems on undirected networks, 
multi-source/destination networks, uncertain source/destination networks and devel-
op solutions for these extended models. 
In the previous problems, the attacker has full information of the network state. 
A third class of problems that we address in this thesis is the interdiction problem 
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where the attacker has only statistical information about the network state, referred 
as partial information. For instance, the attacker may not observe the result of all 
attacks, or the attacker is uncertain about the existence of certain arcs. In these prob-
lems, the attacker may gather information from observing the actions of the network. 
This raises the possibility for the network to deny information to the attacker. 
This problem can be abstracted as a zero-sum game with nested information. 
To find the equilibrium behavior strategy, we adopt the Linear Programming (LP) 
formulation developed in (von Stengel, 1996). Notice the size of the LP problem grows 
exponentially with the number of interactions. To tackle this difficulty, we develop a 
method, which exploits the nested information structure of the game and decomposes 
the multi-stage games into a sequence of one-stage subgames. The method estimates 
the expected payoff of each subgame as a function of its initial belief. We show 
that the original equilibrium strategies can be found by solving these subgames. For 
games with Markov structure, experiments shows that our method is faster than the 
comparable LP approaches in (von Stengel, 1996). For larger problems which the LP 
approach fails to solve, our method can output high quality solutions within a short 
time. 
1.3 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
• For one-stage stochastic network interdiction problems, 
- Developed a new solution method that integrates the branch and bound 
techniques with increasingly accurate lower bounds, which is shown to be 
significantly faster than the previous methods. 
- Extended the model to undirected networks, multi-source/ destination net-
works, uncertain source/ destination networks and developed new solution 
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algorithms for these extended models. 
• For multi-stage network interdiction problems with adaptive strategies 
Proposed a new formulation to address the problem where the attacker can 
adapt its next actions based on the observed outcomes of previous attacks. 
Developed a model-predictive approach and extend our previous method 
to solve this problem. Numerical experiments show that our method is the 
fastest among all available methods. 
- Extended the model to undirected networks, multi-source/ destination net-
works, uncertain source/ destination networks and developed new solution 
algorithms for these extended models. 
• For network interdiction problems with nested-information 
- Proposed a game-theoretic model to address the problem where the at-
tacker has partial information about the network state and the network 
may refrain from using available arcs to deceive the attacker. 
- Developed a subgame decomposition method which decomposes the multi-
stage games into a sequence of one-stage subgames by exploring the nested 
information structure, and finds the original equilibrium strategies by solv-
ing these subgames. 
- Improved the computation efficiency exponentially for games with Markov 
structure. Experiments shows that our method is faster than the compa-
rable LP approach in (von Stengel, 1996). More important, our method 
can handle large problems which the LP approach fails to solve. 
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1.4 Dissertation Overview 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces relevant background results that provide the foundation for 
our results in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 3 introduces and formulates the stochastic network interdiction problem. 
In this chapter we develop our new solutions and provide numerical examples to 
illustrate the efficiency of our method, compared with previous results. 
Chapter 4 extends the model in chapter 3 to undirected networks, multi-source 
j destination networks, uncertain source/ destination networks and provides solutions 
to those models. In the numerical section, we implemented our method to solve 
interdiction problems on a real power grid, IEEE 300 Bus System, which is formulated 
as an undirected multi-source/ destination flow network. 
In chapter 5, we study the multi-stage interdiction model with information up-
date. We solve the problem in a model-predictive approach with our extended branch 
and bound algorithm. In the numerical experiments, we show that our method is the 
fastest among all available methods. We also extend the model to undirected net-
works, multi-source/ destination networks, uncertain source/ destination networks and 
developed new solution algorithms for these extended models. 
In chapter 6, we study dynamic interdiction games where the attacker has partial 
information about the network state. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game 
with nested information. To find the equilibrium, we develop an algorithm, which 
decomposes the multi-stage games into a sequence of one-stage subgames and finds 
the equilibrium strategy by solving these subgames through backward and forward 
dynamic programming. 
In chapter 7, we study games with Markov structures. By exploiting these struc-
tures, we reduce the computation of the subgame decomposition method exponen-
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tially. Numerical experiments shows t hat our method is several orders of magnitude 
faster than the comparable LP approaches in (von Stengel, 1996) . For larger problems 
where the LP approach fails to solve, our method can output high quality solutions 
within a short time. 
In chapter 8, we summarize this dissertation and provide potential directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
This chapter provides background for the work in this dissertation. It includes the 
Sequential Approximation Algorithm for Stochastic Network Interdiction Problems in 
Section 2.1, the L-Shaped decomposition method in Section 2.2, the Sample Average 
Approximation in Section 2.3. We also introduce the extensive form games and its 
linear programming formulation in Section 2.4, as well as the Point-Based Value 
Iteration method for POMDP in Section 2.5 , both of which are essential to our work 
on the Dynamic Games with Nested information. 
2.1 Stochastic Network Interdiction 
Cormican et al. (Cormican et al., 1998) studied the stochastic network interdiction 
problems where the attacker interdicts the network to minimize the expected max-
flow after the interdiction, the outcome of which is stochastic. They developed the 
Sequential Approximation Algorithm to solve these problems. The model there is 
essentially the same as that in chapter 3, where we develop a new algorithm, 2 to 3 
orders of magnitude faster than their method. 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with nodes N and arcs A, together with 
an identified source node s and a terminal node t. Each arc ( i, j) E A has an initial 
capacity uij. Let ( t , s) be an artificial return arc from t to s with infinite capacity and 
A := AU { ( t , s)}. Let Xij be the flow on arc ( i, j) and Xts, the flow on the artificial 
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Figure 2·1: The interdiction problem on a. directed flow network. The 
numbers associated with each arc are the capacity of tha.t arc and the 
probability of removing that arc if it's under attack. The defender 'ivill 
send flows from s to t after the attack. 
arc (1, .s), be the total flow from 8 to t. Then the max-flow problem is 
rnax:£t5 , 
'r E)( 
where :r E X means that :r ?: 0, satisfies the conditional capacity constraints 
and the flow conservation constraints 
L Tni- L :Cjn = 0, Vn EN. 
(n,i)EA (i,n )EA 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2 .3) 
Notice that the maxinnnn flow through the network can be increased by at most one 
unit by increasing the capacity of an arc by one unit, therefore, we have 
Lemma 2.1.1 Th e dual variables associated with constr-aints (2.2) are bo·unded by 1. 
Denote the availabilities of arcs within the network (referred as the network state) as 
a lA !-dimension binary vector w with W;j = 1 meaning arc ( i, j) is not available and 
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Wij = 0 otherwise, then the max-flow problem given a network state w is 
h(w) := maxx20 Xts 
L.: (n,i)EA Xni - L.:(j,n)EA Xjn = 0, 'tfn E N. 
Define a penalty flow problem given a network state w as 
s.t. Xij ~ uij, 'tf(i,j) EA. 
L.: (n,i)EA Xni - L.: (j,n)EA Xjn = 0, 'tfn E N. 
Theorem 2.1.2 (Cormican et al., 1998) For any wE {0, 1}1AI, h(w) = g(w). 
Proof: Denote A*(w) = {(i,j) E Alwij = 1}, then h(w) is the maximum flow 
problem (2.1) with the additional constraints 
Xij ~ 0, 't/(i,j) E A*(w). (2.4) 
For any n EN, (i , j) E A, let aij, 1fn, /1ij be the dual variables corresponding to the 
constraints of (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) respectively. Then the dual problem of h(w) is 
s.t. 1ft- 1f5 ~ 1, 
a .. + 1r·- 1r· > 0 't/(i J.) E A- A*(w) 
'J ' J - ' ' 
aij + 1ri- 1fj + /1ij ~ 0, 't/(i,j) E A*(w) 
aij, /1ij ~ 0, 't/( i, j) E A. 
Denote the optimal primal and dual solution to h(w) as (x*, 1r*, a*, p,*). If we can 
show (x* , 1r*, a*) is also the optimal primal and dual solution to g(w), then the proof 
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will be completed. Notice the feasible set in g( w) contains the feasible set in h( w), 
then x* is feasible in g(w). Furthermore, by strong duality (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 
2004), we have 
Therefore we just need to show the feasibility of (1r*, a*) in the dual problem of g(w), 
which is 
s.t. 1ft- 1f8 2: 1, 
aij + ?ri- Kj 2: 0, V(i,j) E A- A*(w) 
aij + ?ri- Kj 2: -1, V(i,j) E A*(w) 
aij 2: 0, V(i,j) EA. 
In fact , the dual constraints associated with ( i, j) E A - A* are identical in both 
hD(w) and gD(w). The remaining difference is that for hD(w) 
* - * * * > 0 w(. .) A* ( ) · ?ri 1rj + aij + /-Lij _ , v z, J E w , (2.5) 
while for gD(w) 
(2.6) 
By lemma 2.1.1, we have /-L;j ::; 1. Therefore any (1r*, a*) satisfying (2.5) must satisfy 
(2.6). Therefore ( 7r* , a*, f-L*) is also the optimal primal and dual solution to g(w). • 
Denote the attacking strategy as a IAI-dimension binary vector 1 where /ij = 1 
means attacking arc ( i, j) and /ij = 0 otherwise. When arc ( i, j) is attacked, it 
requires resource cij, and with probability Pij, the attack will be successful, i. e . wij = 
1. We assume that the outcomes of attacks on different arcs will be independent , 
and that the interdictor has a budget of R that constraints the attack. Then the 
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interdiction problem is 
where 
w* := min E[h(!' ·I)], 
!'Er(R)b 
r(R)b := {I I L Cij/ij :::; R , /ij E {0, 1}} 
ij 
(2 .7) 
is the set of feasible binary strategies and I is a IAI-dimension binary random vector 
where the probability of Iij = 1 is given by Pij. Since h(w) is equal to g(w) for any 
binary w , (2.7) is equivalent to 
w** := min E [g (!' ·I)], 
!'Er(R)b 
meaning that w* = w** and both problems have the same optimal solution. 
(2.8) 
When relaxing w from wE {0,1}IAI tow E [0,1]1AI, we will show that h(w) is 
concave and g(w) is convex. 
Lemma 2.1.3 h(w) is concave on wE [0, 1] IAI_ 
Proof: For any wl, w2 E [0, 1JIAI, let X 8 be an optimal solution to h(w8 ), s = 1, 2, 
then we have 
Since for any (i,j) E A, x7j :S Uij(1- w~) , k = 1, 2, then 
which is the capacity constraint in h()...w1 + (1 - )...)w2 ). Moreover, )...x}j + (1 - )...)xij 
satisfies flow conservation since xk, k = 1, 2 satisfy flow conservation, then )...x 1 + (1-
)...)x2 is a feasible solution in h()...w1 + (1 - )...)w2). Notice h(w) is maximizing over x, 
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then 
So h(w) is concave on wE [0 , 1]IAI. • 
Lemma 2.1.4 g(w) is convex on wE [0, 1]1AI. 
Proof: For any w1 , w2 E [0, 1]1AI, .\ E [0, 1], let x be an optimal solution to 
g(.\w1 + (1- .\)w2 ), then 
=Xts - 2:).Xw}1 + (1 - .\)wJ1)xij 
ij 
=A(xts - 2.:wf1xi1) + (1- .\)(xts- 2.:wi1xi1) 
ij ij 
The last inequality is because g(w) maximizes on w and x is feasible in both g(w 1 ) 
Theorem 2.1.5 
min g(r · E[I])::; w*::; min h(1 · E[I]) . 
-yE r(R)b -yEr(R)b 
Proof Since h(w) is concave, by Jensen's Inequality (Jensen, 1906), 
E[h( 1 ·I)] ::; h( 1 · E[I]), 
take the minimization over 1 on both sides, we have 
w* ::; min h(r · E[I]). 
-yH(R)b 
• 
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Similarly, one can use the convexity of g(w) and Jensen's Inequality to show 
min g("' · E[I]) ::; w*. 
)'Er(R)b 
• 
Theorem 2.1.5 states that (2.7) and (2.8) are upper and lower bounds for the origi-
nal problem (2.7). Compared with problem (2.7), the size of the lower bound problem 
is exponentially smaller since it only considers the expected outcome. Due to strong 
duality, one can replace g( ·) with its dual in the lower bound problem mi~Er(R)b g( 'Y · 
E[I]) , which then becomes a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem. 
Definition 2.1.6 A partition ofD, denoted as <I>, is a set of subsets { ¢J ojD, such 
that <Pi n ¢] = 0 if i =I j; and Ui¢i = D. 
The gap between these bounds can be improved by taking finer and finer partitions 
on the domain of random variable I, as shown next. Given <I>, define 
LBMIN(<I>) := min LP(¢) g(p(¢) · "f), 
'I'Er(R)b 
¢E<P 
where P( ¢) is the probability of subset ¢ and 
p( ¢ )ij := E[Iij II E ¢], V( i, j) E A 
Denote the approximate value of a binary strategy 'Y given <I> as 
UB(i!!, 'Y) := L P(¢) h(p(¢). "f) . 
</>E<P 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
Definition 2.1.7 Let <I>\ <I> 2 be two partitions of D. <I> 2 is said to be more refined 
than if! 1 , denoted <I> 1 ::; <I> 2 , if and only if 
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T heorem 2.1.8 Let 1'> 1 , 1'>2 be two partitions of 0. If 1'>1 :::; 1'> 2 , then 
Proof: For any"(, 
L P(q})g(p(¢2) . 'Y) = L P(¢1) L ~~:~))g(p(¢2). "f). 
(p2Ei1?2 ¢1E<I>l ¢2c¢1 
Because g(·) is convex, by Jensen's Inequality, we have 
L P(¢2)g(p(¢2). 'Y) ~ L P(¢l)g( L ~((:~))p(¢2). 'Y) 
¢2Ecp2 ¢1E<I>l ¢2c¢1 
= L P(¢l)g(p(¢1). "f). 
¢1Ecpl 
Take the minimization over 'Y on both sides, we have 
Similarly, using the concavity of h(·) and Jensen's Inequality, one can show 
• 
To solve LBMIN(<I>) , one can replace g(w) with its dual gD(w) and convert 
LBMIN(<I>) to a MILP problem. 
The idea behind the Sequential Approximation Algorithm (SAA) in (Cormican 
et al. , 1998) is to create a sequence of finer and finer partitions until the gap between 
the lower and upper bounds is less than a positive tolerance E. SAA algorithm is 
summarized in Procedure (1). 
There are two steps in SAA's partitioning subroutine. The first one is Selecting a 
cell to subdivide where the method calculates the gap for each cell of current partition 
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Procedure 1 Sequential Approximation Algorithm(SAA) 
1: Let~= {D}, U* = inf and L* = 0. 
2: Solve LBMIN(~), denote the optimal value as L* and the solution as -r. 
3: if U* - L * :::::; E then 
4: Output solution 1* and terminate. 
5: end if 
6: Evaluate U' := U B(~, -r). 
7: if U' < U* then 
8: Update 1* ~ -r and U* ~ U'. 
9: end if 
10: if U* - L * :::::; E then 
11: Output solution 1* and terminate. 
12: end if 
13: Refine partition ~ according to partition procedure described below and go to 
Step 2. 
with current binary solution -r 
D(¢, -r) := p(¢)[h(p(¢) · -r) - g(p(¢) · -r)J, V¢ E ~ ' 
and selects the cell with the largest D(¢, -r), denoted as¢. The second step is Subdi-
viding on arcs within the cell. Denote the set of arcs that do not have fixed outcomes 
within¢ as 
A((/;):= A- {(i ,j) IIij 0, or Iij = 1, VJij E (/;}. 
Initially A((/;) = A since ¢ = D is the unique cell in the initial partition {D} and 
D has no fixed outcome on any arc. The partition on ¢ is restricted in A((/;). The 
method estimates the gaps as if splitting¢ on any arc (i,j) in A((/;). Let ¢?j(¢), ¢L(¢) 
be the two new cells resulting from splitting¢ on arc (i , j), i.e. , 
then the new gap between bounds in ¢ is 
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Let (i *,j*) be the arc that has the minimum Dij· Then SAA splits J; on arc (i*,j*), 
which yields the new partition for the next iteration. Notice in each iteration, SAA 
only splits one old cell and keep others the same. Therefore the new partition has 
one more cell than the one in the previous iteration. 
Our algorithm developed in chapter 3 improves SAA in two aspects: (1) solving 
the approximation problem and (2) refining partitions, which will be discussed in 
details in section 3. 2. 
2.2 L-Shaped Decomposition 
Problem (2 . 7) has the structure of a two-stage decision problem, where the first stage 
is the binary strategy "(, which is made before the observation of the random outcome 
and the second one is the network flows after the outcome. Bender's Decomposition 
(Benders, 1962) , or the 1-Shaped method (Slyke and R.J.Wets, 1969) when it applies 
to stochastic linear programming problems, is suitable in solving linear problems 
with such stochastic structure. This method is a basic subroutine in our algorithms 
developed for both the one-stage problem and the two-stage problem in chapter 3 to 
chapter 5. 
Consider the stochastic network interdiction problem of (2.8) 
min E[g('Y · J)] = L P(I)g('Y ·I), 
-yH (R)b I 
(2.11) 
where P(I) is the probability of scenario I. The method decomposes (2.11) into a 
master problem (2. 12) and a set of subproblems (2. 13) 
rmn z , 
('Y ,z )EF 
(2. 12) 
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where F := f (R)b Q9 R with Q9 as Cartesian product; 
(2.13) 
where x satisfies the flow conservation constraints (2.3) and the capacity constraints 
(2.2). In the master problem (2 .11) , the initial feasible set is F = f (R)b Q9 R. The 
1-Shaped method solves the master problem and checks its solution with subproblems 
(2.13). Based on the optimal solutions of t he subproblems, it constructs an additional 
effective constraint for the master problem. By repeating above procedure iteratively, 
t he 1-Shaped method finds an optimal solution which makes all subproblems feasible 
and bounded. The det ails are shown in Procedure 2 where E is a positive tolerance. 
Procedure 2 1-Shaped Decomposition 
1: Solve (2. 12), denote the optimal solution as ('-y*, z* ). 
2: For any I , solve (2.13), let x i be the optimal solution. 
3: Check the inequality 'EI P(I ) [x{s - 'E (i,j)EA I i]rijx{j ] :::; z* + E. 
4: if the inequality is false then 
5: Update the feasible set in the master problem with the additional constraint 
I (i,j)EA I 
6: Go to Step 1. 
7: end if 
8: Output 1* as the optimal solution, z* as the optimal value of (2. 11). 
By replacing I: I P(I)g( 1 · I) with z in the objective function and adding a con-
straint z 2: LI P(I)g(r · I) , problem (2. 11) can be transformed to an equivalent 
problem. One can find that any solution in the feasible set of the transformed prob-
lem must be an solution in F and satisfies the additional constraints in iterations. 
Since both minimization problems have the same objective function z, the one with 
larger feasible set is the lower bound of the other problem. Therefore, we have 
Proposition 2.2.1 In each iteration, z* is the lower bound of (2. 11) . 
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Denote U as U := LI P(I)[x{s- L (i ,j) EA Iij/';jx{j], because l'ij is a feasible solution 
to a minimization problem (2.11) and U is its objective value, then 
Proposition 2.2.2 In each iteration, U is the upper bound of (2.11). 
Since z* is the lower bound and U is the upper of the optimal value of (2.11), then 
Proposition 2.2.3 IJU < z*+E, then z* is the optimal value of (2 .11) with tolerance 
E and /'* is the corresponding solution. 
An alternative decomposition is to decompose the original problem into a set of 
subproblems of (2. 13) and following master problem 
(2.14) 
where F := r(R)b ® Rn with n is the total number of subproblems. In each iteration, 
let the optimal solution of the master problem be (!'* , { z*I } ). For each subproblem, 
check whether 
I - '"""' I · . * I < *I ~ Xts D ~J I'ijxij - z + 
n (i,j)EA 
is valid. Once an invalid inequality is found , add the following constraint to the 
master problem and start the next iteration 
x{s :S: L (Iijx{jhij + zi. 
(i ,j)EA 
With similar deduction as for the original 1-Shaped decomposition, one can show that 
the alternative decomposition also yields the optimal solution to Problem (2.11). 
The inequality that we check within each iteration is called the Optimality In-
equality, which checks whether the current solution of the master problem is (ap-
proximately) the optimal solution of the original problem. When implemented for 
general stochastic programming problems, there is an additional inequality for each 
subproblem, called the Feasibility Inequality, which checks whether the subproblem 
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is feasible based on the current solution of the master problem. However , in our case, 
(2.13) is always feasible and bounded for any values of 1* E r (R). Therefore we can 
omit the feasibility check in our implementation. 
Note that in the decomposition method, 1 and I are not required to be binary. In 
fact , in some implementations in the rest of this dissertation, 1 and I are fractional 
variables. 
2.3 Sample Average Approximation 
The stochastic interdiction problem formulated before is essentially a two-stage s-
tochastic mixed-integer program (SMIP) having discrete first-stage variables (the bi-
nary interdiction strategy) , and continuous second-stage variables (the flows on arcs). 
Sanchez and Wood (Sanchez and Wood, 2006) proposed a "BEST" algorithm for gen-
eral SMIP problems which uses Monte Carlo techniques to deal with the difficulty 
arising from the problem size, due to the exponential number of outcomes in stochas-
tic problems. Janjarassuk and Jeff (Janjarassuk and Linderoth, 2008) tailored this 
method to stochastic network interdiction problems. 
Consider a stochastic network interdiction problem 
(2. 15) 
Since the number of outcomes of I grows exponentially with the number of arcs, 
the size of the problem is exponentially large. The Sample Average Approximation 
Approach (SAM) first solves M approximation problems. Each of them considers N 
independently sampled scenarios. For problem m, m = 1, ... , M, denote the sampled 
scenarios as I;: , n = 1, . .. , N, then t he approximation problem is 
(2.16) 
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With the decomposition techniques introduced before, SAM solves this problem as a 
mixed-integer programming (MIP) problem. Denote its solution and optimal value 
as "r, Lm respectively. Let 1*, w* be the optimal solution and the optimal value of 
(2.15). 
Proposition 2.3.1 Let L := ~ 2::::~=1 Lm, which is a random value due to the ran-
dom samples of r: ' then 
E[L] ::; w*. 
Proof By definition, we have 
M N 
E[L] = ~ L E[~ L9(rm · J:)J. 
m = 1 n = 1 
Notice that 1m is the optimal solution to (2.16) , then 
1 N 1 N 
E[N Lg(rm · J:)J::; E[N Lg(r* · J:)J = E[g(r* ·I)], 
n = 1 n=1 
where the last equation is because 1: are i.i.d. Therefore E[L] ::; E[g(r* ·I)] = w* . 
• 
After solving these approximation problems, SAM has M solutions, denoted as 
{ /m }t1 . Then it evaluates the performances of these solutions by a set of random 
sampled scenarios {Ie }~=1 . For any /m, m = 1, ... , M , define its approximation 
objective value based on {Ie }~= 1 as 
Proposition 2.3.2 Let U := fv1 2::::~=1 um, which is a random value due to the ran-
dom samples of Ie, then 
E[U] ?:: w*. 
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Proof: By definition, 
1 M E 
E[U] =ME LLE[g(rm. fe)]. 
m=l e=l 
Notice that 1: are i.i.d, and ry* is the optimal solution to (2.15), then 
therefore E[U] ~ E[g( ry* ·I)] = w*. • 
SAM selects the solution with the minimum um as the output. In SAM, the 
samples in {I;;n}:,:-=1 can be reused in {Ie }~=l and E is usually much larger than N. 
SAM provides a lower bound L and the upper bounds U in statistical sense. For 
either bound, it can also estimate the range of the bound with a given confidence level 
according to the Student 's t-test. However, due to its random nature, it's possible 
that L > U. Therefore we would use L , U as measures of the estimation quality 
rather than a stopping criteria. 
We will show with numerical results that our algorithm not only guarantees opti-
mality but is also faster than the Sample Average Approximation. 
2.4 Games in Extensive Form 
From a game-theoretic approach, the network interdiction problem can be formulated 
as a zero-sum game between the attacker and the network. To better represent the 
dynamics in the multi-interaction problems, we use extensive form games. 
Generally speaking, a game consists of three elements: players , actions and payoffs. 
Payoffs are functions of the game's outcome (or ending), which is a combination of 
players' actions that leads to the outcome. Each player tries to maximize its payoff 
by choosing its actions (called strategy). A game can be single-stage where all players 
act once at the same time, or multi-stage where players act at different times. 
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An extensive form is a directed tree where a node represents a state of the game 
(denoted by a history of players' past actions) while an edge represents a player's 
action on that state (the starting node) which leads the game develop into the next 
state. The leaf nodes are the outcomes of the game, which are associated with players' 
payoffs. Each non-leaf node (also call eli a decision node) belongs to exactly one player, 
who will act on that node. 
Definition 2.4.1 In an extensive form game, a sequence, defined by a node of the 
game tree, is a string of actions from the root to that node. A subsequence of 
player X , is the subsequence (of that node) that contains all the actions belonging 
to player X. 
Definition 2.4.2 A play is a sequence corresponding to a leaf node in the game tree, 
i.e. , a play represents a path of the game from start to end. 
If the game has n players , then each play is associated with an n-dimension tuple, 
representing the payoffs to these players. If the randomness (if any) within a game is 
considered as an action of player Nature, then Nature has no payoff. 
Definition 2.4.3 An information set is a set of non-leaf nodes in the extensive 
form, such that 
• All nodes within the set belong to the same player; 
• That player can NOT tell the difference between nodes within that set; 
• That player can distinguish nodes within that set from its other nodes outside 
that set. 
For the class of games considered in this thesis, information sets will arise because of 
partial knowledge of players' past actions. Because a player can not tell the difference 
of nodes within an information set, its actions on these nodes must be the same. 
Therefore, we say a player acts on an information set instead of an individual node. 
Fig. 2.4 is the extensive form of a simple stochastic network interdiction game, 
where the underlying network has two arcs that are uncertain and interdictable. First, 
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Nature (the top square) selects the network states ( 4 solid nodes in the second line). 
The availabilities of arcs are represented by two binary digits with 1 being available 
and 0 otherwise. For example, 01 is the network state where only the second arc is 
available. Nature's action is denoted as s~1 , ij = 00, 01, 10, 11 where s~1 means Nature 
selects network state ij. Then the attacker acts, represented by solid arrows starting 
from the nodes in the second line. Since the attacker does not know the exact network 
state, its information set (the ellipse in the second line) contains all s~1 . The attacker 
can detect either the first arc (left arrow, denoted as ai) or the second arc (right 
arrow, denoted as a~). Then the network acts, represented by dashed arrows. Notice 
the network is assumed to kno-¢ the network state, therefore its information sets all 
contain one single node. It can either send a flow on the detected arc if it's available 
(left arrow, denoted as di) or no flow (right arrow, denoted as d6). For some network 
states when the detected arc is available, no flow means the network refrains from 
using that arc. At last the attacker acts again. Its information sets are the ellipses 
in the fourth line. Since it does not know the network state, it can not tell the 
difference between nodes within each ellipse. The corresponding substrings for these 
information sets (from left to right) are [ai, d6J, [ai, df], [a~, d6J, [a~, df] respectively. 
The attack is represented by solid arrows starting from the fourth line. The attacker 
can attack either the first arc (left arrow, denoted as af) or the second arc (right 
arrow, denoted as a~). Then the game ends. A play of the game is a leaf node in the 
tree, represented by a sequence of actions. For example, all nodes in the fifth line are 
plays, where the second one can be represented by [s81 , ai, d~ , a~]. 
Let JX,s denote the information sets of player X, where s is an index of the 
information sets. 
Definition 2.4.4 A strategy of a player X, denoted as sx, is a function of player 
X 's information sets such that it maps each JX,s into an admissible action for player 
X at any of the nodes in JX ,s. 
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Figure 2·2: The extensive form of a network interdiction game. 
Strategies can be in one of three forms: pure strategies, behavior strategies and mixed 
strategies. In pure strategies, players act deterministically at all information sets. 
Definition 2.4.5 A mixed strategy is a strategy that the player selects a pure s-
trategy randomly according to a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. 
In behavior strategies, players act randomly with a given distribution on possible 
actions at each information set. Let A(JX,s) be the set of possible actions on the 
information set JX,s and D(Ix,s) be the set of probability distributions on A(IX,s). 
Definition 2.4.6 A behavior strategy of player X , denoted as Bx , is a strategy 
such that for any Ix ,s, Ex (Ix ,s) is an element in D(Ix,s) with B; (Ix,s) for any 
a E A(Ix,s) being the probability of taking action a at JX,s. 
The difference between mixed strategies and behavior strategies is that in the former, 
players ' actions are correlated between information sets while in the latter they are 
independent. 
Players' strategies affect the development of a game, including its final endings 
and the associated payoffs to these players. 
Definition 2.4. 7 The total (expected if any randomness is involved) payoff of a play-
er X is a function of all players' strategies, which can be denoted as px (S1 , S2 , ... , sn), 
where sn is player n 's strategy. 
Given the strategies of all players, one can calculate the distribution of the plays 
in a game. Then the total payoff to a player is the expected payoff based on this 
distribution and the player 's payoffs in all plays. 
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Definition 2.4.8 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies Sh, S 2*, ... , sm, such 
that no player gets a better payoff by unilaterally changing its strategy. That is, for 
any player X= 1, ... , n, 
x(sh sx* sn*) > x(sh sx sn*) \..lsx p , ... , ,. 0 . , _p , 0 0 0 , ,. 0 0 , , v 0 
There is much work in the game theory literature on finding Nash equilibria. von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) showed that 
Theorem 2.4.9 For any zero-sum game with a finite set of actions, there exists a 
Nash equilibrium in terms of mixed-strategies. 
Definition 2.4.10 Two strategies of a player are called realization equivalent if 
and only if for any fixed strategies of other players, both strategies define the same 
probabilities for reaching nodes in the extensive form tree. 
If two strategies are realization equivalent, for any strategies of other players, they 
yield the same distribution of the outcomes of the game, thus the same payoff values 
to players. Obviously any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a special behavior 
strategy where at each state the player selects one action with 100% probability. Given 
a combination of all players' behavior strategies, one can calculate the distribution of 
outcomes and find a convex combination of all player's pure strategies that yields the 
same distribution. In this sense, any behavior strategy is realization equivalent to a 
mixed strategy. The inverse is not necessary true for general games. 
Definition 2.4.11 A player is said to have Perfect Recall if and only if it knows 
what it knew (this f eature is called perfect memory) and what it did in previous 
stages. 
The feature of Perfect recall contains two meanings (Okada, 1987): each player knows 
what it knew and what it did in previous stages. Most games fall into the category 
where all players have perfect recall, including the problems that we're studying. For 
games with such features, we have following result 
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Theorem 2.4.12 (Kuhn, 1950) For a game where all players have perfect recall, any 
mixed strategy is realization equivalent to a behavior strategy. 
By theorem 2.4.12, one can find an equilibrium in terms of behavior strategies rather 
than mixed strategies. 
Consider a N player game, given players' behavior strategies Bn, n = 1, ... , N, 
for any sequence s, denote the sequence of player n as sn where sn C s, then the 
probability of s is 
n=l aEsn 
where r• is the information set where player n takes action a E sn c s, thus it 's on 
the path of sequence s. 
Let P be the set of plays in the game, and cn(p) for any pEP be player n's payoff 
when the game ends at p , then player n's objective is to maximize 
N L II II B~ (Ik' )ck(p) (2.17) 
pEP k= l aEsk 
over its behavior strategy Bn. 
Notice (6.3) is a complex function of B n. von Stengel (von Stengel, 1996) devel-
oped the sequence form formulation for games with perfect recall, where finding the 
equilibrium of a two-person zero-sum game is equivalent to solving a linear program 
(LP) problem with the size proportional to the size of the extensive form tree. We 
will show this result in the rest of this section. 
Definition 2.4.13 A realization plan of player n, denoted as rn, zs a mappzng 
-+ from the set of its sequences sn to IR , such that 
rn(s~) = 1; L rn(sn) = rn(s~) , Vs~ E sn (2 .18) 
a:sn= [s;,,a] 
where s~ is player n 's first information set(s) and sn = [s~ , a] means the sequence sn 
is extended by sequence s~ with a. 
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Given player n 's behavior strategy En, one can calculate rn(s) as, 
rn(s) :=II E~(r•), Vs E sn. (2 .19) 
aEs 
For games with perfect recall, within each information set, there is a common subse-
quence corresponding to that player 's previous actions reaching to (all nodes of) that 
set. Denote r ,sn as an information set with such subsequence sn, then by (2.19) , 
aEA(Jn,sn) a'EA(In ,sn) 
Since the above equation is true for any r ,sn, then rn ( s) calculated by ( 2.19) is a 
realization plan. That is , in a perfect recall game, given a player 's behavior strategy, 
one can calculate the corresponding realization plan by (2.19). The reverse is not 
true for general games, because an information set in a non-perfect-recall game may 
not have the common subsequence representing the player's previous actions to that 
set. However , for games with perfect recall, we have 
Theorem 2.4.14 (von Stengel, 1996) For games with perfect recall, any realization 
plan arises from a suitable behavior strategy. 
Proof: For any realization plan rn satisfying (2 .18), we can define En recur-
sively such that for any s~ E Sn 
otherwise B~(In, s;_.) 2: 0 with 
aEA(Jn ,s:,) 
By the above formula and (2.18), for any s' E sn, we have 
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Notice B~(In,s') 2: 0, therefore Bn(In,s') is a distribution on r ,s' . Since this is true 
for all r,s E I n, then E n is a behavior strategy. • 
By theorem 2.4.14, finding the equilibrium behavior strategies is equivalent to 
finding the corresponding realization plans since with the realization plans, one can 
construct the corresponding behavior strategies via the equations within theorem 
2.4.14. 
In a two-person zero-sum game, denote the players as X , Y and c as the payoff 
to player X. Let x, y be player X 's realization plan and player Y 's realization plan 
respectively, with their probability conservation constraints denoted as Ex = e and 
Fy = f, then player X is to 
maxmin L x(p )y(p)c(p), 
xEX yEY 
pEP 
(2.20) 
and player Y is to 
min max L x(p)y(p)c(p) , 
yEY xE X 
pEP 
(2.21 ) 
where X := { xjx 2: 0, E x = e}, Y := {yjy 2: 0, Fy = f} and Pis the set of the game's 
play. Notice the objective function is a bilinear function on x, y , we can denote it as 
x'Cy with C derived from c(p) for all p E P. By replacing the inner optimization 
problems with their duals in (2.20) and (2 .21 ) respectively, (2.20) and (2.21) can 
be converted to LP problems, which have the same optimal value by strong duality. 
Then we have 
Theorem 2.4.15 (von Stengel, 1996) The equilibria of a zero-sum game in extensive 
form with perfect recall are the optimal primal and dual solutions of a linear program 
whose size, in sparse representation, is linear in the size of the game tree. 
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2.5 Point-Based Value Iteration 
Point-Based Value Iteration (PBVI) is an approximation method for Partially Ob-
servable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which is a generalized Markov Decision 
Processes with partially observed states of the system. A POMDP consists the fol-
lowing elements 
S: the (finite) set of states, 
A: the set of discrete actions, 
0: the set of observations providing incomplete/ noisy information, 
b0 : the distribution on S. For any s E S, b0 ( s) is the probability of initial state s. 
T: the conditional probability of st+1 given st and at. 
T(s , a, s') := Prob(st+l = s'iat =a, st = s). 
S1: the conditional probability of observing d given st and at. 
Sl(o, s,a) := Prob(d = oiat = a,st = s). 
R: the reward given state s and action a, R(s, a) . 
r: the discount factor of the reward. 
With a finite number of stages T , a POMDP can be taken as an extensive form 
game between a decision maker and Nature, who controls the randomness in that 
process. The payoff to the decision maker is the (discounted if any) sum of periodic 
rewards R( s, a) and the decision maker tries to maximize this payoff. A sequence in a 
POMDP is a string of states st, actions at and observations d before that node. Since 
the decision maker can not see the state directly, its information set before taking 
action at is 
I t [ 1 1 t-1 t - 1] := a , o , ... , a , o . 
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A strategy in a POMDP is a mapping from these information sets It into an admissible 
action at these sets. Since the number of the information sets grows exponentially 
with the number of stages, the number of possible mappings is very large, which is 
called the curse of history. To handle this difficulty, it has been shown that there 
is a sufficient statistic, called the belief state, defined as the distribution over S 
conditioned on previous observations and actions 
which can be updated to incorporate the latest action a and observation o 
bt(s') := TJrl(o, s', a) LT(s, a, s')bt-1(s) 
sES 
where 'TJ is a normalizing factor that makes bt ( s') as a probability distribution. Since 
belief states are sufficient statistics, the strategy of a POMDP at time t can be 
restricted to be a ftmction of the current belief state. Notice the dimension of the 
belief state is constant over time, the strategy of a POMDP becomes trackable. Given 
the strategy, one can derive the realization probabilities of all plays. Then the total 
payoff to the decision maker is the expected payoffs of all plays according to that 
distribution. Let Vt(b) be the expected payoff function given the current belief is b 
and the sequential strategies are all optimized, then this value function can be defined 
recursively by 
Vt(b) :=max"""" R(s, a)b(s) + 1T(b, a, b')Vt+l(b) . at~ 
sES 
Denote the optimal solution of the above problem as at*, then the optimal strategy 
maps the belief state b into action at* at time t. 
Theorem 2.5.1 (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973) For POMDPs with discrete-time and 
finite actions, observations and horizon, the optimal payoff function is a piecewise-
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linear, convex fun ction on the belief of the current state. 
Given a belief state b at current stage t and the set of support vectors Qt+1 of the 
next stage value function Vt+1 (-), then the value function of current stage is 
vt(b) =max["' R(s , a) b(s) + 'Y ""' max ""'LT(s, a, s')D(o, s' , a)q(s')b(s) ]. 
a EA L__. L__. qEQt+ l L__. 
sES oEO sES s'ES 
(2.22) 
Sondik et al. (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973) proposed a single-pass value-iteration 
method, which decomposes the multiple stages into a set of single-stage decision prob-
lems and then implements backward induction to find the set of support vectors st age 
by stage. This method was further improved by numerous researches in (Monahan, 
1982), (Kaelbling et al. , 1998) , (Cheng, 1988) . To improve these algorithms ' efficien-
cy, Pineau et al. (Pineau et al., 2003) argued that the inefficiency is due to the curse 
of history, i.e. the number of histories grow exponentially with the number of stages. 
They proposed a Point-Based Value Iteration solution which approximately estimates 
the payoff function by selecting a small set of representative belief points and then 
tracking the value and its derivative for those points only. Procedure 3 summarizes 
the PBVI algorithm. In this method, Pineau et al. (Pineau et al., 2003) provided an 
error bound for the approximation solution, which depends on the gap between the 
maximum and minimum rewards, and the maximum distance to the nearest neighbor 
in the belief space. 
In chapter 6, we will extend this algorithm for the solut ion of zero-sum games 
with nested imperfect information. 
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Procedure 3 PBVI to evaluate Qt based on Qt+1 
Select a finite set of beliefs B := {bi}r=o 
Initiate Qt +- 0. 
for each bi do 
Solve (2 .22), denote the optimal action as ai, and the support vector in QH1 
corresponding to each o as qf~ 1 . 
, 
Calculate the support vector Qi for bi by 
Qi(s) := R(s, ai) + r 2.:::2.::: T(s, ai, s')O(o, s', ai)qf;1(s'), '1/s E S. 
Add Qi to Q. 
end for 
Output Q 
oEO s'ES 
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Chapter 3 
Branch and Bound Algorithms for 
Stochastic Network Interdiction Problems 
We consider a stochastic network interdiction problem where an attacker chooses a 
set of arcs to attack with limited resources, to minimize the maximum flow that the 
network will be able to support after the attack. The outcome of the attack is random 
and binary, i.e. , each arc being attacked is either removed or remains in the network 
with full capacity according to a given probability. The sequence of actions are shown 
in Fig. 3. 
We assume that the outcomes are independent across arcs . This problem is essen-
tially the same as that in (Cormican et al. , 1998). Borrowing the idea of sequential 
approximation bounds in their paper, we develop a new solution method that in-
tegrates the branch and bound techniques with increasingly accurate lower bounds. 
Numerical experiments show that our method is significantly faster than previous 
approaches, including the Sequence Approximation Algorithm proposed in (Cormican 
et al. , 1998) . 
D Attacker 
D • 0 )Jr ~ 0 Nature 
Attack Random Observe result ~ Defender network outcomes send max-flow 
Figure 3 ·1: The sequence of actions of the one-stage interdiction prob-
lem. 
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3.1 Problem Formulation 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with nodes N and arcs A, together with an 
identified source s and a destination t. Each arc ( i, j) E A has an initial capacity 
uij· Let (t , s) be an artificial return arc from t to s with infinite capacity and A := 
AU{ ( t, s)}. Denote a network state w to be a binary vector on the number of arcs, 
where Wij = 1 indicates arc ( i, j) is broken and cannot be used. Let Xij be the flow 
on arc (i , j) and Xts, the flow on the artificial arc (t, s), can be taken as the total flow 
from s tot. Then the max-flow problem for condition w is 
h(w) := max Xts, 
xEX(w) 
where x E X(w) means that x 2: 0, satisfies the conditional capacity constraint 
and the flow conservation constraints 
L Xni - L Xjn = 0, 'in E N. 
(n, i )EA (j ,n)EA 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
The optimal network action based on observed state w will be to send flow along the 
solution of (3. 1). 
Let 1 be an interdiction strategy, which is a IAI-dimension binary vector with 
"/ij = 1 means attacking arc ( i, j) and "/ij = 0 otherwise. When arc ( i, j) is attacked, 
it requires resources Cij, and with probability Pij , the attack will be successful, i.e. 
Wij = 1. We assume that the outcomes of attacks on different arcs will be independent , 
and that the interdictor has a budget of R that constraints the attack. Denote f(R)b 
as the set of feasible binary strategies satisfying the budget constraint , and f(R) as 
its convex hull, i.e. , 
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r( R) := { 11 2::: cij/ij :::; R, o :::; /ij :::; 1} 
ij 
Construct an auxiliary random binary vector I corresponding to the arc survival 
outcomes under the assumption that every arc in A is attacked, so I ij = 1 means the 
interdicted arc would be broken if attacked and I ij = 0 otherwise. Let 0 := {0, 1 } IAI 
be the space of I and P(I) the probability of I , which is 
P(I) = II (1- Pij)l - Iij pf?' 'III E 0. 
(i,j)EA 
The availability of arc ( i, j) after interdiction is given by Iij/ij. Then the optimization 
problem for the attacker is 
J := min L P(I) h(I ·1), 
-yEr(R)b [Erl. 
(3.4) 
where I · 1 is the element-wise product of I and I· 
There are several difficulties in solving Problem (3.4). First , the problem is com-
binatorial in size, where the number of possible discrete attacks grows exponentially 
with the number of arcs. Second, even if one relaxed the binary constraint, i.e, re-
placing f(R) 6 with f(R), the resulting objective is the sum of concave functions, 
so minimization is again combinatorially complex. Finally, the evaluation of any s-
trategy requires a summation over an exponential number of outcomes, which would 
require solving an exponential number of max-flow subproblems h(I · 1). We will 
develop a solution approach that addresses these issues in the next section. 
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3.2 Modified Branch and Bound Method 
Our method solves Problem (3.4) via a branch and bound approach with increasingly 
accurate approximations. The basis for this approach is an alternative representation 
of the max-flow problem, developed in (Cormican et al. , 1998). 
For any w E [0, 1]1AJ, define the penalty problem 
g(w) := maxXts - L WijXij, 
xE X (i,j)EA 
(3.5) 
where x E X means x ~ 0, satisfies the flow conservation constraints (3.3) and the 
capacity constraints (unrelated to w) 
(3.6) 
Compared to h(w), g(w) moves w from the capacity constraints to the objective 
function as a penalty. Therefore the feasible set X ( w) in h( w) is a subset of the feasible 
set X in g(w) , which is independent from w. Next we will explore the properties of 
h(w) , g(w) as well as the relationship between them, which form the foundation of the 
approximation in our method. 
Theorem 3.2.1 is a restatement of Theorem 2.1.2, which is proved by duality in 
(Cormican et al. , 1998). Here we provide a direct proof, which is more intuitive and 
simpler. 
Theorem 3.2.1 h(w) = g(w), for any wE {0, 1}1Al . 
Proof: For any x E X(w), for any (i,j) it's eithe~ wij = 0 or Xij = 0 due to 
capacity constraint, then we have Xts - L(i,j)EA WijXij = Xts · Therefore when x E 
X(w) , problems h(w) and g(w) have the same objective value. Notice X(w) c X , 
now we just need to show that g(w) always has an optimal solution in X(w). 
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Let x* be an optimal solution to g(w), such that x* tJ. X(w), i.e. 
A(x*) := {(i,j)l(i,j) E A,wij = 1 and x;i > 0} # 0. 
We solve a max-flow problem maxxEX(x*) Xts on G(N, A) where X E X(x*) means X 
satisfies the flow conservation and the following capacity constraints 
xii-:::; x;i, V(i,j) E A- A(x*);xii-:::; 0, V(i,j) E A(x*). 
Since it restricts using any arcs in A(x*) in the above problem, its optimal solution, 
denoted as x(x*), represents all the cycles within x* that use no arcs in A(x*). Define 
iii = x;i - Xij(x*) for any (i , j) EA. By this definition, in i, any cycles passing (t, s) 
must pass arcs in A(x*), therefore we have L (i,j)EA(x*) Xij 2': its · Moreover, because 
i is upper bounded by x* and x;jwij = 0 for any (i,j) E A- A(x*), we have 
L Wij Xij = L Xij 2': Xts, 
(i ,j)EA (i,j)EA(x*) 
and x is a feasible solution in g(w) , with the objective value as 
Xts - L WijXij 
(i, j )EA 
=(x;s - L Wijx;j)- (i ts- L WijXij) 
(i,j)EA (i,j)EA 
2':x;s- L WijX;j. 
(i,j)EA 
(3.7) 
where the last inequality is due to (3 . 7). Then by the definition of x*, x is also an 
optimal solution to g(w). Also notice that Xij = 0 for any (i,j) E A(x*), therefore 
x E X(w) , which completes the proof. • 
Our method uses lower bound approximations to find the optimal solution. This 
bound is based on the convexity of g(·) and the concavity of h(·), which have been 
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shown in lemma 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. 
Lemma 3.2.2 For any wE [0, 1]1 AI, there is a set of binary vectors {Ji}{~u such that 
w is a convex combination of these vectors. That is, 
K K 
w = L wili, where L wi = 1, and wi;::: 0, Vi= 1, ... , K. 
i=l i= l . 
Proof: [0, 1] 1AI is a unit hypercube in IAI-dimensions, with its corner points the 
set of binary vectors. Since the unit hypercube is a convex set polytope, therefore 
for any w E [0, 1]IAI, it can be represented as a convex combination of these corner 
points. • 
Theorem 3.2.3 g(w):::; h(w), Vw E [0, 1]IAI. 
Proof: For any wE [0 , 1]1 AI, by lemma 3.2.2, one can decompose it as a convex 
combination of binary vectors w = 2:~1 wJi, where Ji is a IAI-dimension binary 
vector and wi;::: 0, 2:~1 wi = 1. Then By theorem 3.2.1, 
Since h(w) is concave and g(w) is convex, by Jensen's Inequality, we have 
K K 
g(w):::; LWig(Ii) = LWih(I i):::; h(w). 
i = l i=l 
• 
Theorem 3.2.1 shows that h(w) and g(w) are equal when w is binary, which allows 
us to represent the interdictor problem (3.4) as 
J = min L P(I) g(I ·r) = E[g(I ·r)]. 
')'Ef'(R)b 
JEri 
(3.8) 
By relaxing the feasible set from f(R)b to f(R), because g(w) is convex, we can use 
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Jensen's inequality to get a bound on J 
J 2 min E1 [g(I ·1)] 2 min g(E[I]·!) 
')'E I'(R) ')'EI'(R) (3.9) 
This result (3.9) provides a lower bound on the achievable interdiction performance 
through the solution of a single averaged max-flow problem for each possible attack. 
Furthermore, the objective function is convex in the relaxed attack variables ')' . Even if 
the bound is loose, one can improve the bound by using a partition average approach, 
such as the Sequence Approximation Approach in (Cormican et al. , 1998). 
Given a partition <I> of n, define the binary-relaxed lower bound problem as 
L(<I>, r(R)) := min L P(¢) g(p(¢) · 1), 
')'E I' (R) 
</JE if.> 
(3.10) 
where P( ¢) is the probability of subset ¢ and 
p(¢)ij := E[Iij[I E ¢], V(i,j) EA. 
Note when <I> = {n} , L( {n} , r(R)) = min,Er(R) g(E[I] · 1), which is a lower bound 
of J. We will show this lower bound approximation is monotonically non-decreasing 
with finer partitions in Theorem 3.2.5, which is an application of the more general 
result in (Hausch and Ziemba, 1983). 
Lemma 3.2.4 If <I> 1 :::; <I> 2 , for any ¢k E <I>1 , denote { ¢i , ... , ¢;.} c <I>2 such that 
¢k = u~l ¢; ' then 
Proof: By the definition of p( ¢) and the conditional expectation, for any 
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(i,j) E A 
p(¢k)ij = E[Iijiiij E ¢kl = E[E[Iijiiij E ¢~]1Iij E ¢kl = L ;~:7] p(¢~) ij · 
_,2 c-'-1 k 
'f'm 'f'k 
• 
Theorem 3.2.5 Let <!> 1 , <1> 2 be partitions of rt with <1> 1 :::; <1> 2 , then for any nonempty 
r , 
Proof: For any 1 E r, the objective function in L(<I> 2 , r) is 
L P(¢2)g(p(¢2). I) 
¢2EiJ>2 
= L L P(¢2)g(p(¢2) . I) 
Because g(·) is convex, by Jensen's Inequality, we have 
L P(¢2)g(p(¢2) . I) 2: L P(¢1)g( L ;((::))p(¢2) . I) 
¢2EiJ>2 ¢1 EiJ>1 ¢2c¢1 
Applying lemma 3.2.4 on the right hand side, we have 
Minimize 1 E r on both sides, then we have L( <1> 1 , r) :::; L( <!>2 , r). • 
Theorem 3.2.5 shows that the gap between L(<I> , r(R)) and J decreases monoton-
ically on finer partitions. We now define a particular set of partitions that will form 
the basis for our approximations: 
Definition 3.2.6 For any subset of arcs D C A, the partition aligned with D , 
denoted as <I>(D) , is a partition that has 2IDI components, and each component ¢i has 
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a single, unique outcome on the arcs in D and every possible outcome on the arcs not 
in D . 
For instance, if D consisted of a single arc (1, 2), then partition <I> would consist of 
two sets: <h = {1Ihz = 1} and ¢z = {Jih,z = 0}. For any binary strategy 1, let the 
set of attacked arcs be 
D(r) := {(i,j)lfij = 1} . 
Denote the expected performance of 1 as 
u(r) := L P(I) h(I ·1) 
!Erl 
and the approximation value of 1 with partition <I> as 
l(<I> ,1) := LP(¢) g(p(¢) · 1), 
</>Eif? 
we will show that the approximation value can be equal to the original value without 
considering all possible scenarios in 0. 
Theorem 3.2. 7 If 1 is binary, then l(<I>(D(1)), 1) = u(r). 
Proof: For any¢ E <I>(D(r)) and any IE ¢, if lij = 0, then 
p( ¢ )ijlij = Iij/ij = o. 
If lij = 1, since every scenario I in ¢ has the same outcome in arc ( i, j), then 
As a result, 
p(¢) · 1 =I · 1, \:II E ¢. 
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Note also that P(¢) =~IE</> P(I). These two observations imply that 
P(¢)g(p(¢) . I') = L P(I)g(I. I') = L P(I)h(I. f'). 
IE</> I E</> 
Summing over all¢ E <I>(D(I')) , we have l(<I>(D(I')) , I') = u(!'). • 
Our algorithm, Modified Branch and Bound (MBB), is based on the branch and 
bound method (Land and Doig, 1960), exploiting the sequence of bounds derived 
above and using aligned partitions that are successively refined. This approach can 
be illustrated as a binary tree, where, at each level of the tree, there is a decision 
to interdict or not to interdict a particular arc. Hence, each node consists of a 
feasible partial attack specified by the path down the tree , along with some free attack 
variables that can subsequently be optimized. The novelty of our approach is: for each 
node in that tree, we can define an aligned partition to the partial strategy represented 
in that node, and use our bounds to obtain a lower bound in performance. Thus, 
our bound approach has increasing resolution: early in the search, coarse partitions 
are used, and later in the search, finer partitions are used that lead to more accurate 
lower bounds, which provide guidance to select the order in which to refine nodes in 
the tree. 
A node k in the branch and bound tree consists of a subset of arcs Ak c A with 
specific assigned interdiction values /'ij E {0, 1}, V(i,j) E Ak. Let fk c f(R) be the 
feasible set of possible values for interdiction variables 'Yij that are consistent with the 
assignments on Ak. Denote 
as the set of arcs that are surely interdicted in fk, and 
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as the set of arcs on which actions in rk are fixed. <I>(D(fk)) denotes the partition 
aligned with respect to D(fk). At each node, one solves a lower bound problem 
(3.11) 
and uses the optimal solution to expand the search. 
However, this minimization may be non-trivial because g(·) is a maximization 
problem. We address this by using the dual of g(w) which is a minimization problem 
in terms of dual variables for each node 7rn (associated with the constraint (3.3)) and 
for each capacitated arc aij (associated with the constraint (3.6)) 
Dg(w) := min1r,a .L:: (i ,j )EA Uijaij 
s .t. 1ft- 1fs 2: 1, 
a··+ 7f · - 7f · > -w .. '1/(i J.) E A t] t J - t]' ' 
aij 2: 0, 'If( i , j) E A. 
Notice that w appears linearly as constraints in the dual formulation, not multiplying 
any of the dual variables. Thus, by strong duality, replacing g(-) with Dg(-) , we can 
reformulate (3.11) as a linear program with variables { 1 }ij, { 1r} f, {a} f 
min "' P(¢ ) Dg(p(¢) · 1) 
,Erk ~ 
¢E<l> (D(rk)) 
(3.12) 
where there is a set of dual variables { 1r} f, {a} f for each set of outcomes ¢. The 
MBB algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 4. Typically, the number of sets in the 
aligned partition I<I>(D(fk))l is much smaller than the number of outcomes lrll, thus 
the number of terms required to evaluate a bound of u( r k) is much smaller than the 
number of possible outcomes. The resulting algorithm uses a loose bound based on a 
coarse partition early in the process, and uses an increasingly accurate bound as the 
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Procedure 4 Branch and Bound Method for SNIP 
1: Initialize 1* +-- 0, J* +-- max-flow without attack. 
2: Solve L( {0} , f(R)), denote the optimal value L0 and solution 1°. 
3: Initialize the set of candidate branch(es) Q +-- {(r0 , L0 , {0})}. 
4: while Q =/= 0 do 
5: Select and remove a node (rk, Lk, rk) from Q. 
6: if lk is binary then 
7: Evaluate u( lk) = L ¢E<I>(D('yk)) P( cP) g(p( cP) . lk) . 
8: if u(rk) < J* then 
9: Update 1* +-- lk, J* +-- u(rk). 
10: Remove any node (:Y,L,r) in Q if L ~ J*. 
11: end if 
12: end if 
13: Select an arc that have the maximum fraction interdiction rt, 
( i*, j*) E arg max 1;
1
• .. 
(i ,j)~A(fk) 
14: Split rk on ( i* , j*) such that , 
15: fk ,O := fk n {ri*,j* = 0} and fk ,l := fk n {ri*,j* = 1}. 
16: for c = 0, 1 do 
17: Solve L(<I>(D(fk,c)), fk ,c), denote the optimal value Lk,c and solution lk,c _ 
18: if Lk,c < J* then 
19: add (rk,c, Lk ,c, fk ,c) to Q. 
20: end if 
21: end for 
22: end while 
23: Output 1*, J* as the optimal solution and value. 
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partitions are refined deeper in the branch and bound tree. 
Implementations of Subroutines There are two important subroutines in MBB: 
solving the lower bound problem L(<I>(fk), fk) and selecting the next candidate node 
rk in the branch and bound tree to explore. 
Notice L(<I>(fk), fk) has the stochastic programming structure with a specified 
subset of scenarios, we implement the £-Shape decomposition method (Section 2.2), 
which is widely used to solve stochastic programming problems. We have two im-
plementations whose difference is on the master problems. The original L-Shaped 
method (Decomposition 1) has the master (2.12) and the alternative decomposition 
method (Decomposition 2) has the master problem (2.14). We will compare the 
performance of these two methods with numerical examples. 
Another subroutine consists of selecting the order in which nodes in the set Q are 
explored. Several criteria are explored here. 
• "Best First Search" (BFS): select the best branch, which has the lowest £k. 
• "Depth First Search" (DFS): select the deepest branch, which has the largest 
IA(fk)l. 
BFS and DFS are two traditional branching criteria in Branch and bound method. 
BFS is often superior to DFS, especially when the optimal solution has shallow depth 
and the objective function is smooth (neighboring solutions have similar objective 
values). 
• "Distributed Best First Search" (DBFS): select the best branch from top, then 
choose the best one among those with one more depth. After reaching the 
bottom, return to the top and repeat this process. 
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• "Least Depth First Search" (LDFS): similar to (DBFS) but instead of choosing 
the next within the candidates with one more depth, it chooses one with AT 
LEAST one more depth. 
DBFS is a criteria introduced by Kao et al. (G.K.Kao et al., 2009) , which is a 
hybrid between DFS and BFS. By combining DFS and BFS, DBFS is designed to 
find an optimal solution earlier than DFS. With similar intuition, we extend it to 
LDFS, which reaches the bottom more quickly than DBFS. Notice in our problem, 
the number of surely interdicted arcs I D (rk) I (called score) should be a more proper 
to measure the closeness to the global solution than IA(rk) 1- Therefore, replacing the 
depth with ID(rk) I in DFS, DBFS, LDFS respectively, we get 
• "Score First Search" (SFS): replacing IA(rk) I with ID(rk) I in DFS. 
• "Distributed Score First Search" (DSFS): replacing IA(rk)l with ID(rk)l m 
DBFS. 
• "Least Score First Search" (LSFS): replacing IA(rk)l with ID(rk)l in LDFS. 
Compared with Sequential Approximation Algorithm Both our method and 
Sequential Approximation Algorithm (SAA) (see Section 2.1) utilize the idea of im-
proving bounds sequentially by more refined partitions. However, our method differs 
from their method in the following aspects. 
First of all, in each iteration, SAA solves the problem of LB MIN (if!) , which is a 
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem with a constant feasible set. In 
our method, our lower bounds are obtained by solving a LP problem L( if!, r) with 
shrinking feasible set. We get a fractional solution, rather than a binary solution in 
SAA. We depend on the branch and bound using these lower bounds to obtain an 
integer solution later. 
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<l>= l llk=bllb = 0.1 ;k= 1.4.51. binary, 
update I since u( y )<} 
binary, NOT 
update I sine~ u( y )>I 
Figure 3·2: MBB solving an interdiction problem on a network with 
5 attackable arcs where the attacker can attack at most 3 arcs. 
Furthermore, SAA's partition procedure requires lots of computations to select a 
cell and an arc within the cell to split. To select a cell, SAA calculates the gaps be-
tween the upper and lower bounds for all cells. After a cell is selected, SAA also needs 
to check all possible splits, each of which requires additional computation of solving 
4 optimization problems. In contrast, we partition based on the fractional solution 
of L(<I> , r), which does not need any computation to generate the new partition for 
next iteration. 
Finally, the implementation of SAA requires the availability of a tight upper bound 
problem (e.g. h(w)) because it needs to calculate the gap between bounds for cells 
and for splitting arcs. However our method does not need this. Therefore our method 
can be extended to solve problems that do not have a tight upper bound. In fact , we 
extend our method to solve the multi-stage interdiction problem studied in chapter 
5. 
Fig. 3.2 illustrates how MBB solves an interdiction problem on a network with 
5 attackable arcs and the attacker has budget to attack at most 3 arcs. MBB starts 
at the root node where the initial partition is <I> = {n}. By the solution to the 
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approximation problem of L(<P , D(R)) , MBB splits on arc 2 according. Then the 
feasible set of 1 has been separated into two directions: one surely attack arc 2, 
f 1 := {!liz = 1} and the other surely not to attack arc 2, f 0 := {1hz = 0}. 
Correspondingly, MBB aligns the partition of outcome space with the split feasible 
sets: <P 1 := { {IIIz = 1} , {IIIz = 0}} for r1 := {l l!z = 1} and <P = {D} for 
f 1 := {llfz = 0} . After another split on fo := {llfz = 0}, MBB reaches node A 
where the lower bound problem outputs a binary solution. Since the exact value of , 
this solution is better than current optimal value, we update the optimal solution at 
this node. Similarly we update optimal solution at node B, C since we get better 
binary solutions there. At node D , E , MBB has binary solutions, however , they are 
not better than current optimal solution. Therefore we discard them. At the two X 
nodes, MBB discards them because the lower bound values at these nodes are greater 
then current optimal value. At last , MBB outputs the optimal solution at node C , 
i.e. , attack arcs 1, 4, 5. As one can see, the largest partition size is 23 = 8, much less 
than the total scenario number 25 = 32. 
3.3 Numerical Results 
In this section we compare our method (MBB) with other two methods, Sequential 
Approximation Algorithm (SAA) (Cormican et al. , 1998) and Sample Averaging Ap-
proach (SAM) (Janjarassuk and Linderoth, 2008) , on simulated network interdiction 
problems, which were also used as examples in both papers. To highlight the effi-
ciency of those methods, we also include the performance of an enumeration method 
(ENU), which enumerates only the feasible strategies on the border of the budget 
constraint, thus limits the number of strategies to evaluate. ENU can be viewed as 
a brute force benchmark to illustrate the difficulties of solving these problems. All 
methods are coded in C with CPLEX Callable Library (version 12.0) and all nu-
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Figure 3·3: SNIP 7 x 5: 37 nodes and 72 arcs, 22 of which are inter-
dictable. 
merical experiments in this paper are run on a 64bit Windows 7 machine with Intel 
i5- 2430 CPU (Dual core, 2.4 GHz) and 4GB memory. 
The underlying networks are shown in Fig. 3·3 (SNIP 7 x 5) and Fig. 3·4 (SNIP 
4 x 9). The capacities of arcs are shown on the graph. If the capacity has a tilde 
on top, then Pij = 0. 75, the probability of successful interdiction; otherwise, Pij = 0 
and that arc cannot be interdicted. The resource required to interdict each arc is 
cij = 1, 'V(i, j) E A. The interdiction budget R ranges from 5 to 9. When R increases, 
the number of feasible strategies increases exponentially, which in turn raises the 
difficulty of solving that problem. Simply, we can take R as an indicator of the 
hardness of problems. 
Notice that MBB have two important subroutines: solving LP problems and se-
lecting candidate nodes in the branch and bound tree. We explore the combinations 
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Figure 3·4: SNIP 4 x 9: 38 nodes and 67 arcs, 24 of which are inter-
dictable. 
of them to find the best one. Table 3.1 shows the running time of solving the interdic-
tion problem on SNIP 7 x 5 (Budget = 6) with different combinations of subroutines. 
"Sub#" is the number of calling the network solver for g(w) , which is a relative mea-
sure of computation since the network solver is frequently called and it takes up most 
of time in our method. The results show that the choice of decomposition method 
does not affect the processing time. The branching strategy also has little impact in 
the overall performance, although there is a preference for avoiding simple algorithms 
such as depth-first search. This may due to the example is too small to generate a 
deep Branch and Bound tree. Without specific instruction, in the rest of this paper, 
our method uses "Decomposition 1" and "BFS". 
We compare MBB with SAA and ENU in Tab. 3.2, which shows the running times 
in solving interdiction problems on the above two networks. MBB performs best in 
all instances and is about 3 orders of magnitude faster than the benchmark ENU. 
Compared with SAA, MBB is faster in about 2 orders of magnitude. For instance, 
in SNIP 7 x 5 with budget 5, SAA spends about 3 second while MBB runs 0.06. Its 
efficiency becomes more obvious when the problem is harder. For SNIP 4 x 9 with 
budget 9, SAA needs 1127.06 seconds, compared with 2.87 seconds in MBB. 
Next we compare MBB with SAM (see Section 2.3), which is a random algorith-
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Table 3.1: Performance of Different Branching Criteria and Decom-
position Methods 
Decomposition 1 Decomposition 2 
Method Time(s) sub# Time(s) sub# 
BFS 0.0880 3162 0.1010 2758 
DFS 0.0850 2837 0.1250 3779 
DBFS 0.0930 2960 0.0820 2022 
DSFS 0.0830 2694 0.0740 1946 
SFS 0.0860 2799 0.0960 2671 
LSFS 0.0830 2684 0.0770 1946 
LDFS 0.0910 2980 0.0780 1870 
Table 3.2: Compare MBB with SAA on solving SNIPs 
Budget I 5 6 7 8 9 
SNIP 7 x 5, second 
ENU 5.34 28.44 127.57 483.20 1499.55 
MBB 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.58 
SAA 2.45 5.26 6.12 9.06 17.74 
SNIP 4 x 9, second 
ENU 11.73 58.30 290.02 1312.87 4846.50 
MBB 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.72 2.87 
SAA 1.97 11.32 60.20 112.12 1127.06 
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m that uses Monte Carlo technique to solve SNIPs approximately. SAM solves M 
approximation problems, each considers N independent samples. SAM uses E inde-
pendent samples to evaluate the expected values of these solutions and then selects 
the one with the smallest value. In (Janjarassuk and Linderoth, 2008) , they imple-
mented SAM with M = 10, E = 105 and N ranges from 50 to 5000. We adapt the 
same set of parameters in our implementations. In SAM1, (N, M, E) = (50, 10, 105 ) 
and in SAM2, (N, M, E)= (5000, 10, 105 ). 
Tab. 3.3 shows the running times of these methods. Notice SAM is a random 
algorithm, which should be accessed by its average performance. We ran SAM 100 
times to solve each problem and provided average performance in Tab. 3.3. We also 
estimate the output solutions by relative error (defined as the solution's objective 
value over the optimal value and minus one) and its standard deviation. 
MBB is much faster than SAM in all cases, in about 2 orders of magnitude. This is 
more obvious in small problems (with small R) due to the computation increment with 
R is slower in SAM than in MBB. SAM's computation is affected by the subproblem's 
size. When the size increases from 50 to 5000, its computation is almost doubled. 
However, additional computation can improve the output's quality. For example, in 
the case of SNIP 4 x 9 with R = 9, the average error of SAM1 is 0.16% with standard 
deviation of 0.31 %. After increasing subproblem's size N from 50 to 5000, the error 
decreases to 0.01% with standard deviation of 0.01%. 
As the numerical. results indicate, MBB performs much better than the other two 
methods. It's about two orders of magnitude faster than SAA. When compared with 
SAM, it runs faster and its outputs are guaranteed to be optimal. 
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Table 3.3: Compare MBB with SAM on solving SNIPs 
Budget I 5 6 7 8 9 
SNIP 7 x 5, second 
ENU 5.34 28.44 127.57 483.20 1499.55 
MBB 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.58 
SAM1 8.24 8.65 9.33 10.40 14.39 
err 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
std 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
SAM2 15.26 17.97 19.01 24.45 35.50 
err 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
std 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
SNIP 4 x 9, second 
ENU 11.73 58.30 290.02 1312.87 4846.50 
MBB 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.72 2.87 
SAM1 10.18 12.96 14.62 17.20 19.61 
err 0% 0.07% 0.05% 0.07% 0.16% 
std 0% 0.12% 0.08% 0.53% 0.31% 
SAM2 15.40 23.65 47.06 52.91 95.23 
err 0% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 
std 0% 0.07% 0.04% 0.01 % 0.01% 
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Chapter 4 
Extended Stochastic Network Interdiction 
Problems 
The basic model in chapter 3 considers a directed network with a single source and 
a single destination. In some applications, the network is undirected. It may have 
multiple sources/ destinations , or the existences of these sources/ destinations are un-
certain. In this chapter we will extend the model in the previous chapter to incorpo-
rate these features and extend our algorithms to solve these models. We first discuss 
these extensions and formulate corresponding bounds separately. Then in section 4.4, 
we develop solutions for these models. Finally we implement our algorithms to solve 
interdiction problems on a real power grid, IEEE BUS 300 System, which is modeled 
as an undirected network with multiple sources/destinations. 
4.1 Interdiction of Undirected Networks 
Given an undirected network G(N,Au) where the arcs in Au are denoted as (i,j) 
with i < j, one can convert it into an equivalent directed network by doubling each 
undirected arc into two directed arcs with opposite directions, both of which inherit 
the capacity constraint of that undirected arc. Denote the set of the directed arcs as 
A:= {(i,j)lif (i , j) or (j , i) E Au}. 
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Then we have a directed network G(N, A). By introducing an artificial arc (t, s) from 
t to s with infinite capacity and denote the new set of arcs as A, the flow conservation 
constraint is 
L Xni - L Xjn = 0, 'lin E N. ( 4.1) 
(n ,i)EA (j,n)EA 
The conditional capacity constraint is different from the basic model. Let wij, V(i, j) E 
Au be the the availabilities of arcs in A u, each of which corresponds to two arcs in 
A. Denote the capacity of arcs in A u as u, then given w, for any ( i, j) E A 
Xij ~ Uij(1- Wij), if i < j; x·· < u .. (1- w .. ) otherwise t ) - J2 Jt ' . (4.2) 
The max-flow problem is 
( 4.3) 
where x E xu(w) means x > 0 and satisfies both constraints in (4.1) and (4.2). 
Define the penalty problem as 
(4.4) 
where x E xu means x ~ 0, satisfies (4.1) and for any (i,j) E A 
(4.5) 
Theorem 4.1.1 hu(w) = gu(w) , for any wE {0, 1}IAI_ 
Proof: For any x E xu(w), for any (i,j) E Au it's either wij = 0 or Xij = 
Xij = 0 due to capacity constraint, then we have Xts- L(i,j)EAu Wij(Xij + Xji) = Xts· 
Therefore when x E xu(w), problems hu(w) and gu(w) have the same objective value. 
Notice xu ( w) c xu, now we just need to show that gu ( w) always has an optimal 
solution in xu(w). 
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Let x* be an optimal solution to gu(w), such that x* ¢:. xu(w), i.e. 
A(x*) := {(i,j) l(i ,j) E A,wij or Wji = 1; and x;j > 0} =1- 0. 
We solve a max-flow problem maxxEX(x*) Xts on G(N, A) where x E X(x*) means x 
satisfies the flow conservation and the following capacity constraints 
xij:::; x:j, 'V(i,j) E A- A(x*);xij:::; 0, 'V(i,j) E A(x*). 
Since it restricts using any arcs in A(x*) in the above problem, its optimal solution, 
denoted as x(x*), represents the cycles within x* that use no arcs in A(x*). Define 
Xij = xTj - Xij(x*) for any (i , j) E A, by this definition, in x, any cycles passing (t, s) 
must pass arcs in A(x*), therefore we have L (i ,j)EA(x*) Xij ~ Xts· Moreover, because 
x is upper bounded by x* and xTjwij = 0 for any (i,j) E A- A(x*), we have 
L Wij(Xij + Xji) = L Xij ~ Xt8 , 
(i,j)EAU (i,j)EA(x*) 
and x is a feasible solution in gu (w ), with the objective value as 
Xts- L Wij(Xij + Xji) 
(i ,j)EAU 
=[x;s- L Wij(x;j + xjJ] - [Xts- L Wij(Xij + Xji) ] 
(i,j)EAU (i,j)EAU 
~x;s- L wij(x;j + xji). 
(i,j)EAU 
(4.6) 
where the last inequality is due to ( 4.6). Then by the definition of x*, x is also an 
optimal solution to gu(w). Also notice that Xij = 0 for any (i,j) E A(x*), therefore 
x E X(w), which completes the proof. • 
Next we show the convexity of gu(w) and the concavity of hu(w) after relaxing w 
to be fractional. 
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Lemma 4.1.2 hu(w) is concave on wE [0, 1]1Aul. 
Proof: For any wl, w2 E [0, 1]1Aul, let X 8 be the optimal solution to hu (w 8 ), s = 
1, 2, then we have 
Since for any (i , j) E Au, xt,xji::::; uij(1-wt),k = 1,2, then 
which is the capacity constraint in hu (> .. w1 + (1- >.)w2 ). Moreover, >.x}j + (1- >.)x7j 
satisfies flow conservation since xk , k = 1, 2 satisfy flow conservation, then >.x1 + 
(1- >.)x2 is a feasible solution in hu(>.w1 + (1- >.)w2). Furthermore, since hu(w) is 
maximizing over x, therefore 
So hu(w) is concave on wE [0, 1]1Au l. • 
Lemma 4.1.3 gu(w) is convex on wE [0, 1]1Au l. 
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to be x, then 
gu (>.wl + (1 - >.)w2) 
= maxXts- """' (>.w}j + (1- >. )wij)(xij + Xji) 
xE X 6 (i ,j)EAU 
= Xts - 2::: (>.w}j + (1- >.)wij)(xij + Xji) 
(i,j)EAU 
=>-[its- 2::: w}j(xij + Xji )] + (1- >.)[its- 2::: wij(xij + Xji) ] 
(i ,j)EAU (i ,j)EAU 
The last inequality is because gu ( w) maximizes on w and x is feasible in both gu ( w 1) 
and gu(w2). • 
Theorem 4.1.4 gu(w)::; hu(w) , Vw E [0 , l]IAul . 
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 3.2.3, which utilizes the convexities of 
9u (w ), hu (w) with Jensen's Inequality. • 
As a summary, h u ( w) and gu ( w) satisfy 
P2 Vw E [0, 1]1AI, hu(w) is concave and gu(w) is convex. 
Now we can develop lower bounds as before, and integrate them in a branch and 
bound context . We will show that in details in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Interdiction of Multi-source/destination Network 
Models with multi-source/ destination networks are more general and they are impor-
tant in real world applications. For example, in the smuggling network, there may be 
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more than one smuggler. In the military deployment, the enemy probably has more 
than one supply. Therefore we extend the model to cover multi-source/ destination 
networks. 
Some previous works also consider interdictions on multi-source/ destination net-
works. Akgiin et al. (Akgun et al., 2011) studied a deterministic interdiction problem 
with undirected network, which has multiple sources/ destinations. The attacker min-
imizes flows from the sources and to the destinations. The formulation in this section 
can be viewed as an extension of Akgiin's model. Compared to Akgiin's model, our 
model considers stochastic problems rather than deterministic problems. Further-
more, our objective function is more flexible, allowing the attacker to weight flows 
differently based on sources/destinations. 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with nodes N and arcs A that transports 
homogeneous goods from K sources to L destinations, which are denoted assk, t1 E N 
with k = 1, ... , K; l = 1, ... , L, respectively. Let uij be the capacity of arc (i, j) , 
which is bounded. Assume that any source cannot be a destination and vice versa, i.e. 
for any sk, t1, sk =1- t1, therefore there is an implicit cap on the max-flow of the network. 
The network has different weights on flows based on their sources/destinations. Let 
C8 k (or ctz) denotes the unit price for flows from s k (or to CtJ. 
Extend the network with a virtual node v and virtual arcs (t1, v), (v, sk) for any 
sk, tz with infinite capacities. Let A, N be the set of arcs and the set of nodes in the 
extended network. Given a network state w, the network maximizes 
(4.7) 
where x E X H ( w) means x 2:: 0 and satisfies the conditional capacity constraints 
(4.8) 
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and the fiow conservation constraints 
L Xni- L Xjn = 0, 'Vn E N. (4.9) 
(n,i)EA (j,n)EA 
Define the penalty problem as 
(4.10) 
where cH > maxk Csk + max1 Ct1; x E XH means x 2: 0, satisfies the flow conservation 
constraint (4.9) and capacity constraints 
( 4.11) 
Theorem 4.2.1 hH(w) = gH(w), for any wE {0, 1}1Al. 
Proof: For any x E X(w), for any (i,j) it's either wij = 0 or Xij = 0 due to 
capacity constraint, then we have cH L (i,j)EA wijXij = 0. Therefore when x E XH (w ), 
problems hH(w) and gH(w) have the same objective value. Notice XH(w) C XH , now 
we just need to show that gH(w) always has an optimal solution in XH(w). 
Let x* be an optimal solution to gH ( w) , such that x* tf:_ X H ( w), i.e. 
A(x*) := {(i,j)l(i,j) E A,wij = 1 and x;j > 0} -1-0. 
We solve a problem on G(N, A) 
K L 
where x E X(x*) means x satisfies the flow conservation and the following capacity 
constraints 
Xij :s; x;j, 'V(i , j) E A- A(x*);xij :s; 0, 'V(i,j) E A(x*). 
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Since it restricts using any arcs in A(x*) in the above problem, its optimal solution, 
denoted as x(x*), represents the cycles within x* that use no arcs in A(x*). Define 
Xij = x;j - Xij(x*) for any (i,j) E A, by this definition, in x, any cycles passing v 
must pass arcs in A(x*) , then 
/{ L 
L Xij 2::: L Xv ,sk + L Xt1,v· 
(i,j)EA(x*) k=l l=l 
Furthermore, because CH > maxk C8 k + maxt Ct11 we have 
/{ L 
CH L Xij 2::: L CskXv,sk + L CttXtt ,v · 
(i,j)EA(x•) k=l l= l 
Moreover, because x is upper bounded by x* and x;jwij = 0 for any ( i, j) E A- A( x*), 
we have 
/{ L 
CH L WijXij = CH L Xij 2::: L Csk Xv,sk + L Ct1Xt1,v, ( 4.12) 
(i ,j)EA (i,j)EA(x*) k=l l = l 
and xis a feasible solution in gH(w) , with the objective value as 
K L 
L CskXV,Sk + L CttXtt ,v - CH L WijXij 
k=l l=l (i,j)EA 
K L 
=(L Cskx: ,sk + L Cttx;t,v - CH L Wijx;j) 
k= l l=l (i,j)EA 
K L 
- (L CskXv,sk + L Ct1Xt1,v - CH L WijXij) 
k=l l=l (i,j)EA 
K L 
2::: L Cskx:,sk + L Ct1X;1,v - CH L Wijx;1. 
k=l l=l (i,j)EA 
where the last inequality is due to ( 4.12). Then by the definition of x*, x is also an 
optimal solution to gH(w). Also notice that Xij = 0 for any (i,j) E A(x*), therefore 
x E X ( w) , which completes the proof. • 
Similar to h(w) and g(w), hH(w) is concave and gH(w) is convex, which will be 
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shown in the following lemmas. 
Lemma 4.2.2 hH(w) is concave on wE [0, 1] IAI_ 
Proof: For any wl, w2 E [0, 1]1AI, let X 8 be an optimal solution to hH (w 8 ), s = 
1, 2, then for any ,\ in [0, 1], we have 
K L K L 
>.[L Cskx~ ,sk + L Ct1Xiz,vJ+(1->.)[L CskX~ ,sk + L Ct1X;1,v] = ,\hH (w1)+(1-,\)hH (w2 ). 
k= l l=l k=l l=2 
Since for any (i , j) E A , x7j:::; Uij(1- w~), k = 1, 2, then 
which is the capacity constraint in hH(>.w1 + (1- >.)w2 ). Moreover, >.x}j + (1- >.)x;j 
satisfies flow conservation since xk , k = 1, 2 satisfy flow conservation, then >.x1 + 
(1- >.)x2 is a feasible solution in hH (>.w1 + (1- >.)w2 ). Furthermore, since hH (w) is 
maximizing over x, therefore 
K L K L 
2:>-[L CskX~,sk + L Cttxi1,v] + (1- >.)[L Cskx~,sk + L Ct1X;1,v] 
k=l l=l k=l 1= 2 
So hH(w) is concave on wE [0, 1]1AI_ • 
Lemma 4.2.3 gH(w) is convex on wE [0, 1JIAI_ 
Proof: For any wl,w2 E [0, 1] IAI,,\ E [0, 1], let i be an optimal solution to 
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K L 
= ~8f L CskXv,sk + L CttXtt ,v - CJ-I L (.AwJj + (1- .A)wij)Xij 
k= l l=2 (i,j)EA 
K L 
= L Cs/iv,sk + L Ct/Ett ,v - CJ-I L (.AwJj + (1- .A)wij)Xij 
k=l 1=2 (i,j)EA 
K L 
=.A(L CskXv,sk + 2:::; CttXtt ,v - CJ-I L wJjxij) 
k= l 1=2 (i ,j)EA 
J( L 
+ (1- .A)(L csJv,sk + L CttXt~,v - CJ-I L wljxij) 
k=l 1=2 (i,j)EA 
The last inequality is because gH ( w) maximizes on w and x is feasible in both gi-I ( w 1) 
• 
By the above lemmas, with similar deduction as in Theorem 3.2.3, we have 
Theorem 4.2.4 gH(w)::; hH(w), Vw E [0, 1]1AI. 
In summary, h I-I ( w) and gH ( w) have the following properties 
P2 Vw E [0 , 1] 1AI, hH (w) is concave and gH(w) is convex. 
Now we can develop lower bounds as before, and integrate them in a branch and 
bound context. We will show that in details in Section 4.4. 
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4.3 Interdiction of Networks with Uncertain Sources and 
Destinations 
In some interdiction problems, the attacker is not sure of the existences of sources and 
destinations, i.e. it only knows the probability of existences of sources/destinations. 
For example, the border police may not know whether there is any smuggling from 
sk and tk. For problems like this, it's meaningful to extend the model to cover the 
networks with uncertain sources/ destinations. 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with K sources and L destinations, let z 
be a K + L dimension random binary vector with zi = 1 indicates that the ith 
sources/destinations exists and zi = 0 otherwise. Denote Z as the space of z, which 
is finite and has the dimension of 2K+L. Let p(z) be the probability of z for any 
z E Z, which is known to the attacker. The realization of z is independent from the 
interdiction results. 
Let h(z,w) be the max-flow problem considering the existing sources/destinations 
in z given the network state w, then 
K L 
h(z, w) := max L CskZskXV,Sk + L CtzZtzXtz,v· 
xEXH(w) k=l l=l 
Compared with hH ( w) in the multi-source/ destination network 
h(z, w) only considers the existing sources/ destinations (i.e. sources/ destinations with 
corresponding Zi = 1). Given a network state w, the network maximizes the expected 
maximum flow 
hz(w) := LP(z)h(z,w) (4.13) 
zEZ 
Similarly, define g(z, w) as the penalty problem considering the existing sources and 
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destinations in z given the network state w 
K L 
where cH 2: maxk C8 k +maxz Ct1 • Compared with gH (w) in the multi-source/ destination 
network 
g(z, w) only considers the existing sources/ destinations in z. Define the penalty prob-
lem for the uncertain sources/ destinations network as 
gz(w) := LP(z)g(z, w) , 
zE Z 
prices, then all the results that applied to h H ( w) and gH ( w) can be applied to h( z, w) 
and g(z, w). By theorem 4.2.1, for any z, 
h(z, w) = g(z,w), Vw E {0, l}IAI. 
Theorem 4 .3.1 hz(w) = gz(w), Vw E {0, l}IAI . 
Proof: Since for any z, h(z, w) = g(z,w) , for any wE {0, l}IAI , then 
zEZ zEZ 
• 
Lemma 4 .3.2 For any wE [0, l] IAI, hz(w) is concave and gZ(w) is convex. 
Proof: For any z, by lemma 4.2.2, h(z, w) is concave on w E [0 , l] IAI, then 
hz(w) is also concave on wE [0 , l]IAI as the convex combination of h(z, w). Similarly, 
we can show gz(w) is convex on wE [0 , l] IAI due to the convexity of g(z,w). • 
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Theorem 4.3.3 gz(w)::; hz(w), 'iw E [0 , l]IAI. 
Proof: Because the concavity of hz(w) and the convexity of gz(w), with similar 
deduction to 3.2.3, one can show 
by using Jensen's Inequality. • 
In summary, h z ( w) and gz ( w) have the following properties 
P2 'iw E [0, l] IAI, hz(w) is concave and gz(w) is convex. 
Now we can develop lower bounds as before, and integrate them in a branch and 
bound context. We will show the details in next section. 
4.4 Solutions to the Extended Models 
In this section we formulate the stochastic interdiction problems on a generalized 
network, which includes all cases discussed before. Then we provide solution method 
to this general model. 
Let h*(w) be the optimization problem that the network maximizes given the net-
work state w. It can be h(w) in the basic model, hu(w) in t he model with undirected 
network, hH(w) in the model with multi-source/ destination network, and hz(w) in 
the model with network with uncertain sources/ destinations. Let '"'! be the attacker 's 
strategy and r(R)h be the feasible set with R as the resource constraint , then the 
interdiction problem is 
J * : = min 2::..:: P (I) h *(I · '"'() . 
-yEr(R)b l EO 
(4.14) 
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where I is a possible scenario and P(I) is the corresponding probability. 
Let g*(w) be the corresponding penalty problem. It can be g(w) in the basic 
model, gu ( w) in the model with undirected network, gH ( w) in the model with multi-
source/ destination network, and gz ( w) in the model with network with uncertain 
sources/destinations. As discussed before separately in these cases, h*(w) and g*(w) 
satisfy 
P1 Vw E {0, 1}1AI , h*(w) = g*(w). 
P2 Vw E [0 , 1]1AI, h*(w) is concave and g*(w) is convex. 
P3 Vw E [0 , 1]1AI, g*(w) ::::; h*(w). 
Because of Property Pl , h*(w) can be replaced by g*(w) in (4.14) , then 
J* = min L P(I) g*(I · 1) . 
')'Er(R)b 
l E O. 
Because of Property P2, when we relax f(R)h to f(R) and by Jensen's Inequality, 
(4.14) has a lower bound of 
min g*(E[I] · 1) . 
/'Er(R) 
This may not be a good approximation to (4.14). However , one can improve this 
approximation by taking finer partitions on Sl, the space of I, as the same approach 
we solve the basic model. The rest of this section provides foundation to extend the 
method for the basic model to solve the general model. 
Given a partition <I> on Sl, denote the lower bound problem as 
L*(<I>, r(R)) := min L P(¢) g*(p(¢) · 1). 
'YH(R) 
</>Eif> 
(4.15) 
Theorem 4.4.1 Let <I> 1 , <I> 2 be partitions of Sl with <I> 1 ::::; <I> 2 , then for any non-empty 
r, 
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Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.5. Notice the only difference 
is that L(·, ·)changes to L*(·, ·)with g( ·) replaced by g*(·). Since g*(·) is also convex 
as g( ·), one can show the result for L*(·, ·). • 
For any binary strategy 1, define its expected performance as 
u*(r) := L P(I) h*(I · 1) 
/EO 
and its approximation value with partition <I> as 
l*(<I> , I):= L P(¢) g*(p(¢) ' I)-
¢E if> 
As defined in 3.2.6, let <I>(D) be a partition aligned with D where D is a subset of 
arcs. 
Theorem 4.4.2 If 1 is binary, then l*(<I>(D(r)) , 1) = u*(r). 
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.7, with the only difference 
ish(·) replaced by h*( ·), and g(·) replaced by g*( ·). • 
Based on Theorem 4.4. 1 and Theorem 4.4.2, by replacing L( ·, ·) with L * ( ·, ·) and 
g( ·) with g* ( ·) in Algorithm 4, we extend our method for the general models, with 
details are shown in Algorithm 5. 
4.5 Interdiction Problems on IEEE Bus 300 System 
Now we apply MBB to solve the stochastic network interdiction problems on a power 
grid, t he IEEE 300 Bus System, which is one of the power system test cases from 
(Christie, 1999) . 
The power system is modeled as an undirected flow network with multiple sources 
and destinations, where t he generators , loads and buses are nodes and the connecting 
branches are arcs. The topology of IEEE 300 Bus System is shown in Fig. 4· 1. The 
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Procedure 5 Branch and Bound Algorithm for the Extended Models 
1: Initialize 1* +-- 0, J * +-- h*(O) , the optimal value without attack. 
2: Solve L*( {D} , r(R)) , denote the optimal value L0 and solution 1°. 
3: Initialize the set of candidate branch(es) Q +-- {(1°, L 0 , {D} )} . 
4: while Q =I 0 do 
5: Select and remove a node (Jk, Lk, rk) from Q. 
6: if lk is binary then 
7: Evaluate u*(Jk) = L ¢E<I>(D ('yk)) P(¢) g*(p(¢) ·1). 
8: if u( !k) < J* then 
9: Update 1* f- /k, J* +-- u(Jk). 
10: Remove any node (:Y,L,r) in Q if L ~ J *. 
11 : end if 
12: end if 
13: Select an arc that have the maximum fraction interdiction rt, 
( "* "* ) k 1. , J E arg max lij · 
(i,j)~A(rk) 
14: Split rk on ( i*, j*) such that , 
15: rk,O := r k n {ri* ,j* = 0} and rk,l := rk n {ri*,j* = 1}. 
16: for c = 0, 1 do 
17: Solve L*(<I>(D(rk,c)), rk,c) , denote the optimal value Lk,c and solution lk,c . 
18: if Lk,c < J* then 
19: add (Jk,c,Lk,c,rk,c) to Q. 
20: end if 
21: end for 
22: end while 
23: Output 1*, J * as the optimal solution and value. 
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flow on a branch depends on the parameters of both ends and that branch. According 
to (Saccomanno, 2003), the flow on arc (i,j) is 
where vk, k = i, j is the voltage of node k and Xij, o:ij are the reactance and phase 
angle of arc (i,j), respectively. We take x1 as the capacity of arc (i,j). Generators 
'1 
with degree of one are considered as sources, and other nodes with degree one are 
sinks. Branches with the same starting node and ending node are merged as one arc. 
The resulting network has 409 arcs and 300 nodes, out of which 33 are sources and 36 
are sinks. We further adjust the capacities of arcs that directly linked to the sources 
and the destinations such that all demands in sinks are met given there is no attack 
I 
on the network, which reflects the real supply and demand in the power grid. All 
the arcs within the network are attackable, with the same attacking costs (1 per arc) 
and the same probability of survival if attacked, 0.5. As before, we assume that the 
events of attacked arcs surviving are mutually independent. 
For the interdiction problems on this multi-source, multi-sink, undirected network, 
we can first convert them to the problems of directed network and then further con-
vert them to the problems of directed networks with multiple sources/destinations. 
Because the three properties of hH(w) ,gH(w) developed in Subsection 4.2, by replac-
ing g(·) with gH(·) in (2.9), and h(·) with hH(·) in (2.10), Theorem 2.1.8 still holds. 
Therefore Sequential Approximation Algorithm (SAA, Algorithm 1) can be extended 
to solve the interdiction problems on these networks. Similarly replacing g( ·) with 
gH (-) in (2.16), Sample Averaging Approach (SAM) SAM can also be extended for 
these problems. 
We compare Algorithm 5 with these two methods. Their running times (in terms 
of seconds) are shown in Tab. 4.1. The second row is the number of feasible attacking 
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Figure 4·1: IEEE Bus 300 System: an undirected flow network with 
409 arcs and 300 nodes , out of which 33 are sources (dark rectangles) 
and 36 are sinks (light diamonds). Capacities of arcs are adjusted such 
that all demands are met before attack. 
strategies, which is a measure of the problem's difficulty. The parameters for SAM are 
(N, M, E) = (50, 10, 105 ) in SAM1 and (N, M , E) = (5000, 10, 105 ) in SAM2, where N 
is the subproblems' size, M is the subproblem's number and E is the evaluation sample 
number. We ran SAM 50 times for each problem and show its average performance 
in Tab. 4.1. 
MBB is substantially better than other methods in solving all these problems. 
Compared with SAA, MBB is about two orders of magnitude faster. In the case 
when R = 9, MBB spends 107.11 seconds while SAA requires 14689.51 seconds. 
SAM takes less computation than SAA, but it 's still slower than MBB in about one 
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Table 4.1: Solving Interdiction Problems on IEEE BUS 300 Systems. 
Budget 5 6 7 8 9 
Str.# 4 X 1010 2 X 1012 1 X 1014 4 X 1015 6 X 1017 
MBB 0.67 2.26 2.68 23.96 107.11 
SAA 1.91 5.23 6.30 521.37 14689.51 
SAM1 213.53 221.96 244.53 308.29 480.96 
err 0.09% 0.19% 0.21% 0.22% 0.32% 
std 0.11% 0.22% 0.22% 0.24% 0.34% 
SAM2 319.07 434.50 592.21 982.96 1411.17 
err 0.02% 0.04% 0.07% 0.10% 0.12% 
std 0.02% 0.05% 0.09% 0.11% 0.13% 
order of magnitude. For the same case, SAM needs 480.96 seconds if its subproblems 
consider only 50 scenarios and 1411.17 if 5000 scenarios is considered. 
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Chapter 5 
Multi-Stage Interdiction Problems 
In this chapter, we study a new class of stochastic network interdiction problems 
where the attacker can attack multiple times and adapt its next attacks based on 
the observed outcomes of previous attacks. This is an extension of the previous 
stochastic network interdiction problem. The problem becomes more difficult due to 
the exponentially growing number of outcomes in each stage. We develop a model-
predictive approach to tackle the difficulty. We focus on the two-stage interaction 
problem and develop a new set of performance bounds, which are integrated into a 
branch and bound procedure that extends the single stage approach to multiple stages. 
We also extend the model to undirected networks, multi-source/ destination networks, 
uncertain source/destination networks and provide solution to these models. 
5.1 Problem Formulation 
Consider an interdiction problem on a directed network G(N, A) where the attack 
takes place in two rounds. The first attack's outcomes are observed before the second 
attack is launched. After the second attack, the surviving network is used to conduct 
maximum flow from a source s to a destination t. The problem consists of selecting 
the dynamic attacks in order to minimize the max-flow conducted by the network 
after the outcomes of both attacks take place. The sequence of the actions are shown 
in Fig. 5.1. 
For k = 1, 2, for any ( i, j) E A, let "/ be the kth attack with 1& 1 means 
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Attack Random O bserve result Random O bserve rc•s ult 
network ou tcome;; at tack again ou tcom~s send max-tlow 
0 Attacker 
Q Natu r~ 
~ Dd~nder 
Figure 5·1: The sequence of actions of the two-stage interdiction prob-
lem. 
at tacking arc (i , j) and 1t = 0 otherwise; let Jk be the outcome of "fk with 1ft = 1 
means arc ( i , j) is removed given it 's attacked in '"'/ and Ib = 0 otherwise. For 
simplicity, we assume that the outcomes of arcs being attacked are independent across 
arcs and stages. j\!Ioreover for each arc, the probability of successful attack is constant 
across the sta.ges. vVe restrict each stage to include a maximum of one attack per 
arc, so / J, ,.2 E {0, 1}1.41. Therefore for any arc (i,j) E A, w{:i := !'{:iii~ indicates its 
availability with wiJ = 1 means arc ('i, j) is NOT available after the first attack and 
w}:i = 0 otherwise. Similarly 
indicates the availability of arc ( i, j) after the second attack with wij = 1 means arc 
('i, j) is NOT available after both attacks and wi:i = 0 otherwise. vVe allow 1 2 to adapt 
to the observed first stage outcomes, i.e., 1 2 depends on 1.1 · 11 , denoted as "(2 ( 1) . 11) . 
Because 1 1 ,J1 , r 2 (ry1 · ! 1),J2 are binary-valued vectors, for any (i.j) , we have 
(5. 1) 
where the last equality follovvs because , whenever "dJi1i = 1, arc (i, j) is destroyed in 
stage 1, and thus gets no subsequent attack in stage 2, so "rfj(/1 · 11) = 0. Let the 
resomce limits in the first stage and in the second stage be R 1 , R 2 respectively. Then 
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the two-stage interdiction problem as 
where w are defined in (5 .1 ). Notice w is binary; By theorem 3.2.1 , one can replace 
h(w) wit h g(w) in (5.2). 
5.2 Model-Predictive Approach 
Notice there are exponential number of realizations of ! 1 and J 2 , tremendous com-
putations are required to evaluate a strategy over two stages. To make it tractable 
for a network with a reasonable size, we develop a model-predictive approach as in 
(Castanon and Wohletz , 2009) . 
Consider the following approximation problem 
where p := E [J2] is the vector of probabilities of successful interdiction on arcs. 
Compared with Problem (5.2), (5.3) replaces 1 2 (11 · 11) · 12 with its expectation 
1 2 (11 · J 1) · p . Note also that (5.3) allows the second stage interdictions 1 2 (r1 · J 1) 
to be continuous instead of binary-valued. A possible interpretation for this is to let 
1'& (r1 · J1) be the probability to attack arc ( i, j) in the second stage if the network 
condition at that time is 1 1 · Jl. 
Theorem 5.2.1 12 is a lower bound of J2org· 
Proof: Due to the convexity of g( ·) , for any 1 1 , ! 1 , the inner minimization 
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problem in (5.2) is 
Notice the above equation is true for any ')'1 , 11, so summing over Jl and minimizing 
'Y1 on both sides, we have 12 :::; 12org. • 
Compared with 12org where one has to consider all possible outcomes of both 
! 1 , 12 , the lower bound problem 12 requires less computation since it only enumerates 
scenarios of ! 1 . In model-predictive approach, we first solve problem (5.3) , whose 
optimal solution corresponding to the first attack ')'1 is binary. After carrying out 
the first attack ')'1 and observing the network surviving from it, we have a single-
interdiction problem, which can be solved by our method in chapter 3. 
For a model with more than two stage attacks, we can solve it in a similar ap-
proach, which considers fractional non-first-stage strategies and the average effect of 
the corresponding results. After the first attack and the network is updated, the 
resulting problem is one stage less. By doing this iteratively, one can have binary 
attacking strategies for all stages. 
The success of the model-predictive approach depends on the quality of the lower 
bound approximation. Since we focus on the reduction of flows , comparing the ex-
pected flow reduction would be a good way to measure the quality of approximation. 
Given a first attack strategy')', let E('Y) be the expected max-flow after all attacks, 
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assuming the first attack is 1 and the sequential attacks are all binary and optimized 
based on the updated network. Define the expected flow reduction r(r) as 
r(r) := 1- E(r)/ f, (5.4) 
where f is the max-flow in the network without attack. 
In the following discussion, we show the approximation quality with numerical 
results of two-round interdiction problems on SNIP 7 x 5 (Fig. 3·3) and SNIP 4 x 9 
(Fig. 3·4). In each problem, we evaluate the lower bound values for all first attack 
strategies 1 1 E f 1(R)h 
and rank 1 1 by these values. We also calculate their flow reductions r( 1 1) . Specifically, 
to compute E( 1 1) for each first attack strategy 1 1 , we enumerate all possible outcome 
! 1 and for each updated network state 1 1 · ! 1 , we solve a one-stage problem to get 
the minimum expected flow f ( 1 1 · ! 1). Then averaging over ! 1 with its probability 
P(P) , we get E(11) := "2:::11 P(I1)j(r1 - J1). 
Fig. 5·2 shows the flow reductions versus the approximation ranks for the top 1% 
rank strategies. We solve four interdiction problems for each network (the top 4 plots 
for SNIP 7 x 5 and the bottom 4 plots for SNIP 4 x 9) with different attacking budgets 
in the first round and in the second round, denoted as R 1 , R2 respectively. Within 
each plot , the solid line is the flow reduction achieved by the optimal solution of the 
exact problem. Each point represents a strategy whose y-axis is the flow reduction and 
x-axis is the approximation rank, i.e., left strategies are better than right strategies in 
terms of the approximation values; upper strategies are better than lower strategies 
in terms of the exact values. A good approximation should have strategies ' ranks 
closely match their reduction, which is the case for all problems shown in Fig. 5·2. 
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The optimal reductions are achievable by top ranked strategies. There are other 
interesting observations. First , the approximation becomes worse when the budgets 
in both stages increase, especially the second stage budget . For SNIP 7 x 5, the band 
of points in (R\ R2 ) = (5 , 3) becomes wider than that in (R1 , R2 ) = (5 , 2) , meaning 
the variance of flow reduction with similar approximation rank is larger. In SNIP 
4 x 9, this effect is more obvious. Second, the bands in SNIP 7 x 5 are larger than 
those in SNIP 4 x 9, meaning the approximation is better in SNIP 7 x 5 than in SNIP 
4 x 9. Notice SNIP 4 x 9's min-cut contains only 4 arcs while SNIP 7 x 5's min-cut 
has 7. The second observation suggests that the approximation is better when the 
network has larger min-cut. 
We further compare the optimal approximation solution ;y with the exact optimal 
solution "(* in terms of flow reductions. The testing problems are on SNIP 7 x 5 and 
SNIP 4 x 9, with the first attack budget R 1 ranges from 5 to 9 and the second attack 
budget R2 ranges 2 to 3. The results are shown in Tab. 5.1. In most cases, MBB 
finds the exact optimal solutions. Even in the worse case where the approximation 
solution is not the exact optimal solution, it still achieves more than 99.9% optimal 
reduction in SNIP 7 x 5 and more than 99.67% in SNIP 4 x 9. 
5.3 Branch and Bound for the Approximation Problem 
It's still a challenge to solve (5.3). First , the problem is combinatorial in size, where 
the number of the first attacks grows exponentially with the number of arcs. Second, 
the evaluation of any strategy requires a summation over an exponential number of 
outcomes, which would require solving an exponential number of min-max problems 
We extend the MBB algorithm in chapter 3 to tackle these difficulties. Given <I> 
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Table 5.1: The approximation quality of Model-Predictive Approach 
(Rl , R2) SNIP 7 x 5 SNIP 4 x 9 
r( 'Y* ) r( i') r (i) r ( 'Y*) r(i') r(i) 
'Y* ,..,. 
(5, 2) 78.39% 78.39% 100% 97.17% 96.79% 99.61% 
(6 , 2) 84.90% 84.90% 100% 97.83% 97.83% 100% 
(7,2) 89.44% 89.44% 100% 98.11% 98.10% 99 .99% 
(8, 2) 91.74% 91.74% 100% 98.46% 98.13% 99.67% 
(9, 2) 92.73% 92.73% 100% 98.69% 98.69% 100% 
(5 , 3) 84.87% 84.87% 100% 98.24% 98.24% 100% 
(6, 3) 89 .65% 89.64% 99.98% 98.59% 98.59% 100% 
(7, 3) 92.64% 92.64% 100% 98.72% 98.72% 100% 
(8, 3) 94.11 % 94.11 % 100% 98.92% 98.84% 99 .92% 
(9 , 3) 94.78% 94.70% 99.91% 99.02% 98.93% 99 .91% 
as a partition of the space of Il, construct an approximation problem L2(<1> , r(R1)) 
by averaging Jl and relaxing the binary constraints on 1 1 in (5.3), 
where 1 2(11 · p(¢)) depends on ¢ . Because g( ·) is convex, by Jensen's Inequality, (5.5) 
is a lower bound of (5.3). Next we will show that the gap between the lower bound 
(5.5) and (5.3) can be tighten by refining partition <1>. 
Given 1 1 and ¢ E <1>, the inner minimization problem on 1 2 in (5.5) is 
which is a min-max problem. Notice for any w E [0, 1]1AI , both of g(w) and its dual 
Dg(w) are bounded LP problems with feasible sets, there is strong duality between 
them. Therefore one can replace g(w) with Dg(w) in f(/1 · p) , which then becomes a 
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LP problem 
s.t. 'Trt- 'Trs ~ 1, 
aij ~ 0, \7' ( i, j) E A 
Lemma 5.3.1 For any fixed 1 1, f(r 1 · p) is convex on p E [0, 1]1AI. 
Proof: For any p1, p2 E [0, 1] IAI, let their convex combination be 
Denote the corresponding optimal solutions to f(r 1 . p) when p = p1, p2 as 1 2,1 ,1 2,2 
respectively. Let 
Since in f(r1 · p), the feasible set is convex, then 12 is feasible and therefore 
Moreover, because the convexity of g( ·), 
Therefore 
g(r1. p + 12. p) 
=g(.\ (!1. p1 + ,2,1. p) + (1- .\)(11. p2 + ,2,2. p)) 
<5:_.\g(rl . pl + 12,1 . p) + (1- .\)g(J1 . p2 + ,2,2 . p) 
=A min g(r1-p1+r2·p)+(1-.\) min g(rl-p2+r2·p) 
-y2Er(R2) -y2Er(R2) 
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i.e. f (11 · p) is convex on p. • 
The following theorem shows that refining the partitions <P helps to t ighten the 
gap between the lower bound approximation and (5 .3) . 
Theorem 5.3.2 Let <P 1 , <P2 be partitions of J1 's space n. If <P 1 ::; <P2 , then for any 
non-empty r, 
Proof: Notice f(r 1 · p) is convex on p, then for any 1 1 E r , 
= L P(q}) L ;~::~f(/1 . p(q})) 
q,1 E<I>1 q,2 c ¢ 1 
?:: L P(q})f(/1. L ;(1<) p(q})) 
¢ 1ep1 q,2cq,1 (¢ ) 
= L P(¢1)f(l1. p(¢1)). 
¢ 1 E<P 1 
Since the above inequality is true for any 1 1, minimizing 1 1 over r on both sides, we 
have 
• 
For a binary strategy 1, denote its lower bound value under partition <P as 
l 2 (<P, 1) := L P(¢) f(r. ¢) 
¢Eif> 
and its objective value in (5 .3) as 
u
2(!) := L P(I) f(r ·I). 
I E if> 
Let <P(D(r)) be the partition aligned with D , as defined in 3.2.6 , where Dis a subset 
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of arcs. The following result shows that the gap between u2 (r) and Z2 (<I>, 1) can be 
zero without enumerating all possible outcomes I 1 , i. e. <I> -::/:- D. 
Theorem 5.3.3 If 1 is binary, then l2 (<I>(D(r)) , 1 ) = u 2 (r). 
Proof: Since <I> (D (r)) is the full partition with respect to 1, then for any 
¢ E <I>(D(1)), 
I · I = I · ¢, VI E ¢, 
which means f( l ·I) = f(r · ¢), VI E¢. Also note LIE¢ P(I) = P(¢), then 
¢Eif>(D(I)) I E¢ ¢Eif>(D(I)) 
• 
Based on theorem 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, our method can be extended to solve the ap-
proximation problem (5.3) by refining the partition <I> in L2(<I> , 1'). Details are shown 
in Algorithm 6. 
5.4 Numerical Results 
In this section, we implement our method as well as other two extended methods to 
solve two-stage network interdiction problems on SNIP 7 x 5 and SNIP 4 x 9 in a 
model-predictive approach, and then compare their performances in terms of running 
times as well as the quality of the output solutions. We also implement the brute 
force enumeration method (ENU) as a benchmark. 
We evaluate the output strategies' performances of different methods in a model-
predictive way. Specifically, by implementing these methods for the two-stage prob-
lems, we have the binary strategies for the first interdiction. We carry out these 
strategies and for each possible outcome, it becomes a one-stage problem, which can 
be solved exactly by the methods developed in the previous chapters. We evaluate 
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Procedure 6 Modified B&B Method for Two-Stage Interdiction 
1: Initialize 'Y* +-- 0, J* +-- max-flow without attack. 
2: Solve L2( {D}, f(R)), denote the optimal value L 0 and solution "(0 . 
3: Initialize the set of candidate branch( es) Q +-- { ('Yo, L 0 , { D})}. 
4: while Q =F 0 do 
5: Select and remove a node ( 'Yk, Lk , fk) from Q. 
6: if 'Yk is binary then 
7: Evaluate u2 ('Yk) = L ¢E<P(D(-yk)) P(¢) f('Y ·I). 
8: if u('Yk) < J* then 
9: Update 'Y* +-- "fk, J* +-- u2('Yk) . 
10: Remove any node ('Y, L, r) in Q if L?.: J*. 
11: end if 
12: end if 
13: Select an arc that have the maximum fraction interdiction r~, 
( "* "*) k ~ , J E arg max 'Yij . 
(i,j)~A(rk) 
14: Split f k on ( i*, j*) such that 
15: fk ,O := fk n {ri• ,j• = 0} and fk ,l := fk n {ri •,j• = 1}. 
16: for c = 0, 1 do 
17: Solve L2(<I>(D(fk,c)), fk ,c), denote the optimal value Lk,c and solution 'Yk,c _ 
18: if Lk,c < J* then 
19: add ('Yk,c, Lk,c, rk,c) to Q. 
20: end if 
21: end for 
22: end while 
23: Output 'Y*, J* as the optimal solution and value. 
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the expected performances of these strategies in terms of the reduced flow r(t) as 
defined in ( 5.4). 
SAA Extension for two-stage problems Cormican et al. (Cormican et al., 
1998) extended their model to have multi-attacks on an arc. However , the attacker 
can not observe the first attack result to optimize its second attack. In their extended 
model, The problem can be formulated as 
where w(I1 , 12 ) is the network state after both attacks, which is 
The constraints on ''/, ''?, represented by the feasible set r( Rl, R 2 )&, are 
"'1 "'2 E {O l}IAI. "'"' cl ."'l · < Rl· 
I ' I ' ' L t] It] - ' 
(i ,j)EA 
L c;j,;j :S R2 ;/i~ 2 1Jj, V(i,j) E A 
(i,j)EA 
(5.6) 
where the last sets of inequality is to forbid taking one attack as the second one 
instead of the first one. Notice in this formulation, the second attack does NOT 
depends on the outcomes of the first attack 11 , which is the fundamental difference 
from our model. The extended the Sequence Approximation Algorithm (SAA) for 
this model is quite similar to the basic one, which partitions the space of the outcome 
11 , J2 to get sequentially improved lower bounds. Within a cell, let p1 , p2 be the 
average outcomes of 11 , 12 of this cell, then the averaged (fractional) network state 
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given strategies 1'1 , 1'2 is 
(5.7) 
The last equation is true due to the constraint of 1'1 ~ f'2 . Substitute wf into (2.9) 
and (2.10) to replace p · f', we have 
(5.9) 
The details of SAA extension can be found in Algorithm 7. The partitioning subrou-
Procedure 7 Sequential Approximation Algorithm(SAA) for multiple attacks 
1: Let <I>= {0}, U* = inf and L* = 0. 
2: Solve LBMIN2 (<I>), denote the optimal value as L* and the solution as ,:Y. 
3: if U*- L* ::; E then 
4: Output solution /'* and terminate. 
5: end if 
6: Evaluate U' := U B 2 (<I> , ,:Y) . 
7: if U' < U* then 
8: Update /'* +-- 1 and U* +-- U'. 
9: end if 
10: if U*- L* ::; E then 
11 : Output solution /'* and terminate. 
12: end if 
13: Refine partition <I> according to partition procedure described below and go to 
Step 2. 
tine is quite similar to the single-attack problem, except it restricts the partition of 
Ii~ must after the partition of Ii~ for any arc ( i, j) in A. 
We compare MBB with this extended SAA method in Tab. 5.2 with the same 
interdiction problems as in previous examples. SAA is slower than MBB in about 1 
to 2 orders of magnitude. In the case of SNIP 7 x 5 with budget 8, MBB runs about 5 
seconds, compared with 216 seconds in SAA. More important , the solution obtained 
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Table 5.2: Compare with SAA in model-predictive approach 
Budget ENU2 MBB2 SAA 
r(r*) Time I r(i' ) Time r(i) I Tl'Y'l" r( i') Time ~i~ r -y• 
SNIP 7 X 5 
5 78.39% 37.52 78.39% 0.27 100% 65.52% 6.935 83.58% 
6 84.90% 223.55 84.90% 0.81 100% 73.03% 24.460 . 86.02% 
7 89.44% 970.59 89.44% 1.73 100% 75.59% 23.822 84.52% 
8 91.74% 3041.53 91.74% 4.59 100% 89.41% 216.313 97.46% 
9 92.73% 9562.44 92.73% 13.71 100% 90.61% 402.716 97.71% 
SNIP 4 X 9 
5 97.17% 53.68 96.79% 1.08 99.61% 93.41% 8.800 96.13% 
6 97.83% 315.51 97.83% 3.37 100% 93 .91% 62.768 95.99% 
7 98.11% 1598.57 98.10% 15.99 99.99% 95.20% 244.874 97.04% 
8 98.46% 6492.84 98.13% 57.69 99.67% 95.53% 478.164 97.03% 
9 98.69% 22885.70 98.69% 180.02 100% 95.73% 900.117 97.00% 
by MBB is much better than those output by SAA. In the case of SNIP 7 x 5 with 
budget 5, MBB finds the exact solution but SAA outputs solution with performance 
only 83.58% of MBB 's solution. 
SAM Extension for two-stage problems In a model predictive approach, we 
need to solve the approximation problem of (5.3) for the two-stage interdiction prob-
lem 
As discussed. before, the inner minimization problems can be replaced by f ( 1 1 . ! 1) , 
therefore we solve 
(5.10) 
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Notice this is a stochastic programming problem, we can extend the Sample Aver-
aging Approach (SAM) approach to solve it. Details are shown in Procedure 8. As 
Procedure 8 Sample Averaging Approach (SAM) for Problem (5.10) 
1: for m = 1, .. . , M do 
2: Randomly sample N scenarios based on the distribution of I , denote the set 
of samples as sm := U:}n· 
3: Solve miiLylEr(Rl)b };1 LinES"" j(i1 ·fl). Denote the optimal solution and value 
as "r and Lm respectively. 
4: end for 
5: Randomly sample E scenarios based on the distribution of I , denote the set of 
samples as SE := { I~ }n· 
6: Initialize 1* f-- 0, U* f-- oo. 
7: for m = 1, ... , M do 
8: Calculate um := ~ LieESE !( 'Ym. Ie) 
9: if U* > um then 
10: update 1* r 'Ym, U* r um. 
11: end if 
12: end for 
13: Output 'Y*, v* as the optimal solution. 
shown before in Section 2.3 , L := it Lm Lm is the lower bound and u := it Lm um 
is the upper bound in statistical sense. As in the single-attack problems, we imple-
ment SAM with different subproblems' sizes. In SAM1 , the subproblem considers 50 
samples. In SAM2, the subproblem considers 5000 samples. In both cases, we solve 
10 subproblems and evaluate their solutions with 10000 samples. 
We compare the performance of SAM1 , SAM2 with our MBB algorithm of solving 
the two-stage interdiction problems on networks SNIP 7 x 5 and SNIP 4 x 9 in Tab. 
5.3. In these problems, the first round budget ranges from 5 to 9 and the second 
round budget is fixed on 2. MBB is about 2 to 3 orders of magnitude faster than 
SAMl. Compared to SAM2, MBB is even faster. In the case of SNIP 7 x 5 with 
budget 5, MBB spends 0.27 second while SAM1 requires about 50 seconds. The 
running time of SAM2 are even more, about 115.44 seconds. With less time, MBB 
outputs solutions with higher quality, as measure by the reduced flow. In all cases of 
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Table 5.3: Compare with SAM in model-predictive approach, where 
1 1 , 1 2 are solutions output by SAM1 , SAM2. 
Budget ENU2 MBB2 SAM1 SAM2 
Time Time r (i) I Time r (-y l ) I Time r('y2) r(!~ rl1*J r(,•) 
SNIP 7 X 5 
5 53.68 0.27 100% 49.22 95.50% 115.44 95 .50% 
6 315.51 0.81 100% 52.39 90.40% 235.58 90.40% 
7 1598.57 1.73 100% 60.22 84.52% 281.13 92.02% 
8 6492.84 4.59 100% 90.78 97.50% 628.49 97.50% 
9 22885.70 13.71 100% 241.21 97.71% 1356.94 97.71% 
SNIP 4 x 9 
5 53.68 1.08 99.61% 65.49 95.91% 460.31 95.91% 
6 315.51 3.37 100% 104.66 96.88% 842.48 96.88% 
7 1598.57 15.99 99.99% 163.59 96.80% 1804.88 97.04% 
8 6492 .84 57.69 99.67% 321.83 96.83% 3434.83 96.83% 
9 22885.70 180.02 100% 581.39 97.38% 4071.35 99.68% 
SNIP 7 x 5, MBB find the exact optimal solutions. while the output of SAM1 can 
be as worse as 84.52% in the case of budget 7. In SNIP 4 x 9, it 's similar similar 
situation, the outputs of MBB are much closer to the optimal solution in terms of 
performance than the solutions obtained by SAM. 
5.5 Extended Multi-stage Interdiction Problems 
As discussed before, it's meaningful to extend the basic model to cover different types 
of networks. In this section, we extend the model to emphasize multi-stage interdic-
tion problems on undirected networks, multi-source/ destination networks as well as 
the networks with uncertain source/ destination. Notice in the basic multi-stage in-
terdiction model, our method depends on the convexity of the inner minimization 
problem f(r · p). We will formulate the corresponding problem in each extended 
model and show its convexity. Then we provide solutions to these models in a gen-
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eral form. Finally we implement our method to solve some two-stage interdiction 
problems on IEEE BUS 300 System. 
5.5.1 Interdiction of Undirected Networks 
Given an undirected network G(N, Au), one can convert it into an equivalent directed 
network. Follow the discussion in Section 4.1 and adopt the formulation of gu ( w), 
(5.11) 
where w is the network state after all attacks. Then the two-stage interdiction problem 
on the undirected network is 
where ,.,/, I l, 1 2 ( ''/ • Jl ), J2 are defined as the same in the basic model in Section 5.1. 
As in the basic multi-stage model, in a model-predictive approach we will solve the 
following lower bound approximation, 
which relaxes 1 2 to be fractional and takes the average effect of the second attack 
1 2 • p. Define the inner minimization problem as 
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Notice the dual of gu ( w) can be written as 
s.t. 1rt- 'lrs 2: 1, 
where 1rn , Vn E N is the dual variable corresponds to the flow conservation constraint 
( 4.1) on node n, and aij, O'.ji, V ( i, j) E Au corresponds to the capacity constraints 
(4.5). Since for any wE [0, 1]1Aul, gu(w) is feasible and bounded, then strong duality 
holds. By replacing gu ( ·) with Dgu ( ·), fu ( 'Y1 · p) can be written as 
min,2Er(R2) ,a;rr L: (i,j)EAU Uij ( O'.ij + O'.ji) 
s.t. 1rt - 'lrs 2: 1, 
O'.ij + 1ri- 1rj + Pij 'Yfj 2: - 'Yfj Pij, 
O'.ji + 1rj - 1ri + P ij 'Yfj 2: - 'Yfj Pij, 
aij, aji 2: 0, V(i, j) E Au 
Lemma 5.5.1 For any fixed 'Y1 E {0, 1}1Aul, fu('Y 1 • p) is convex on p. 
Proof: For any p1, p2 E [0, 1]1Aul, let their convex combination be 
p := >..p1 + (1 - >..)p2 , '\/).. E [0, 1]. 
Denote the corresponding optimal solutions to fu ( 'Y1 . p) when p = p1 , p2 as 'Y2,l, 'Y2,2 
respectively. Let ry2 := A'Y2' 1 + (1 - >..)'Y2•2 . Note in fu('Y 1 • p), the feasible set is 
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convex, then ry2 is feasible and 
Moreover, because the convexity of gu ( ·), 
9u ('/ <P + -;y2 . P) 
~ )..gu (!1. p1 + 1 2,1. p) + (1 - 'A)gu(r1. p 2 + 1 2,2 . p) 
='A min gu(r1-p1+r2 · p)+(1->.. ) min gu(r1 -p2 + r2 ·p) 
1'2Ef(R2) 1'2Er (R2) 
• 
5.5.2 Interdiction of Multi-source/destination Networks 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with nodes Nand arcs A that transports homo-
geneous goods from K sources to L destinations, which are denoted as sk , t 1 E N with 
k = 1, ... , K; l = 1, .. . , L, respectively. Let C8 k (or ctt) denotes the unit price for flows 
from sk (or to CtJ Follow the discussion in Section 4.2 and adopt the formulation of 
K L 
gH(w) := mx~ L CskXv ,sk + L Ct1Xt1,v - CH L WijXij· 
xE 
k= 1 l = 1 (i,j)EA 
(5. 12) 
where w is the network state after all attacks. Then the two-stage interdiction problem 
1S 
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In the model-predictive approach, we want to solve the following lower bound ap-
proximation 
Define the inner minimization problem as 
The dual of gH(w) can be written as DgH(w) 
s.t. 1rv- 1rsk 2: Csk' k = 1, ... ' K , 
7r tl - 7r v 2: Ctp l = 1' . .. ' L 
a· + 1r·- 1r· > - cHw· V(i J.) E A tJ t J - t]' ' 
aij 2: 0, V(i,j) E A 
where 7rn, Vn E N is the dual variable corresponds to the flow conservation constraint 
(4.9) on node n, and aij, V(i,j) E A corresponds to the capacity constraint (4.11). 
Since for any w E [0 , 1]IAI, gH(w) is feasible and bounded, then by strong duality, 
replacing gH(w) with DgH(w) in JH(/ 1 · p), we have 
aij 2: 0, V( i, j) E A 
Lemma 5.5.2 For any fixed 'l, jH(,./ · p) is convex on p E [0, 1]1AJ. 
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Proof: Similar to that of lemma 5.5.1 by utilizing the convexity of gH(·). • 
5.5.3 Interdiction of Networks with Uncertainties Source/destination 
Consider a directed network G(N, A) with K sources and L destinations, let z 
be a K + L dimension random binary vector with zi = 1 indicates that the ith 
source/ destination exists and Zi = 0 otherwise. Follow the discussion in Section 4.3, 
and adopt the formulation of gz(w) := L zEzp(z)g(z,w) with g(z, w) as the penalty 
problem considering the existing source/ destination in z with the network state w 
K L 
Then the two-stage interdiction problem is 
The corresponding lower bound problem in the model-predictive approach is 
Define the inner minimization problem f z ('y1 , p) as 
Lemma 5.5.3 For any fixed 'Y\ f z ('y1 · p) is convex on p E [0, 1] IAI . 
Proof: Similar to that of lemma 5.5.1 by utilizing the convexity of gz(·). • 
5.5.4 Solution to the Extended Models 
We will extend our method for the basic model to solve these extended models. Denote 
f* ('y ·I) be the network's optimization problem given the attacker's first action 'Y and 
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the corresponding outcome I. f* ( '"'( · I) can be f ( '"'( · I) in the basic model; f u ( '"Y ·I) for 
undirected networks; f H ('"'! ·I) for multi-source/ destination networks, and f z ('"'!· I) for 
uncertain sources/ destinations networks. Then the two-stage lower bound problem is 
12* := min L P(I) j* ('"Y ·I). 
')'Er(R)b 
f Ell 
Define the lower bound approximation with the partition <I> in I's space as 
L2*( <I> , r(R)) := min ~ P(¢) j*('"Y · ¢). 
1'1Er (Rl) ~ 
r/>E 'P 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
Theorem 5.5.4 Let <I> 1, <I> 2 be partitions of I 's space 0. If<I> 1 ~ <1> 2 , then for any 
non-empty set r J 
Proof: The proof is the same as the basic model, which utilizes the convexity 
of f* ('"Y · p) on p E [0 , 1]1AI . • 
For a binary strategy '"'(, denote its lower bound value with respect to partition <I> 
as 
l2*(<I>,'"'() := LP(¢) j*('"Y. ¢) 
r/>E 'P 
and its expected performance as 
u2*('"Y) := LP(I) J*('"Y·I). 
JE'P 
We can show that the lower bound approximation can be tight without enumerating 
all possible outcomes I. Let <I>(D('"Y)) be the partition aligned with D , as defined in 
3.2.6, where D is a subset of arcs. 
Theorem 5.5.5 For any binary '"'(, l2*(<I>(D ('"Y)), '"'!) = u2*('"Y). 
Proof: For any ¢ E <I> ( D ('"'!)) and any I E ¢, if '"Yij = 0, then 
p( ¢ )ij'"'iij = Iij'"'iij = 0. 
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If /ij = 1, since every scenario I in cp has the same outcome in arc ( i , j), then 
As a result, 
p( ¢) · I = I· /, \f I E ¢. 
Note also that P(cp) =LIE¢ P(I). These two observations imply that 
P(cp)j*(p(cp) •!) = L P(I )j*(I •!) = L P(I)j*(I .,). 
I E¢ IE¢ 
Summing over all cp E ~ (D(I)), we have Z2*(~(D (I)), 1) = u2*(1) . • 
To solve the extended models, one just need to replace j*(! · ¢) with J(! · ¢) in 
Algorithm 6. Here we implement MBB to solve the two-stage interdiction problems on 
IEEE 300 Bus System, which is formulated as an undirected network with multiple 
sources and destinations. In the second round the attacker at most interdicts two 
arcs. ENU cannot handle such problems because of the large size of the network. 
Therefore we only compare MBB with SAM in Tab. 5.4. The second row is the 
number of all possible (first stage) attacking strategies, which is a measure of the 
problem's difficulty. The parameters for SAM are (N, M , E) = (50, 10, 105 ) in SAM1 
and (N, M, E) = (5000, 10, 105 ) in SAM2. MBB is much faster than SAM, in about 
two orders of magnitude. In the case where R1 = 5, MBB runs about 4 seconds 
while the fast SAM1 needs more than 800 seconds, and the slow SAM2 requires 1438 
seconds. For problems with larger R 1 , MBB is still much faster than SAM. When 
R 1 = 9, the running time of MBB is 32.52 seconds, comparing to 2431.04 seconds 
of SAM1 and 3623.10 seconds of SAM2. Also note that MBB outputs an optimal 
solution while SAM cannot guarantee optimality. When the problem becomes more 
difficult (i.e. R1 increases), SAM's average error increases from 0.45% to 1.12% in 
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Table 5.4: Solving Dynamic Interdiction Problems on IEEE BUS 300 
Systems. Second round attack budget is R2 = 2. 
Budget 5 6 7 8 9 
Str.# 4 X 1010 2 X 1012 1 X 1014 4 X 1015 6 X 1017 
MBB 4. 15 5.34 9.17 26 .81 32.52 
SAM1 808.49 890.44 942.88 1836.29 2431.04 
err 0.45% 0.69% 0.81% 1.02% 1.12% 
std 0.50% 0.72% 0.82% 1.04% 1.16% 
SAM2 1438.23 1572.46 1649.00 2730.17 3623.10 
err 0.21% 0.24% 0.35% 0.40% 0.52% 
std 0.26% 0.28% 0.37% 0.47% 0.53% 
SAM1 and from 0.21% to 0.52% in SAM2. 
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Chapter 6 
Dynamic Network Interdiction Games 
with Nested Information 
In the multi-stage interdiction problems studied in chapter 5, both the attacker and 
the defender (the network user) have perfect information about the network state. 
In some situations, the attacker has only statistical information about the network 
state, referred as partial information. For instance, the attacker can not observe the 
results of all attacks, or the attacker may be uncertain about the existence of arcs. 
In these problems, the attacker may gather information from observing the actions of 
the defender. This raises the possibility for the defender to deny information to the 
attacker. 
From a game-theoretic approach, these problems can be formulated as zero-sum 
games with nested information in which one player (the defender) has more informa-
tion than the other player (the attacker). To find the equilibrium behavior strategies, 
one can adopt the Linear Programming (LP) formulation developed in (von Stengel, 
1996) . Since the size of the LP problem grows exponentially with the number of 
interactions, we develop a method, which exploits the nested information structure 
and decomposes the multi-stage game into a sequence of one-stage subgames. The 
method computes the expected value of each subgame as a function of its initial dis-
tribution. We show that the equilibrium strategies in the original game can be found 
by solving these subgames. 
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6.1 Problem Formulation 
In this section, we first formulate an extensive form game with nested information. 
Then we map this game to the dynamic network interdiction problem where the 
attacker has imperfect information. 
Consider a dynamic zero-sum game with finite stages T (T ~ 2) where player 
X and player Y act by turns. Let at, d!, t = 1, ... , T be the player X 's action and 
player Y 's action at stage t respectively. Let st be an underlying state in the game 
at stage t, which evolves according to the previous states sT-1 and players' actions 
aT, dT , for any 7 :s; t with transition probabilities that known by both players. We 
introduce a third player (called Nature) to represent the evolution of the underlying 
state, whose action can be denoted as st, meaning Nature chooses the state st . Since 
Nature's strategy is known and its payoff is not considered, this game is still zero-sum 
for player X and player Y. A typical play in this game has the following sequence 
T . [ 0 1 d1 1 T dT TJ O" .= s , a , , s , . .. , a , , s . (6 .1) 
Then the payoff associated with that play is determined by the sequence of underlying 
states and players' actions. As the game is zero-sum, when the game ends with a play 
O"T , let CaT be player X's payoff, and -CaT be player Y's payoff. 
Define a special class of sequences O"t as the history of the game 
t [ 0 1 d1 1 t dt tl O" := s , a , , s , ... , a , , s , 
which includes all the actions up to time t from the beginning. We assume both 
players have perfect recall, i.e. , each of them knows what it knew and what it did 
before. Assume player X has imperfect information about the game, i.e., it does not 
know the underlying state st, t = 0, ... , T. However it sees all past actions by Player 
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Y, and remembers its own past actions. Then player X's information set right before 
taking action at is 
I x ,t ·= [a1 d1 at-1 dt-1] 
. ' ' ... ' ' . 
Assume player Y has perfect information about the game. Its information set right 
before taking action dt is 
I Y,t ·= [so a1 d1 s1 at - 1 _n-1 st- 1 at] 
. ' ' ' ' . . . ' ,a ' ' . 
Assume the evolution of st depends on all previous actions and underlying states, 
then Nature 's information set right before st is 
I Z ,t ._ [ 0 1 d1 1 t - 1 Jt-1 t-1 t Jtl .- s , a , , s , . .. , a , u , s , a , u . 
In the extensive form, the sequence of actions in this model at each stage is as follows: 
Nature selects state st- 1, then Player X selects at, followed by Player Y selecting 
dt, and Nature subsequently selecting st. Each sequence corresponds to a node in 
the game tree, which is represented by a string of actions reaching the node. Let's 
extend the concept of sequence to include the substrings of actions of a node (called 
subsequence). Then in perfect recall games, each information set can be represented 
by a common subsequence of the nodes within that set , as the above In,t for n = 
X ,Y, Z. 
Definition 6.1.1 A dynamic zero-sum game is said to have nested information 
if and only if the information set of one player (the less-informed player) is a subset 
of the information set of the other player (the more-informed player) at any stage. 
Since I x ,t c JY,t for any t , therefore the extensive form game defined above has nested 
information. 
We want to find a set of saddle point strategies of the game, which is a Nash 
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equilibrium. For general games, the pure strategy equilibrium does not necessary 
exist. By theorem 2.4.9, there is always an equilibrium in terms of mixed strategies. 
Notice all players in this extensive form game have perfect recall , then according to 
Theorem 2.4.12, we can find a set of behavior strategies which is realization equivalent 
to a set of equilibrium mixed strategies. 
For any n = X , Y, Z, let A(r·t) be the set of actions at information set In,t and 
S be the set of underlying states, all of them are assumed to be finite. Denote player 
X's behavior strategy as 
with u1x,t,at as the probability of taking action at at Ix,t. Similarly, player Y 's 
behavior strategy is 
with v1Y,t,dt as the probability of taking action dt at JY,t . Denote Nature's strategy as 
with r1z,t,8 t := Prob{ stiJZ,t} as the transition probability of stat JZ,t, which is known 
by all players. Nature also selects the initial underlying state s0 by the following 
probability distribution 
(3° := { f3~ 1Vs E S}, 
where fJ~ := Prob{s} is the probability of Nature selects s. Given /3° and strategies 
u, v, r, the realization probability for a history CJT, VT = 0, ... , Tis 
T 
Prob{ CJTiu , v, r , /3°} := fJ~o IT u1x,t ,atVJY,t,dtr1z, t,8 t. 
t= l 
(6.2) 
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Figure 6·1: The sequence of actions of the dynamic network interdic-
t iou problem with nested iufonnation. 
where s0 , I x.t, at , p ·. t, d1, ! 2 •1, .'/are all on the path of the history uT . Summing up all 
plays with their realization probabilities, the expected payoff to player X is 
T L f3~o II 1Lrx.t,atVJ'Y.,t.dt1" r z,t, 8 tCaT . (6.3) 
aT t=I 
The dynamic network interdiction problem where the attacker has imperfect infor-
mation as described before can be mapped into the above extensive form game. The 
underlying state .'/ (t = 0, ... T) is the network state after the t-th attack, referred as 
t he availability of arcs at time t. The attacker is player X , ·with at as the set of arcs 
that are attacked at stage t. The attacked arc may exist; if it exists. the defender (as 
player Y) must decide whether to send fl.ovvs on it (as action dt) after observing the 
attacker 's action. If the defender refrains from using existing arcs, its deception cost 
is proportional to the unused network capacity. The attacker does not knovv the exact 
network state s0 but has its statistical information, i.e., the attacker lmows the initial 
distribution of /3°. The attacker can not see the result of interdiction st . However it 
can observe the defender's actions d1 and update its statistical information . Based on 
that, the attacker adjusts its consequent strategy. ·when the game ends at a play uT , 
the attacker's payoff (as CaT) is the sum of defender 's deception costs in all periods 
minus the maximum flow in the network after all the attacks . The sequence of actions 
in the dynamic network interdiction problem is shown in Fig. 6.1. 
To facilitate the following discussion, let's introduce some concepts and notation. 
D efinition 6 .1.2 Given a. sequence of (JT = [.§0 , a,1 , d1 ' .§ 1 , . .. 'aT, dT, .§T], define its 
pmjections on sub spaces (represented by their typical elem ents) st , at, dt and I X ,t, J Y,t, 
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~~0 d' . ~~~---····)>0 a' ~9 d ' ~9~(}' VLlt ·· , .l V~l t• ., . l\1 , ;1 ' ~ ~·[, - , 
x, ... = X t ,.,u, - ~ X J ;·· .~- =Xj .J· lit -··' 
·- -------- --- --------· y r· ·,,f= y , ·· ~ · .r Vr .J Player X: Pla)'cr Y: Yr ,J = B.;vi· ·" 
Figure 6·2: Realization plans linearize the realization probability of a 
play CJT. 
I ZJ . CJt as 
I Z,t( AT) ·- [ ~0 Al "t1 At-1 Azt-1 ~ t- 1 o f lAtl CJ .- ,, ,a,(. , ... ,a ,c ,s , a , c . . 
Similar-ly, for a seq'Uence of jY,T = [.5°' eli, ell' ... 'aT - 1 ' clT - 1 ) .§T - l' a7 ], define its pro-
j ection on I x,t , st, at, d1 for any t :S T as 
I u(fY.T) := [.so, a_l. Jl, ... , 0t-1 , Jt- 1, 3t- 1, clt]; 
I-'·t(JYT) := [8,1, Jl' ... 'a.t-r, Jt-1], st(f't',T) =st. at(fY,T) = Q,t, dt(f1-,T) =cit. 
L' j'IAXT [" 1 .11 AT- 1 ]AT-1 ] d..(.; . . . I\ t t t dt 1. ·or a sequence o · = a , o, , ... , a , c. , eJ"ne zts proJectwn on · · , s ·.a , , 
fo-r a·ny t ::::; T as 
! Yt( IAX,T) ·= [ ~ o 0A1 c:i_l (A1t - I d-:-t- 1 ;;t-- 1 a"t]· • -~ , ' , ./; ' • • • ' ' ' , ~ r.:J , ' 
I X.t(fX .T) := [a1 ' cfl' .. . ,c/-I, Jt- 1], st(f.\,T) = ,§t, at(fX,T) =at, dt( fX ,T) = Jt. 
Definition 6.1.3 If a shorte-r sequence I 8 is the CO'I 'responding pmjection of a longeT 
sequence i1, i.e., ! 8 (iz) = fs, then fz is said to be a successor of 18 , denoted as 11 >-f.s 
or is --<ft. 
Notice (6 .3) is a complex function of ·u. and v . To formulate the objective function 
in a bilinear form, we adapt t he sequence form in (von Stengel, 1996) . The idea is to 
linearize the realiza.tion probability of plays by replacing the behavior strategies with 
the realization plans, as shown in Fig. 6·2. 
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For a history a 7 for any T = 1, ... , T, define rur := n;=l r[Z,t(ur), st (ur) as Nature's 
cumulative transition probability. According to von Stengel's sequence form formula-
tion, we can separate the realization probability of a play into three parts: Nature's 
cumulative transition probability r crt, player X's realization plan 
and player Y 's realization plan (with initial distribution (3°) . 
where x 1x ,t at, y1z,t 8 t can be defined recursively by , , 
Then the constraints on x , y are 
L XJX ,l ,al = 1; 
al 
L X[X ,t,at = X[X ,t - l( JX ,t),at-l( JX ,t), '1/t > 1, JX,t; 
at 
~ (30 WJY,l. L.....tYJY,l,dl = sD(J Y,l) , v , 
Let X be the feasible set of x and Y(f3°) be the feasible set of y , representing the 
above constraints on x, y. X, Y( f3°) can be written concisely as 
X:= { x ~ OIEx = e}; Y(f3°) := {y ~ OIFy = Bf3° } (6.4) 
where E, e, F and B are matrices (or vectors) derived from the coefficients of the 
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constraint equations. Specifically, let IIxl, IJYI be the total numbers of information 
sets I x,t, JY,t respectively and lAx I, IAYI be the total numbers of actions across all of 
player X 's information sets and player Y 's all information sets, respectively. E is a 
IIxl x IAxl matrix and F is a IJYI x IAYI matrix. e is a IJXI-dimension vector with 
e1x ,1 = 1 and all other elements being 0. B is a IJYI x lSI dimension sparse matrix. 
By Proposition 2.4.14, x, y are realization equivalent to the behavior strategies 
of u, v (with (3°) where they are derived from. Then we can take x, y as players ' 
strategies. The realization probability is equal to 
Remember car is defined as the payoff at the play CJT . Therefore the expected payoff 
under strategies x, y is 
J(x, y) := L X[X,T(aT) ,aT(aT)YJY,T(aT) ,sT(aT)r aT CaT := x'Cy, (6 .5) 
aT 
where C is a sparse matrix with non-zero elements derived from Carr aT for all CJT. 
Any non-zero element in C corresponding to CJT has the row index associated with 
x 1x ,T(aT) ,aT(aT) and the column index associated with YJY,T(aT),sT(aT) · Since C are 
known constants, then J(x, y) is a bilinear function on x, y. In this game, player 
X 's objective is to maximize J(x, y) by controlling x and player Y seeks to minimize 
J(x, y) by controlling y. Therefore the problem of finding equilibrium strategies can 
be formulated as the following optimization problems 
max min J(x , y), 
xEX yEY(f30) 
min max J( x, y). 
y EY(f30) xE X 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
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Consider the inner maximization problem in (6.7) 
{ 
maxx x'Cy 
s.t. Ex = e; x 2: 0. 
Let p be the dual variable corresponding to the constraint E x = e, then the dual 
problem is 
{ 
minp e'p 
s.t. E'p 2: Cy. 
Replacing the inner maximization problem in (6.7) with its dual, we have 
. I 
mm ep 
y,p 
s.t.Fy = B (3°, y 2: 0, E'p 2: Cy. 
(6.8) 
Lemma 6.1.4 Problem (6.7) is equivalent to (6.8), i.e, they have the same optimal 
value and the same optimal y. 
Proof' Notice the inner maximization problem in (6. 7) is feasible for any y E 
Y((3°) and C, x , yare all bounded, then its objective value is also bounded. By Strong 
Duality of the LP problem, its dual problem is feasible , bounded, and has the same 
optimal value as the primal. Therefore, the optimal solution and the optimal value 
in (6.8) are the same as in (6.7). • 
Consider the inner minimization problem in (6.6) 
{ 
miny x'Cy 
s.t. Fy = B (3°; y 2: 0. 
Let q be the dual variable corresponding to the constraint Fy = B (3°, then the dual 
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problem is 
{ 
maxq (3° B' q 
s.t. F'q::::; C'x. 
Replacing the inner minimization problem in (6.6) with its dual, we have 
max (3° B'q 
x ,q 
(6.9) 
s.t.Ex = e; x ~ 0; F' q::::; C'x. 
Lemma 6.1.5 Problem (6.6) is equivalent to (6.9), i.e, they have the same optimal 
value and the same optimal x. 
Proof: Notice the inner minimization problem in (6.6) is feasible for any x E X 
and C, x, yare all bounded, then its objective value is also bounded. By Strong Duality 
of the LP problem, its dual is feasible, bounded, and has the same optimal value as 
the primal. Therefore, the optimal solution x* and the optimal value of (6.6) are the 
same as (6.7). • 
By taking the dual of (6.8) with x corresponds to E'p ~ Cy and q corresponds 
to Fy = B(3°, one recovers the formulation of (6.9). Because both problems are 
bounded and feasible , Strong Duality still holds. As a result, (6.6) and (6.7) have 
the same optimal value. As a simple application of more general minimax theorems 
(Fan, 1953) , we have 
Theorem 6.1.6 Problem (6.6) and (6.7) have the same optimal value, therefore the 
optimal solutions of the outer problems in (6.9) and (6.8) are the saddle-point strate-
gzes. 
Proof: Let x*, y* be the optimal solutions of the outer problems in (6.9) and 
(6.8). By definition, 
min x*'Cy::::; x*'Cy*::::; maxx'Cy*. 
yEY(f3) xEX 
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On the other side, from previous discussion, we have problem (6 .6) and (6 .7) have 
the same optimal value , i.e., 
min x*' Cy = max x' Cy*. 
yEY(f30) xEX 
Therefore (x*, y*) are saddle-point strategies. • 
Denote the common optimal value of (6.6) and (6.7) as V(,8°) . Next we are going 
to show that V(,B0 ) can be represented by a finite set of support vectors. Before that 
we first need to show some properties about the feasible set in problem (6.7) . 
Lemma 6.1.7 Consider the constraint F'q::; C'x in problem (6.9), if F'q = 0, then 
q = 0. 
Proof: We need to investigate the details of F' q = 0. The inner minimization 
over q in problem (6.9) was derived from the dual of 
{ 
miny2':0 x'Cy 
s.t . Fy = B,B0 . 
Explicitly, the constraints of Fy = B ,8° are 
LYJY,t,dt = YJY.t - 1(JY,t),dt- 1(JY,t), Vt > 1, IY,t_ 
dt 
Let q1Y,r be the dual variable for constraint L:dr y 1Y.r,dr = .B~o(IY, r) and q1Y,t be the 
dual variable for constraint l:dt y1Y,t,dt = y1Y,t - l(JY,t),dt - l(JY,t) for t > 1. Denote the 
coefficient corresponding to YJY,t ,dt in x'Cy as sY,t ,dt ' then the Lagrange function of 
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the above dual problem is 
T 
L L c}Y,t,dtYJY,t,dt + l..:: CB~o( 1Y,l) - LY1Y,1,d1)q1Y,1 
t=l JY,t ,dt JY,1 dl 
T 
+ L L (YJY,t- 1(JY,t),dt-1 (JY,t) - LYJY,t ,dt )qJY,t 
t=2 JY,t dt 
T 
= L,B~o(IY,1)qfY, 1 + L L ( c}Y,t- l,dt- 1- qJY,t-1 + L q1Y,t)y1Y,t - 1,dt-1 
JY,1 t= 2 JY,t-1,dt - 1 J Y,t>- [JY,t- 1,dt-1j 
+ L (c}Y,r,dr- q1Y,r )y1Y,r,dr. 
JY,T ,dT 
Notice y ;:::: 0, the dual constraint F'q ~ C'x can be written explicitly as 
JY,t>-[JY,t- 1 ,dt - 1] 
Then the details of F' q = 0 are 
Since q1Y,r = 0 and we can have q1Y,t- 1 = 0 based on q1Y,t = 0 and q1Y,t-1 
LJY,t>-[JY,t-1 ,dt -1] q1Y,t = 0. Therefore all elements of q are equal to 0. 
Theorem 6.1.8 There is a finite set of vectors Q, such that 
V(,B) = max ,B'q , \1{3 E [0, 1] 15 1. 
qEQ 
• 
Proof: By the definition of V (,B), we just need to show that the optimal 
value of problem (6.9) can be represented by Q. By lemma 6.1.6, the rows of F 
are linearly independent , then the feasible set of the problem (6.9) contains at least 
an extreme point (Theorem 2.6 in (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, 1997)). Notice x, y , C 
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are all bounded, then the saddle point value of V(.B) for any f3 E [0, 1]15 1 must be 
bounded. Then for any f3, there must exist an extreme point that is an optimal 
solution (Theorem 2. 7 in (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, 1997)). Therefore 
V(/3 ) = max 
1 
(3' B' q, 
(x ,q)E{n' };=1 
where {ni}{=1 is the set of extreme points of the feasible set in (6.9). Denote the 
projection of {ni}{=1 on the subspace of q as Q ·- {qi}{=l· Define Q ·- {qijqi = 
B'qi, 'ilqi E Q} , then we have 
V( /3 ) = m8:!- f3'B'q = max f3'q. 
ijEQ qEQ 
• 
6.2 Subgame Decomposition Method 
One can obtain saddle-point strategies by solving LP problems (6.8) and (6.9). How-
ever, their sizes grow exponentially with the number of stages, which limits the appli-
cations to large games. Here we propose a method, which decomposes the multi-stage 
game into a sequence of one stage subgames based on its nested information structure. 
By solving those subgames sequentially, we can obtain the equilibrium strategies of 
the original game. 
6.2.1 Subgame Equilibrium 
In a perfect recall game, because any player can remember what it did and what 
it knew before, any nodes within an information set of a player can not come from 
different information sets of the same player. Also notice that for games with nested 
information, any information set of the more-informed player can not come from 
different information sets of the less-informed player at the same level. Therefore 
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Figure 6-3: Decomposing a multi-stage game into a one-stage subgame 
and subgames with one-stage less (represented by rectangles). (x1, y1) 
are first interaction strategies and (xr, yr) are remaining interaction 
strategies. 
any two information sets of the less-informed player at the same level can not have 
common successors. 
Definition 6.2.1 In a perfect recall game, given an information set of the less-
informed player Ix ,t, t < T and a probability distribution on that set f3 1x ,t, a subgame 
from JX,t with (3 1x,t, denoted as G(Ix,t,(3Jx.t) , is an extensive form game inheriting 
I x,t and all its successors in the original game tree, such that, the subgame starts 
from Nature selecting nodes in Ix,t with the probability distribution f3 1x,t _ 
We will decompose the multi-stage game into a set of single stage games, with payoffs 
from subgames that have one less stage. Note that with the same procedure, one 
can further decompose these subgames, until the lowest level game contains only one 
information set of the less-informed player. The idea of the sub game decomposition 
method is shown in Fig. 6·3. According to (6.2) when t = 1, the players' first 
strategies control the realization probability of the history 0' 1 , which are in multiple 
information sets I x ,z. Therefore given the players ' first strategies, the distributions on 
these information sets I x ,z are fixed. Then we can decompose the original game into 
subgames, each of them starts at one I x,z with the initial distribution f3 1x'2 derived 
from the players ' first strategies. On the other side, once the payoff functions of all 
the subgames G(Ix,t, j31x,t) are given, one can find the equilibrium first strategies of 
the original game. 
115 
To decompose the original game, we separate the players' first strategies from 
their remaining strategies. For any play CJT, the realization probability is 
T 
f3s0UJX ,l al VJY,l dl rJZ,l sl II UJX ,t atVJY,t dtrJZ,t st 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
t=2 
where I X ,t, at , JY,t, dt, I z ,t, st, t = 1, ... , T are all on the path of CJT. Define the first 
interaction strategies before I x ,2 as 
And define the remaining strategies aft er Ix·2 as 
with 
t - 1 
X r . u II u WJ X,t at· JX,t ,at .= JX ,t,at JX,r(JX ,t),ar(IX ,t), V , , 
7= 2 
t-1 
r 1 II wi Y,t, t;::: 2. YJY,t ,dt :=yJY,l(JY,t),dl(JY,t)VJY,t,dt VJY,r(JY,t),dr(JY,t), V 
T=2 
Based on their definitions , the probability constraints on x 1 , y1 , xr, yr are 
LY~Y,2,d2 =y}Y,l(JY,2),dl(IY,2), 'II I Y, 2 ; L X~x , 2 , a2 = 1, 'II J X •2 ; 
d2 a2 
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Denote the feasible sets for x1 , xr as X 1 , xr respectively. Notice the constraints of yr 
depend on y 1 and the constraints of y 1 depend on (3°, denote the feasible set of yr as 
yr (y1 ) and the feasible set of y1 as Y 1 ((3°). 
Denote r:T := n;=2 r[Z ,T(aT ),sT(aT), then the realization probability of (JT can be 
written as 
Given x 1 , y1 , xr, yr and (3°, the expected payoff is 
where the second sum groups plays CJT into the different information sets I x,2 that 
they belong to. By the definition of x i, xr, maximizing x in J( x, y) is equivalent to 
maximizing x1 , xr in ](xi, y1 , xr, yr). Similarly by the definition of yl, yr , minimizing 
yin J(x,y) is equivalent to minimizing yl,yr in ](x1,y1, xr,yr), therefore (6.6) and 
(6.7) are equal to 
JMMmm := max min J(x\y1,xr, yr); 
x l EXl ,xrEXr yl EYl (f30) ,y rEY r(yl) 
lmmMM := min max J(x 1,y\xr,yr). 
y lEYl (J30) ,yrEYr(yl) x l EXl ,xrEXr 
Notice V(f3°) is defined as the optimal value of (6.6) and (6.7), then we have 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
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Consider the following optimization problems 
lmMmM := min max min max ](x1,y1,xr,yr); 
ylEYl(j)D) xlEXl yrEYr(yl) xrEXr 
JMmMm :=max min max min ](x1,y1,xr,yr), 
xl EXl ylEYl (j)D) xrEXr yrEYr(yl) 
(6.12) 
(6 .13) 
where (6.12) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of x1 and yr in (6.11) 
and (6 .13) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of y 1 and xr in (6.10) . 
We will show that all these problems have the same optimal value. 
Lemma 6.2.2 J MmMm and lmMmM are equal to V(,8°) . 
Proof: Switch the optimization orders of x1 and yr in (6.11), by the minimax 
theorem (Fan, 1953) , we have 
Similarly switch the optimization orders of y 1 and xr in (6 .10), we have 
Therefore, we have 
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On the other side, switching the orders of optimization between x1 , y 1 and then xr, yr 
in (6.13), by the minimax theorem, we have 
Therefore lmMmM 2: lMmMm· Combined this result with lmMmM < V(,B0 ) < 
• 
Theorem 6.2.3 The optimal solution xh of the outer maximization problem in (6 .13) 
and the optimal solution yh of the outer minimization problem in (6 .12) are the saddle 
point strategies of the first interaction. 
Proof: By lemma 6.2.2, lmMmM = V(,B0 ), which means player X can not get 
better payoff by changing xi, xr when player Y plays yh. Similarly, J MmMm = V (,8°) 
means player Y can not get better payoff by changing y1 , yr when player X plays xh . 
Therefore , xh, yh are saddle point strategies for the first interaction. • 
Given x 1 , y1 , the probability of reaching I x ,2 for any I x ,2 is 
For any Prx,2 > 0, we can calculate the conditional probability for any 0"1 >- Ix·2 
given the game arrives at Ix·2 
4 1 ( 1 1) ._ 1 1 /P 
fJa1 X , Y .-Xa1(a1)YJ Y,1(a1) ,d1(a1)rfZ,1(a1),s1(a1) [X ,2 
=y}Y,1 (a1 ) ,d1 (a1) r [ Z,1 (a1 ),s1 (a1) I ~ y}Y,1 (i71 ),dl (G-1) r [ Z,1 (G-1 ),s1 (G-1). 
i]-1';-[X,2 
Denote ,erx,2(x1 , y1 ) := {,81 (x 1 , y1)a1, IV0"1 >- Ix•2 } , which is a distribution on then-
odes within Ix·2 . Define the strategies xrx,2 , yix,2 on the subgame G(IX·2 , ,erx,2 (xl, yl )) 
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as 
1x ,2 ·= {x1x .2 IVIX,t >-- 1x ,2}· X . [X,t ,at , 
which satisfy the following constraints 
J r ( 1x ,2 [X ,2 ) ·-[ X,2 X 'y .-
x 1x'
2
, yix,2 can be taken as the projection of xr, yr on JX•2 such that for any Ix,t , JY.t >-
1x,2 
' 
Then ](xi, yl, xr, yr) can be written as the convex combination of the subgames' 
expected payoffs 
]- ( 1 1 r r) ~ 1 X ,y ,x ,y = Xal(IX,2) 
~ p ( 1 l)Jr ( [X,2 [X ,2 ) 
= [ X ,2 X , y [ X ,2 X , y , 
[ X, 2 
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Denote the feasible sets of x1x '2,y1x '2 as X 1x '2, Y 1x '2(.8 1x '2(x 1,y1 )) , then (6.12) and 
(6.13) can be written as 
Consider the inner min-max (or max-min) problems of the above problems 
(6.14) 
(6.15) 
which have the same structures as in problems (6.7) and (6.6) of the original game 
with x1x '2, y1x'2, (3 1x'2 (x1 , y1) correspond to x, y, (3° respectively. In fact , these are the 
exact formulations for the subgame G(Ix·2 ,(31x '2 (xl,y 1 )). Therefore, theorem 6.1.6 
and 6.1.8 apply, problems (6.14) and (6.15) have the same optimal value, denoted as 
V1x ,2 ((3 1x '
2 (x1 , y1)) and there is a finite set of support vectors Q1x ,2 such that 
Vjx ,2((3) = max f3 ·q. 
qEQix,2 
Substitute (6.14), (6.15) with V1x,2((31x '2(x 1 , y 1)) in (6.12) and (6.13), we have 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
Compared with lmmMM and lmmMM, (6.16) and (6.17) are smaller, which are easy 
to solve. But it also raises the following questions 
Q1: How can one obtain the set of support vectors Q1x ,2 for subgame G(JX·2 , (3 1x '2)? 
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Q2: Notice (6 .16) and (6.17) are not simple bilinear optimization problems, how can 
one solve them? 
Q3: How can one obtain the equilibrium strategies for all interactions rather t han 
t he first one? 
We will answer these questions in the rest of this section, which leads to the develop-
ment of the Subgame Decomposition Method. 
6.2.2 Identifying the Set of Support Vectors 
Notice the subgame corresponding to the problems of (6 .14) and (6.15) is one stage 
less t han the original game. In any subgame G(Ix,t, j3 rx ,t ) with t > 2, we can further 
separate its first interaction strategies from its remaining strategies with the same 
process, the corresponding optimization problems will be 
Y t . { yt IYt . j3[X ,t v WJ Y,t >-- I X ,t } . . = [Y,t,dt [Y,t ,dt .= at- l(IY,t) [Y,t ,dt , V , 
Prx ,t+l (x t ' yt) :=X~t (IX,t+l) L yJY,t(at ),dt(at ) rrz,t (at ),st (at); 
at 'r[X ,t+ l 
(6.18) 
(6 .19) 
This process cont inues until it reaches G(Ix,r, j3r x ,r), where the payoff for any play 
CJT = [CJT- I, aT , ~ ' sT] is given by Car . We will use a bottom up procedure to es-
timate the support vectors in Q rx,2 . The ideas of this procedure is shown in Fig. 
• # • 
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Figure 6·4: Bottom up estimation of the set of support vectors Q rx ,t. 
6·4. For bottom subgames G(Ix,r, ·), Qrx,T+l are the payoffs. For other subgames 
G(Ix,t, ·) , t < T, we will show how to estimate Qrx.r with given Qrx,T+l by solving a 
set of one-stage problems. 
Let urx.r ,ar be player X's behavior strategy on Ix,r , VrY,r,dr be player Y's behavior 
strategy on J Y,T >- Ix,r . Given these strategies, the expected payoff in G(Ix,r , j3rx.r) 
can be written as 
Jrx.r(u, v) .-
L V[aT-l ,aT],dT L T[aT- l,aT ,dT], 8TC[aT-l ,aT ,dT,sT]· 
dT sT 
The probability constraints on u, v are 
L U[X ,T,aT = 1; u ~ 0; L V[aT-l ,aT],dT = 1, 'V<JT- l , aT; v ~ 0, 
aT dT 
denoted as u E U, v E V . Notice Jrx.r(u, v) is a bilinear function on u , v , by theorem 
6.1.6 , the saddle point strategies of G(Ix,r, (3rx,r) are the optimal solutions of the 
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following problems 
max min J1x,r(u, v); min max J1x,r (u , v). 
uEU vEV vEV uEU 
Denote their common optimal value as V1x,r((31x,r) . By substituting u1x ,r ,ar with 
x 1x ,r,ar and u1x,r,ar f3~;~1 (JY,T) with y1Y,r ,dr in J1x ,r(u , v), the resulting objective func-
tion has the form of J(x, y) in (6.5), therefore theorem 6.1.8 applies, and V1x ,r(f31x ,r ) 
can be represented as the maximum of a finite set of linear functions. Denote the 
saddle point strategies as (u*,v*), substitute them into J1x ,r(u*,v*), Vjx ,r(f31x ,r) is 
Let QuT- 1 := L aT u;x,T,aT LdT v[uT- l,aT],dT L sT r[uT-l ,aT,dT],sTC[uT-l,aT ,~ ,sTJ, then the 
above equation suggests that q := { qur-1IO'T- l >- I x,T} is a support vector at the 
value (3 1x,r. Identifying the rest of the support vectors requires an algorithm for 
determining the extreme points of the dual polytope; later we will discuss an approx-
imate algorithm for determining these support vectors. 
Assume that we have identified the sets of support vectors for V1x ,r (f3 1x ,r ) for any 
I x ,r , then we use V1x ,r((31x ,r ) to find the set of support vectors for V1x.r-1((31x ,T- l). 
Following this procedure inductively, we can eventually identify the set of support 
vectors for V ((3°). The following discussion will focus on how to find the support 
vectors of V1x,r (f31x,r) given V1x,t+l (f31x,t+l) for all I X ,t+l >- I X,t. 
For a subgame G(JX·t, f3rx,t) with t < T , denote the sets of support vectors of its 
lower level subgames G(IX,t+i, (3 1x.t+1 ) with IX,t+l = [Ix,t, at, dt] as 
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Then any Vjx,t + l ((31x,t+l) can be written as 
X t + l KIX,t+l 
where A/ ' := {Aki L.:k=l ,\k = 1, ,\k ~ 0} is the set of convex combination 
coefficients. This is now a maximization over a continuous variable ,\ instead of a 
discrete variable k. Let u 1x,t,at be player X's behavior strategy on JX•t, V[o-t - l,at],dt be 
player Y's behavior strategy on [at- l , at]. In (6. 19) and (6 .18), substitute 
into the objective function , we have 
Jfx ,t(u, v) 
[ X ,t+l 
The probability constraints on u, v are 
denoted as u E U, v E V. By theorem 6.2.3, the first interaction saddle point strategies 
of G(Ix ,t, (3 1x ,t) are the optimal solutions of the following problems 
max min J 1x ,t(u, v); min max J 1x,t(u , v). 
uEU vEV vEV uEU 
(6.20) 
In minvEV maxuEU 11 x ,t ( u, v), one can merge the maximization over u and the 
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. . . JX ,t+l JX,t+l f t X t+l k 
maxnruzatwn over >.. Define wk := u1x .' ,a' Ak or any a , I ' and , then 
= ~EBzJ L {3~;_:_: L L V[at- l ,a'],d' 
at-1 at d' 
K 1X ,t+l 
L UJX ,t,at AkX ,t+l L r [at - l,a' ,d'],s'qk,[a' - l,a',d' ,s'] 
where W is a set of weights of support vectors in all lower level subgames. 
KjX,t+l 
W:={wl L L wt·'+l' if at( f X, t+l ) = at(JX,t+ l) ; 
k=l k= l 
K 1X,t+l 
2::: 2::: w(·'+l = 1; w ;::: o} , 
at k=l 
d fi . . t' f '\"'KIX,t+l JX ,t+l f JX t+l By its e mtwn, w must sa 1s y L...k=l wk = u1x ,',a'(Ix,t+l) or any ' . 
Denote the linear constraints in W as Lw = l where l is vector with dimension as the 
number of equations in Wand L 's column number is the dimension of w. According 
to this definition , we can retrieve u1x ,',a' by summing w over JX,t+l and we can also 
retrieve >.( 't+ 1 by normalized w within J X,t+l. Denote the objective function in the 
above maximization problem as 
K 1 X,t+l 
Jfx ,t (w , v) := L (3~:.:.: L L V[at- l ,a'],d' L WkX ,t+l L T[at-l,a' ,d'],s'qk,[a'-l ,at,dt,st] 
k=l 
Then millvEV maxuEU J1x,t ( u, v) is equal to 
min max J1x ,,(w, v). 
vEV wEW 
(6.21) 
(6.22) 
126 
From the expression in (6.21) , 11x,t(w , v) is a bilinear function of w , v: w'Av where 
A is a matrix with dimension lwl x lvl and the elements are the coefficients of the 
corresponding product of element in w and element in v. As discussed before, the 
constraint in W is denoted as Lw = l. Let n be the dual variable to Lw = l, then the 
dual problem of maxwEW w'Av is minun:2: Av l'n. Since 11x,t(w, v) are bounded for all 
w , v , by strong duality, replacing maxwEW w' Av with minun:2: Av l'n, we can convert 
(6 .22) to aLP problem 
mm l'n 
v,n 
s.t. L V[ut-l,atJ,dt = 1, V[O't-l' at] >--- IX,t; v 2: 0, 
dt 
L'n 2: Av. 
Therefore, solving (6 .23) can get the saddle point solution v in (6.22). 
(6.23) 
Notice 11x,t ( w, v) is a bilinear function on w, v with probability conservation con-
straints, By theorem 6.1.6 , it's equal to 
max min ]1x,t ( w , v). 
w EW v EV 
(6 .24) 
Denote the common optimal value of (6.22) and (6.24) as ~x,t({31x,t ) . By substituting 
v1Y, t , dt {3~~:(IY, t ) with y1Y,t,dt in 11x,r ( w , v ), the resulting objective function has the 
form of J(x , y) in (6.5) , therefore theorem 6.1.8 applied, V1x,t ((31x,t) can be represented 
by a finite set of support vectors. Furthermore, by theorem 6.1.6, the optimal solutions 
of outer optimization problem in (6.22) and (6.24) , denoted as v*, w* are saddle point 
solutions. Because (6.22) are converted from (6 .20) without changing v , v* is also the 
saddle solution of (6.20). 
Now we show how to solve (6.24) to get the support vector for a given (31x,t . 
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Expand the objective function in (6.24) , we have 
The equation is true because player Y minimizes the payoff by controlling V [a t-l ,at ], dt. 
Define 
and use them as surrogate variables. Then (6.24) is equal to the following problem 
(6 .25) 
Let the optimal solution be (w*, m*), define 
q* := { q;t- 1JQ;t-1 = L m;t-l ,at}. (6.26) 
at 
Then q* is the support vector for the given (Jlx ,t , because the payoff function V1x ,t (.B) 
is equal to the optimal value of (6.25) , which is 
One can solve (6.25) and obtain the support vector by (6.26). With w* , one can 
also obtain the equilibrium behavior strategy u* on JX,t , as shown in the following 
theorem. 
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Theorem 6.2.4 Let w* be an (part of) optimal solution to (6.25) and define u* such 
that 
(6.27) 
then u* is the equilibrium behavior strategy on I X,t in the subgame G (I X,t, j3t). 
Proof: By the definition of u*, for any v E V, J1x,t(u*,v) = ]1x,t(w*,v). Let 
(v*,u*) be the saddle point solutions in (6.20), i.e, 
J1x,t (u*, v*) =max J1x,e(u, v*) =min J1x,t(u*, v). 
uEU vEV 
Because w* is the saddle point solution in (6.24) and (6.25) is converted from (6.24), 
which has the same optimal value as (6.20). Then we have 
h x.e(u*,v*) = minl1x,t(w*,v) = minJ1x,t(u*,v). 
vEV vEV 
Because ]1x,t ( w, v) are converted from J1x,t ( u , v) without changing v, then v* is also 
the saddle solution in (6.22), then 
J1x,t (u*,v*) = ]1x,t(w*,v*) = J1x,e(u*,v*) = maxJ1x,t(u,v*). 
uEU 
As a result , we have 
J1x,t(u*,v*) = maxJ1x,t(u,v*) = minJ1x,t(u*,v), 
uEU vEV 
which completes the proof. • 
The procedure to identify the sets of support vectors for subgame G(Ix,t, ·)for all 
Ix,t, t = 1, .. . , Tis a one-pass backward method, similar to dynamic programming. 
We first evaluate the sets of support vectors Q1x ,r for all the lowest level subgames 
G(Ix,r, ·). With Q1x ,r, one can obtain a support vector of subgame G(IX,T- l , j3T- l) 
by solving (6.25). We will use Procedure 10 to obtain the set of support vectors. By 
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Figure 6·5: Estimating the value function V(,B1x,t) with the support 
vectors on randomly sampled distributions ,8. 
repeating this process until subgame G(Ix,l , ·), one can identify the set of support 
vector Q for V(,B0 ). Procedure 9 summaries the above process. To evaluate the sets 
Procedure 9 Identify the sets of support vectors for all subgame G(Ix,t , ·). 
Find the sets of support vectors Q1x ,r for subgame G(Ix,r, ·) for all Ix,r . 
fort = T-1, .. . , 1 do 
for all subgame G(Ix,t, ·) do 
With given Q1x,t+1 for any JX,t+l >- JX,t, find the sets of support vectors 
Q1x,t (Procedure 10) 
end for 
end for 
of support vectors Q1x,t with given Q1x ,t+l for any JX,t+l >- Ix,t, we borrow the idea 
of Point-based Value Iteration (Section 2.5), as shown in Fig. 6·5 . 
We take the advantage of the nested information structure, which is similar to 
the structure of Partial Observed Markov Dynamic Process (POMDP) where player 
X's strategy is equivalent to the control and player Y 's strategy is optimized based 
on player X 's strategy. The framework of this subroutine is shown in Procedure 10. 
Here the number of samples M is proportional to the dimension of ,8°. 
Please note that in Procedure 10, for each JX,t we also maintain the set of weights 
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Procedure 10 Estimating the set of support vectors Q1x,t 
Initialize Q1x ,t = 0, W1x,t = 0. 
Sample M points of f3 1x ,t independently. 
for each fJlx ,t do 
Solve (6. 2.V, denote the optimal value as V1x,t(f31x,t) . 
if V1x ,t( /3 1 ,t) < minqEQ1x ,t f3
1x ,t · q then 
Denote the optimal solution of (6.25) as (w*, m*) 
Construct its support vector q* by (6.26) with m*. 
add q* to Q1x ,t , w* to W1x ,t . 
end if 
end for 
of lower level support vectors W1x ,t, which will be used to retrieve the equilibrium 
strategies for the original game in the next phase. 
6.2.3 Retrieving the Global Saddle Point Strategies 
After identifying the sets of support vectors for all sub games G (I X,t , ·) , we will retrieve 
the equilibrium strategies for the original game for a given initial distribution (3° . This 
process starts from the top level subgame G(JX,l , /3°) . It obtains the first interaction 
saddle point strategies u;x,l ,al and v;Y,l ,dl by solving (6. 25) (convert w* to u* via 
(6.27)) and (6.22). Then the realization probability of any history a 1 = [s0 , a 1 , d1 , s 1] 
in any I x ,2 can be calculated by 
(6.28) 
which will be normalized within each I x·2 for P1x ,2 > 0 and then used as the initial 
distribut ion in G(Ix,z, ·). Fort~ 2, the behavior strategies on I Y,t can be obtained 
by solving the corresponding (6.23) for that subgame G(Ix,t, f3 1x ,t). However , the 
behavior strategy on I X,t is calculated from w*1x ,t - 1 and W1x ,t . Once the behavior 
strategy for I x ,t is ready, the realization probability of j31x ,t+l for any I X,t+l >- I x ,t is 
• • 
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Figure 6·6: Top down retrieval of the global equilibrium. 
We can also calculate the realization probability for an information set 
(6.29) 
For any I X,t+l 
distributions. 
[Ix ,t, at, dt] with P1x,t+l > 0, we further normalize the conditional 
(6.30) 
Note in this step, we ignore the subgames with zero realization probability. This 
process continues until it obtains the behavior strategies on all on-the-path informa-
tion sets (information sets with positive realization probability given the strategies 
on upper level information sets). The idea of the top down retrieval process is shown 
in Fig. 6·6. 
We obtain w*1x ,l by solving (6 .25) for the first one stage subgame, which is equiv-
alent to the saddle point strategy by theorem 6.2.4. Now we show how to calculate 
132 
w*1x ,t from w*1x ,t- 1 , W1x ,t in a top down process. Notice w*1x,t-
1 is a set of weights 
on the support vectors in Q1x ,t for all JX,t >-- JX,t- 1. For any JX ,t = [JX,t-1 , at- 1 , dt- 1], 
denote its support vector set as 
{ [X,t k} Q[X,t = Q ' , (6 .31) 
and the corresponding set of weights as 
{ [X ,t k} W1x ,t = w ' , (6.32) 
where each w 1x ,t,k corresponding to a q1x ·t,k, which is obtained in Procedure (10) while 
solving the problem of (6.25) for subgame G([IX,t-1 , at-1 , ~-1 ], · ) . Denote the weight 
corresponding to the support vector q1x,t,k in w*1x,t- 1 as wk_1x,t where JX,t depends 
on at-1 , dt- 1 . By theorem 6.2.4, we can calculate the equilibrium behavior strategy 
u 1x ,t- 1 on JX,t-
1 from w*1x ,t- 1, 
(6 .33) 
For any Ix,t = [JX,t- 1, at-1, dt- 1] such that u* > 0, we can normalize the [ X ,t-l ,at-1 
weights within JX,t as 
(6.34) 
Then w*1x,tis calculated as 
KJX ,t 
*[X,t '"""' \ *[X,t [X ,t k 
w = ~ "'k w , . (6.35) 
k= 1 
The following discussion is to justify that w*1x,t calculated in (6.35) is the (part of) 
optimal solution of (6.25) corresponding to subgame G(Ix·t, (31x,t), thus it's equivalent 
to a saddle point strategy. 
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In problem (6.25), define q(w) := {q(w)ut-ljO"t- 1 >- JX,t}, where q(w)ut- l is 
KIX ,t+l 
q( w )ut-l := L min L V[at-l,atJ, dt L Wk X,t+ l L r[at-l,at,dtJ,stqk,[at-1 ,at,dt ,st] · 
v 
at dt k = 1 st 
KIX,t+1 
=""'min ~ WkjX,t+l ~ r [ut-1 at dt j 8 tqk (at-l at dt 8 tj· 6dt 6 6 ' ''' , ,, (6.36) 
at k= 1 st 
By this definition, q( w )at- 1 is the expected payoff on node a-t- 1 when player Y opti-
mizes its strategy for a given strategy w of player X. 
Lemma 6.2.5 For any o-t-1 >- Ix,t, q(w)at-l is a concave function on w. 
Proof: For each at, we are minimizing over a finite set of linear functions of w, 
which is a concave function. The sum of concave functions is concave. • 
Lemma 6.2.6 Let w1x,t,k be a solution in (6.32) and q1x,t,k is the corresponding 
support vector in (6.31), then 
jX,t k ( jX,t k) q , = q w , . 
Proof: Since each w1x ,t ,k is the saddle point strategy when solving the problem 
(6.25) for subgame G(Ix,t, f3t), and q1x,t,k is calculated according to (6 .26), which 
is the expected payoff when · player Y 's optimizes its strategy for the given w1x ,t ,k, 
therefore the conclusion is true. • 
For any JX,t = [JX,t-1,at-I,dt-1], with).* calculated in (6.34), define 
(6.37) 
Lemma 6.2. 7 Let w*1x,t-l be the solution of problem (6.25) corresponding to the sub-
game G(Ix,t- I, f3 1x,t- l). For a next level subgame G(IX,t, f3 1x,t) with the initial dis-
tribution /31x,t obtained according to (6 .30), q1x,t defined in (6.37) is a support vector 
. in this subgame. 
134 
Proof: Assume the lemma is not true, then there is another convex combination 
rX ,t 
of support vectors in the subgame G(Ix,t , /3 1x,t) , ij := ~~=I 5-.C't q1x ,t,k, such that 
j3JX,t _ j3JX,t _ ·q> ·q1x,t. 
When player X replaces >..z/x,t with 5-.C't and keeps other weights the same, its payoff 
in this subgame is 
j3JX ,t _ . q, 
which is better than the payoff when it chooses w*1x ,t- 1 
This contradicts with w*1x,t-1 is the saddle point strategy in G(I X ,t-l, j31x,t-1). There-
fore the assumption is false and q1x,t is a support vector in the subgame G(Ix,t , j31x,t) . 
• 
Theorem 6.2.8 Let w* 1x ,t be calculated in (6 .35) and q1x,t, q(w)at-1 be defined as in 
(6.37) and (6.36) , respectively, then 
P2 w*1x,tis a saddle point strategy in subgame G(Ix,t,j31x ,t). 
Proof: By lemma 6.2.6, we have 
By lemma 6.2.5, qat-1 ( w) is concave on w, therefore, 
(6.38) 
135 
On the other side, by lemma 6.2.7, 7j1x ,t is a support vector for subgame G(Ix,t, (31x ,t), 
then 
(3 /X ,t • _ _ v ((3/X,t) _ (3/X ,t • ( *JX,t) q[X,t - [X,t - q W . 
V1x ,t (f31x,t) = (3 1x ,t . q( w*1x ,t) means given w*1x ,t, player Y can not get better payoff 
by changing its strategy, therefore w*1x ,tis the saddle point strategy in G(Ix·t, f3 1x ,t) . 
Furthermore, consider (3 1x ,t · q(w*1x ,t ) = (31x ,t · 7j1x ,t and (6.38) , notice (3 1x ,t is non-
negative, then 
The top down retrieval process is summarized in Procedure (11) . 
Procedure 11 Retrieve the global saddle-point strategies u, ii given (3°. 
Solve (6.23) , denote the optimal solution as ii1Y,l ,dl. 
Solve (6 .25), denote the (part of) optimal solution w as w*1x'1 • 
Retrieve u1x,l ,al with w*1x ,l via (6.27) . 
Calculate the distribution (31x '2 by (6.28). 
for any t = 2, ... , T do 
for any JX ,t with P1x,t > 0 do 
• 
Solve (6.23) with (31x,t from the upper level subgame, denote the optimal 
solution as ii 1Y ,t dt, V dt. Calculat~ w*1x,tfrom w*1x,t- 1 and W 1x ,t via (6.35). 
Retrieve u1x,t with w*1x,tin (6.33). 
Calculate the realization probability P1x ,t+l by (6.29). 
for any J X ,t+l with P1x ,t+l > 0 do 
Calculate the initial distribution (31x ,t+l for G(IX,t+1,(31x.t+1 ) by (6.30). 
end for 
end for 
end for 
Output players' behavior strategies u, ii. 
By theorem (6.2.3), the behavior strategies obtained in Procedure (11) for the 
first interaction of each subgame are part of the saddle point strategies of the original 
game on that interaction. Note that combining these local saddle point strategies 
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together does not necessary yield the global saddle strategies, i.e., if we obtain w*1x ,t 
by solving one stage subgames G(Ix,t, j31x,t) alone and put w*1x ,t for all JX.t together , 
the resulting strategy is not necessary a saddle point strategy in the multi-stage game, 
as shown with an example in the subsection 6.2.4. Therefore we need the following 
theorem to guarantee the outputs of Procedure (11) are the global equilibrium. 
Theorem 6.2.9 The strategies u, v obtained in Procedure (11) are the saddle-point 
strategies of the original game. 
Proof: See Appendix. • 
6.2.4 Subgame Decomposition on a Two-interaction Game 
We apply the subgame decomposition method for a two-interaction extensive form 
game to illustrate the process of this method. In order to make it easy to track, 
we construct the payoffs and the structure of the game as simple as possible , as 
shown in Fig. 6·7. This is a zero-sum game between player X and player Y , whose 
strategies are denoted as xt, yt at timet= 1, 2. The game starts at Nature selecting 
the underlying state under the initial distribution /3° = (1/2, 1/2) at the top level. 
Then player X and player Y act by turn with player X moves first. The actions of 
players are represented by lines with solid lines (after Nature) for player X and dash 
ones for player Y. Payoffs to player X are shown at the bottom. Two plays associated 
with payoffs -10 after player X's first action are constructed to provide an alternate 
choice for player X . Player X does not know the exact underlying state, therefore its 
information sets are represented by ellipses, which contains the sequences that player 
X can not tell the difference. 
The subgame decomposition method first decomposes the game. We get the first 
level subgame G1 and two lower level subgames G 21 , G22 , whose ranges are represented 
by dash rectangles in Fig. (6·7). Then in Procedure (9), the method evaluates the 
support vectors Q21 , Q22 for subgames G21 , G22 via Point-based value iteration of 
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Figure 6-7: Subgame decomposition on an extensive form game. 
Procedure (10). In subgame G21 , because player Y is a minimizer, it will definitely 
not choose 10 at the second stage. It's easy to find the support vectors are 
q~ 1 = (1, 0), q~ 1 = (0, 2). 
The corresponding weights for those support vectors are 
w~1 = (0, 1, 0, 0) , w~1 = (0, 0, 0, 1). 
Each wk1 represents the weights of G21 's lower level support vectors 
(10, 10) , (1, 0) , (10, 10), (0 , 2), 
which are the payoffs since G21 is at the bottom. Similarly, the support vectors for 
G22 ar~ 
q~2 = (2, 0) , q~2 = (0, 1). 
and the corresponding weights are 
w~2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), w~2 = (0, 0, 0, 1). 
138 
Since G1 is the highest level subgame with a given initial distribution, we don't need 
to estimate its value function. The method then goes to the strategy retrieval phase. 
It solves the problems of (6.22) and (6.25) with its lower level support vectors as qtk 
where k , i = 1, 2 and initial distribution as /3°. The saddle point payoff for this game 
is v* = 2/ 3 and the saddle point strategies for player Y at the first stage are 
vh = (2/3, 1/3; 1/3, 2/3) 
where each element in vh represents the probability of taking an action. By solving 
(6.25), the optimal weights of the 5 support vectors are 
wh = (2/ 3, 1/ 3; 1/ 3, 2/ 3; 0) , 
where the first two elements correspond to support vectors qzl, k = 1, 2 and the next 
two correspond to qz2 , k = 1, 2. The last one was for the payoff ( -10, -10). Based 
on wh , one can derive u*1 = (1 , 0) , ).*21 = (2/ 3, 1/ 3) and ).*22 = (1 / 3, 2/ 3). With 
j3° , vh , u*1 , we have the realization probabilities for nodes in the initial information 
sets of lower level subgame via (6.29). Then the initial distributions for G21 and for 
G22 are 
j321 = (2/ 3, 1/ 3) , (3 22 = (1/3 , 2/ 3) , 
respectively. Based on wh , one can derive the weights of support vectors of subgame 
G21 via (6.34): .A*21 = (2/ 3, 1/ 3) . Using .A*21 to weight the solutions in W 21 via 
(6 .35) , we have w 2 h = .Ai21 * wf 1 + .A22 1 * w~1 = (0, 2/ 3; 0, 1/ 3). From w 2 h we have 
u*21 = (2/3, 1/3), meaning player X chooses left with probability 2/3. Notice player 
Y will definitely not choose 10, the expected payoffs q2 1 for nodes in the initial 
information set of subgame G21 is (2/ 3, 2/ 3). Similarly, we get 
u*22 = (1 / 3, 2/ 3) 
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the expected payoff values for nodes in G22 are q22 = (2/3, 2/3). One can verify that 
with these strategies, the game achieves equilibrium. 
It 's interesting to note that if we obtained the local saddle point strategy u1 x ,t 
within subgame G(Ix,t, (3t) by solving (6.25) alone, instead of calculating w*1x,tvia 
(6.34) and (6.35) as in Procedure (11), the game may fail to achieve global equilib-
rium. For instance, in the subgame G21 , if we solve (6.25), one possible strategy is 
uP = (0, 1; 0, 0). Notice player Y will never choose the actions leading to payoff 10, 
the expected payoff under w21 is 2/3, the same as the expected payoff under w*21 . 
Therefore w21 is a local saddle point strategy. Changing w 2 h to w21 , the expected 
payoffs for nodes within the subgame are q21 = (1, 0). Compared with the expected 
payoffs of q22 = (2/3, 2/3) for nodes within another subgame G22 , player Y can take 
advantage over that by changing its first stage strategy as ii1 = (0, 1; 1, 0) , then the 
new payoff is 1/3, less than the saddle point value of 2/3, therefore the game can not 
achieve equilibrium by these strategies. 
6.3 Other Nested Information Games 
In the previous nested information game, the sequence of players within each inter-
action is 
attacker ~ defender ~ nature 
This is not a necessary requirement for our subgame decomposition method. As 
long as the zero-sum game is nested information, our method can decompose it with 
subgames starting with the information sets of the less-informed player, solves these 
subgames and retrieves the saddle point strategy of the original game. 
Here we propose several interesting extensions for other dynamic games of net-
work interdiction problems. Notice the foundation of our method is the subgame 
decomposition, allowing the game to be decomposed into subgames with one-stage 
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less. One can implement the backward support vectors estimation and the forward 
strategies reconstruction in the same approach as for the basic model. Therefore in 
each extension, we will only focus on describing the subgame decomposition. 
Defender observes the updated network state before its move: In some 
variations of the network interdiction game, the attacker interdicts the network, which 
has random outcomes controlled by Nature. Assume that the defender acts after 
observing the new network state, then the sequence of actions is 
attacker ----+ nature ----+ defender. 
Adapting the same notations from the basic model, the history of the game, the 
information sets corresponding to the attacker , the defender and Nature at timet are 
t _ [ o 1 1 d1 t t dt] t _ 1 T 1· IJ - s ,a ,s , , ... ,a,s, , - , ... , -, 
I X t [ 1 d1 t-1 Jt-1] t 1 T ' =a , ... , a ,a , = , ... , ; 
I Z ,t -[ 0 1 1 d1 dt-1 tl t- 1 T - s,a,s, , ... , ,a, - , .. . ,. 
I Y,t -[ 0 1 1 dl t tl t- 1 T 1 - s,a,s, , .. . ,a,s, - , .. . , - . 
Since the game does not end with the final history IJT- 1 , denote the play of the game 
as 
s:T [ 0 1 1 d1 T -1 T -1 dT -1 T Tj u = s,a,s, , . .. ,a , s , ,a ,s . 
Let u , v, r denotes the behavior strategies for the attacker, the defender and Nature 
as in the basic model, and /3~o be the initial probability on s 0, then the realization 
probability for a play 5T = [.§0 , a1 , sl, di, ... , aT-1, ST-1, dT-1 , aT, .§T j is 
T -1 
Prob{ 6T\u, v, r, /3°} := /3~oUjx , I al rjz ,l 81 VjY,l Jl (IT Ujx ,t atr j z ,t 8eVjY,t Jt )ujx,r arr jz,r 8·r. 
) ) , ' ' ) ' ' 
t=2 
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Define the attacker's (player X's) and the defender 's (player Y 's) realization plan as 
where x 1x ,t,at, y1Y,t,dt are defined recursively by 
Then the constraints on x, y are 
L X JX, l,al = 1; 
al 
""" (3o I-JfY,l . L......t YJY, l ,dl = sD(J Y, l )' v , 
L X JX,t,at = XJX,t - l(JX ,t),at-l(IX,t), \:It > 1, JX,t; (6 .39) 
a! 
L YJY,t,dt = YJY,t-l(IY,t),dt-l(IY,t), \:It > 1, I Y,t _ (6.40) 
dt 
Let X be the feasible set of x and Y((3°) be the feasible set of y , representing the 
above constraints on x, y, which written them concisely as 
X:= { x ~ OIEx = e}; Y((3°) := {y ~ OIFy = B (3°}. (6.41) 
where E , F , e, B are matrices (or vectors) derived from the coefficients of the con-
straint equations, which are similar to the basic model. 
Denote r oT := rr;=l rJZ, t(oT ),st(oT), then the realization probability of a play [JT is 
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Therefore the expected payoff under strategies x, y is 
J( x, y) := L x1x,T(8T),aT(8T)YJY,T-l(iF),dT- l(8T)r8rc8r, 
8T 
(6.42) 
where C8T is the payoff to the attacker when the game ends with oT 0 Then the 
problems of finding equilibrium strategies can be formulated as 
max min J(x, y), min max J(x, y), 
xEX yEY(f3D) yEY(f3D) xEX 
(6.43) 
where X, Y(,B0 ) are feasible sets of x, y based on their definitions. Since c8rr8r for 
all or are known constants, then J(x, y) is a bilinear function on x, y, the same 
formulations as in (6. 7) and (6.6). Furthermore, the constraints of x, y in (6.39) 
and (6.40) represents the same probability conservations as in (6.7) and (6.6). Then 
theorem 6.1.6 applies, we have that the optimal solutions in (6.43) are the saddle point 
strategies of the game. Let V(,B0 ) be the saddle point value in (6.43), By theorem 
6.1.8, there is a finite set of vectors Q, such that 
We're going to decompose this game into subgames by separating the players' first 
strategies from their remaining strategies. For any play or, the realization probability 
is 
T-l 
,B~UJX , l , al V JY,l ,dl rrz,l,sl (II UJX ,t ,atrf z,t, 5 tVJY,t,dt )uJx,T,arr 1z .r, 5 r 
t= 2 
where I X,t' at' IY,t' dt' I Z,t' st' t = 1' 0 0 0 ' T are all on the path of oT 0 Define the first 
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interaction strategies before I x ,2 as 
And define the remaining strategies after I x,2 as 
with 
t-1 
X r . u II u wiX,t at· [ X ,t,at .= [X ,t,at [X ,T(IX,t) ,aT(fX ,t)> V l l 
T=2 
Based on their definition, the probability constraints on x1 , y1 , xr, yr are 
""' Xl 1. ""' yl (30 wiY,l. L.....t al = , L.....t [Y,l ,dl = sO(JY,l), V , 
ai dl 
""' xr _ 1 wiX,2. L.....t [ X ,t ,a2 - , v , 
Denote the feasible sets for x 1 , xr as X 1 , xr respectively. Notice the constraints of yr 
depend on y 1 and the constraints of y 1 depend on (3°, denote the feasible set of yr as 
yr (y1 ) and the feasible set of y1 as Y1 ((3°). 
Denote r8r := n;=2 r [ Z,T(1F) ,sT(8T)' then the realization probability of bT can be 
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written as 
Given x1 , y1 , xr, yr and (3°, the expected payoff is 
J-( 1 1 r r) . """' 1 r r r X ' y 'X 'y .= ~ xal ((jT) TJ Z, l ((jT) ,sl((jT)Xr x .T((jT),aT((jT)YJY,t((jT),dt((jT{(jTC(jT 
(jT 
= L x~l(JX ,2 ) L T[Z, l((jT) , sl((jT)X~x,T((jT) ,aT((jT)Y~Y, t((jT),dt((jT)T~rC(jT, 
[ X,2 (jT'r[X ,2 
where the second sum groups plays JT into the different information sets I x, 2 that 
they belong to. By the definition of x1 , xr, maximizing x in J(x, y) is equivalent to 
maximizing x1 , xr in J(x1 , y1 , xr, yr). Similarly by the definition of y1 , yr, minimizing 
yin J(x, y) is equivalent to minimizing yl,yr in J(xl,yl, xr,yr), therefore (6.43) is 
equal to 
Notice V((3°) is defined as the optimal value of (6.43), then we have 
Consider the following optimization problems 
(6.44) 
(6.45) 
(6.46) 
(6.47) 
where (6 .46) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of x1 and yr in (6.45) 
and (6.47) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of y1 and xr in (6.44). 
With the same deduction as that for the basic model, we can show that 
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Theorem 6.3.1 The saddle point strategies uh, yh in (6.47) and (6.46) are saddle 
point strategies of the first interaction in the original game. 
Therefore we can apply the subgame decomposition method for this game as for the 
basic model. 
Attacker has noisy observation on flows: In some applications, attacker may 
have noisy observations on the flows, i.e., the defender's actions. This noisy observa-
tion depends on previous actions, or simply on whether there is flow on that arc. The 
attacker has random false observations with probabilities known by both the attacker 
and the defender. These observations can be taken as actions of Nature, denoted as 
d, for t = 1, .. . , T. Then the sequence of actions is 
attacker ---+ new state ---+ defender ---+ observation. 
Then the histories and the information sets in this game can be written as 
t [ o 1 1 d1 1 t t _rt t] t 1 T 1 CJ =s ,a ,s, ,o , .. . ,a,s,a,o, = , ... , - ; 
I X ,t -[ 1 1 t - 1 t-1] t - 1 T· -a ,o ... ,a ,o , - , ... ,, 
I z,t_ [o 1 1d1 1 dt-1 t - 1 t]t-'--- 1 T· -s ,a,s, ,o, ... , ,o ,a, -, ... ,, 
I Y,t - [ 0 1 1 d1 1 t tl t - 1 T 1· -s ,a,s, ,o, ... ,a,s, - , ... , -, 
I O ,t - [ 0 1 1 d1 1 t t Jtl t - 1 T 1· -s ,a ,s, ,o , ... ,a,s,a, - , ... , - , 
where JO ,t is the information set of Nature at which it controls the attacker's obser-
vations. Since the game does not end with the final history CJT- 1 , denote the play of 
the game as 
s;T [ 0 1 1 d1 1 dT -1 T -1 T T] u = s,a,s, ,o, ... , ,o ,a ,s. 
Let u, v, r, n denotes the behavior strategies for the attacker, the defender , the 
state transition and the noisy observation respectively and {3~0 be the initial probabil-
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ity on s0 , then given a play OT = [.5° , &1 , .§ 1 , d1, 0 1 , o o o, o_T- 1 , ST- 1 , JT-1 , OT- 1 , o_T, .§Tj, 
its realization probability is 
Prob{ OT iu, v, r, ,8°} :=,B~ou jx ,1 a,1 r Jz ,1 81 v JY,1 J1 n Jo,1 81 
, ' ' ' 
T-1 (II Ujx ,t a,trjz,t .stVjY,t Jtnjo,t 0t)Ujx ,T a,rrjz,T §T o 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
t=2 
Define the attacker's (player X's) and the defender's (player Y's) realization plan as 
where x1x,t at, y1Y,t dt are defined recursively by , , 
l-It> 1, IY,t, _rl; o y1Y,t ,dt = y1Y,t- 1,dt-1VJY,t,dt, v a 
Then the constraints on x, y are 
L X JX ,1,a1 = 1; 
a1 
L XfX,t ,at = X JX ,t-1(IX,t),at -1(IX ,t), '1/t > 1, JX,t; (6.48) 
a1 
LYJY,t,dt = YJY,t- 1(JY,t),dt-1(JY,t), 'lit> 1, IY,to (6.49) 
dt 
Let X be the feasible set of x and Y(,8°) be the feasible set of y, representing the 
above constraints on x, y, which written them concisely as 
X := { x 2 OIEx = e }; Y(,8°) := {y 2 OIFy = B,B0 }0 (6050) 
where E, F, e, B are matrices (or vectors) derived from the coefficients of the con-
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straint equations, which are similar to the basic model. 
Denote r5r := (fli'=~1 rrz,t(fJT) ,st (fJT)nro ,t(fJT),at(fJT))r1z ,r(fJT),sT(fJT), then the realized 
probability of a play OT 
Therefore the expected payoff under strategies x, y is 
J(x, y) := L X JX,T(fJT),aT(fJT)YJY,T-l (fJT),dT-l(fJT)rfJTCJT, 
fJT 
(6.51) 
where CJT is the payoff to the attacker when the game ends with or . Then the prob-
lem of finding equilibrium strategies can be formulated as the following optimization 
problems 
max min J(x, y), 
xEX yEY(f3D) 
min max J(x, y), 
yEY (f3D) xEX 
(6.52) 
where X , Y(,B0 ) are feasible sets of x, y based on their definitions. Since c6rr6r for 
all or are known constants, then J(x, y) is a bilinear function on x, y, the same 
formulations as in (6.7) and (6 .6). Furthermore, the constraints of x, y in (6.48) 
and (6 .49) represents the same probability conservations as in (6.7) and (6 .6). Then 
theorem 6.1.6 applies, we have that the optimal solutions in (6.52) are the saddle point 
strategies of the game. Let V(,B0 ) be the saddle point value in (6 .52), By theorem 
6.1.8, there is a finite set of vectors Q, such that 
Next we separate the players' first strategies from their remaining strategies. For 
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any play JT, the realization probability is 
T - 1 
j3~UJX , 1 ,al VJY,l ,dl TJZ,l ,sl nJO ,l ,ol (II U[X,t ,atTJZ,t,stVJY,t,dtnJO ,t,ot )UJX,T,aTT JZ,T ,sT 
t=2 
where I x,t, at , IY,t, dt, I z ,t, st, t = 1, ... , T are all on the path of JT. Define the first 
interaction strategies before I x ,2 as 
And define the remaining strategies after I x ,2 as 
with 
t-1 
X r . u II u \-IIX,t at. JX, t ,at .= JX ,t,at JX,r(IX,t) ,ar(JX ,t), V , , 
r=2 
t-1 
r 1 II wiY,t
1 
t ~ 2. YJY,t, dt :=yJY,l(JY,t ),dl(JY,t)VJY,t,dt VJY,r(IY,t) ,dr(JY,t), V 
r=2 
Based on their definition, the probability constraints on x 1 , y 1 , xr, yr are 
"'"' r 1 \-/IY,2."'"' r 1 \-/IX,2, ~ YJY,2,d2 =y[Y,l(JY,2), dl(JY,2)' V , ~ X[X,t,a2 = , V , 
L X~x,t,at =X~x,t- l(IX,t),at- l(IX , t)' \:/Ix,t, t > 2; 
at 
Denote the feasible set for x1 , xr as X 1 , xr respectively. Notice the constraints of yr 
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depend on y1 and the constraints of y1 depend on /3°, denote the feasible set of yr as 
yr (y1 ) and the feasible set of y1 as Y1 (/3°). 
Denote r~r := (fli=-;1 r 1z,t(1JT),s t( 1JT)nJo ,t(1JT ),at(oT) )riz,r(1JT) ,sT(,JT), then the realization 
probability of JT can be written as 
Given x1, y1, xr, yr and /3°, the expected payoff is 
= L X~l(IX,2) TJZ,l(JT),sl(JT)nJo,l(JT),ol(JT) L X~x,T(JT),aT(JT)Y;Y,t(oT),dt(oT) r~rC0r, 
[X ,2 <)T<;>-[X,2 
where the second sum groups plays JT into the different information sets I x, 2 that 
they belong to. By the definition of x 1,xr, maximizing x in J(x,y) is equivalent to 
maximizing x1,xr in ](x1,y1,xr ,yr). Similarly by the definition ofy1,yr, minimizing 
yin J(x,y) is equivalent to minimizing y1,yr in ](x\y1,xr , yr), therefore (6.52) is 
equal to 
JMMmm := max min J(x 1,y\xr,yr), 
xl EXl ,xrEXr yl EYl ((3D),yrEYr(yl) 
JmmMM := min max J(x\y1, xr , yr). 
yl EYl (f3D),yrEYr(yl) xl EXl ,xrEXr 
Notice V(,8°) is defined as the optimal value of (6.52), then we have 
(6.53) 
(6.54) 
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Consider the following optimization problems 
lmMmM := min max min max ](x\y\xr,yr); 
ylEYl (,BD) xl EXl yrEYr(yl) xrEXr 
JMmMm :=max min max min ](x\y1,xr,yr), 
xlEXl yl EYl (,BD) xrEXr yrEYr(yl) 
(6.55) 
(6.56) 
where (6.55) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of x1 and yr in (6.54) 
and (6.56) is the result of exchanging the optimization orders of y 1 and xr in (6.53). 
With the same deduction as that for the basic model, we can show that 
Theorem 6.3.2 The saddle point strategies uh, yh in (6.56) and (6.55) are saddle 
point strategies of the first interaction in the original game. 
Therefore we can apply the subgame decomposition method for this game as for the 
basic model. 
Chapter 7 
Games with Markov structure 
In chapter 6, we have developed a subgame decomposition method which exploits the 
nested information structure and decomposes the multi-stage game into a sequence 
of one-stage subgames. We show that the equilibrium strategies in the original game 
can be found by solving these subgames. In this method, we need to estimate a 
value function at each information set of the less-informed player. The number of 
these information sets and their sizes grow exponentially with the number of stages. 
Therefore, the subgame decomposition method requires lots of computation. Howev-
er, for games with Markov structure, we will show the method just needs to estimate 
T- 1 value functions with a constant number of variables. Therefore we can reduce 
computation exponentially. 
Definition 7.0.3 A dynamic game has Markov structure if 
• Markov transition probability The transition probability to a new state st 
completely depends on current state st- 1, current actions at, dt, i.e. , 
• Additive stage costs The total payoff is a sum of per stage payoffs, each of 
them only depends on current state st-1 , current actions at, dt, i.e., there is a 
set of functions ct(ss-1, at , dt), t = 1, ... , T such that 
T 
Cur = L ct(ss- 1(crr) , at(crr), dt(crT)), VerT. 
t=1 
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• Constant per stage actions sets Any information sets at the same level 
have the same set of actions. That is, for a fixed stage t and a fixed player 
n, n =X, Y , Z , any two information sets fn ,t, Jn ,t satisfy A(fn,t) = A(fn,t ). 
For games with Markov structure, we will show that t here is a common cost-to-go 
function for each stage, which only depends on the conditional distribution on the 
information set I x,t at that level. Instead of estimating the payoff functions for all 
the subgames at that stage, one just needs to estimate this cost-to-go function. We 
will show these results for t = 2. With recursive decomposition, one can generalize 
them for the subgames in other levels. 
Definition 7.0.4 For two sequences IL , Is , the remainder of IL mznus Is is 
defined as the subsequence of IL that consists all the elements NOT in Is , denoted as 
IL _Is. 
Another example CJ 2 = [s0 a1 d1] Ix,2 = [a1 d1] then CJ 2 - Ix·2 = s0 
' ' ' ' ' ' . 
7.1 The Common "Cost-to-go" Problems 
As discussed in the previous chapter, given the first stage saddle point strategies 
ul, yl, the optimization problems for subgame G(Ix,2 , ·)are 
J r ( [X,2 [X,2 ) , _ [X,2 X , Y ,-
(7.1) 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
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(7.4) 
(7.5) 
(7.6) 
Lemma 7.1.1 In a game with Markov structure, given two player X 's information 
sets, fX ,2 := [&1,d2],fx,2 := [a1,d2], for any sequences fY,t,o-T , o-1 >-- jx,2, there must 
be another sequences fY,t, a-T, 5 1 >-- 1 x,2 such that 
fY,t _ [al, d2] = JY,t _ [a1 , J2]; 
a-1 - [a\ d"2] = a-1 - [a\ J2]; 
a-T _ [al, d2] = a-T _ [a1 , J2]; 
denoted as fY,t 1x ,2 fY,t · G-1 1x ,2 5 1 · a-T 1x ,2 a-T respectively. 
+------+ ' +------+ ' +------+ 
Proof : Since J Y ,t, 0' 1 are all subsets of O"T, we just need to show for any play 
there must be another play 
Since s0 is the init ial action, if a-T and Jx ,2 exist , then Jz,1 := [s0 , a\ d1] must exist. 
Because the property of Constant per stage actions sets in the Markov game, f Z ,l has 
the same set of action as [.5°, &1 , d1], therefore, [s0 , a1 , d1 , .5 1] must exist. With similar 
deduction adding element one by one, we show that a-T exists. • 
Consider the constraints of (7.4) to (7.6) for two subgames starting at different 
. f . I~x 2 J-x 2 th . bl fX ,2 fX ,2 . b G(I~x 2 {3fx ,2 ) m ormat10n sets ' , ' , map e van a es x fx ,t at, y fY,t dt m su game ' , 
, , 
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with the variables x~x , 2 yix ,2 m subgame G(Jx,z, (31x '2 ) based on jX,t jX,t . fX,t,at' J Y,t,dt , 
jY,tlx,2 jY,t . Then if (3fx, 2 = (3 Jx ,2 , they're essentially the same constraints. Lemma 
+-----t 
7.1.2 summarizes the above discussion. 
Lemma 7.1.2 In a Markov game, any two subgames G(fx,z , (3fx, 2 ), G(Jx,z, (3Jx, 2 ) 
have the same f easible sets on x 1x.2 • They also have the same f easible sets on y1x '2 if 
they have the same initial distribution (3Jx ,2 = (3fx, 2 • 
Due to the property of additive stage costs, we can define 
T 
c~~ := cl(so(CTl), al(CTl), dl(CTl )); c:T := L ct(st- l(CTT), at(CTT), ~(CTT)) . 
t = 2 
Then for any CTT , CaT = c1 1{ T) + crT' where crT only depends on CTT -Ix ,z . Substitute 
a a a a 
. h 1 r . Jr ( JX ,2 JX,2) h CaT Wlt cal +caT ln f X ,2 X 'y ' we ave 
J r ( [X ,2 1x,2) f X ,2 X 'y 
+ 
Because 
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[X ,2 1x,2 r 
X JX ,T(aT),aT(aT)YJY,T(aT),dT(aT)T aT 
T 
=/3~; · 2 L II U[X,t(aT),at(aT)VJY,t(aT),dt(aT)TJZ,t(aT) ,st(aT) 
aT>-a! t = 2 
T-1 
-j3[X,2 """""' II 
- al ~ U[X,t(aT-! ),at(aT- ! )VJY,t (aT-! ),dt(aT- ! )TJZ,t(aT-1 ),st(aT-!) 
aT-! >-a! t= 2 
L UJX ,t(aT),at(aT)VJY,t(aT),dt(aT)TJZ,t(aT),st(aT) 
aT>-aT- ! 
Then (7.1) and (7.2) can be written as 
L f3Ix ,2 (xl' Yl )alC~I + 
al>-JX,2 
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and they have the same saddle point strategies as the following problems 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
By lemma 7.1.2, for subgames that have the same (31x'2 , the corresponding fea-
'bl f [X ,2 [X ,2 h s1 e sets o x , y are t e same. Furthermore, because additive stage costs 
and Markov transition probability, c~r = c~r, r~r = r~r if IJT ~ a-r. Therefore, if 
(3fX'2 = (3Jx.2, the optimizations problems (7. 7) and (7.8) are the same for both sub-
games G(fx·2 , (31x'2), G(Jx,2 , (31x'2) . Then we have 
Theorem 7.1.3 In a Markov game, any two subgames G(fx,2 , (3fx. 2), G(Jx.2 , (3Jx. 2) 
have the same optimization problems (7. 7) and (7.8) if (3fx,2 = (3Jx.2. 
By theorems of 6.1.6 and 6.1.8, (7.7) and (7.8) have the same saddle point value. 
As a function of the initial distribution (31x,2, this saddle point value can be represent-
ed by a finite set of support vectors. Since this "cost-to-go" game does not depend on 
any specific information set I x,2 at that level, without referring to a specific informa-
tion set we can just denote it as G2 ((31) with (31 as the distribution of the initial states 
in the "cost-to-go" game. The corresponding saddle point value function is denoted 
as V2 ((31 ), By theorem 7.1.3, instead of estimating the saddle point value function 
V1x,2((31x'
2) for each subgame G(Ix·2 , ·),one can estimate V2 ((31) for G2 ((31). 
Notice G2 ((31 ) can also be taken as a "cost-to-go" game starting on an information 
set I x, 2 without considering the cost of the first interaction c1 ( s0 , a 1 , d1 ). One can 
further decompose G2 ((31) and find the "cost-to-go" game for the next level subgames. 
By doing this iteratively, one "cost-to-go" game for one level, we just need to estimate 
T- 1 saddle point value functions , Vt((3t-l ), t = 2, ... , T, where Tis the number of 
interactions in the original game. 
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Figure 7·1: Grouping nodes (within the circles) with the same latest 
state to reduce the sizes of subgames. 
7. 2 The Indifferent Histories 
Within a subgame G(Ix,t, (31x,t), the histories CJt- 1 within its initial information set 
I X,t can be written as 
t-1 [ 0 1 d1 1 t - 1 _rl;-1 t-1] CJ =s,a , ,s, ... ,a ,a ,s. 
Notice Ix,t = [a1, dl, ... ,at-1,dt- 1], then the number of histories within that in-
formation set (histories with the same subsequence I x ,t but different subsequence 
CJt- 1 - I x,t) grows exponentially with the number of stages t. However, for games 
with Markov structure, we will "group" the histories that share the same current 
state st- 1 into one "node" , as shown in Fig. 7 ·1. In this approach, the size of I X,t 
is the number of possible underlying states IS I, which is constant over time. In fol-
lowing discussion, without specific instruction, all sequences are restricted to be the 
successors of a given Ix· 2 . 
Lemma 7.2.1 In a Markov game, given two histories Q- 1 := [s0 ,a1,d1,s1], Q- 1 := 
[.5° , a 1 , d 1 , 81], for any sequences fY,t, o-r >- Q-1, there must be another sequences JY,t, o-r >-
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0'1 such that 
denoted as fY,t~ JY,t · a-r ~o-r respectively where a 1 is the space o1 8"1 Q-1 
+------t ' +------t ' • 
Proof Since JY,t is a subset of aT, we just need to show for any play 
there must be another play 
-T [ -0 1 d1 - 1 dJT-1 ~ T ~Tl -1 a := s , a , , s , ... , , a , s >- a . 
Because the property of Constant per stage actions sets in the Markov game, on 0'1 , Q-1 , 
Nature has the same set of action s2 . Therefore the existence of [Q-1 , .5 2] indicates the 
existence of [o-1 , .52] . With similar deduction adding element one by one down to a 
play aT. We prove the lemma. • 
By lemma 7.2.1 , player Y's behavior strategies on information sets fY,t >- a-t can 
be applied to the information sets JY,t >- o-t if fY,t ~ jY,t. Then grouping a-t, o-t 
means restricting player Y's behavior strategies after a-t, o-t, such that 
~ ()1 -
V. - v- l.f IY,t JY,t JY ,t dt - JY,t dt -- · 
, , f---------t 
We will show that for two Q- 1 , 0'1 in the same I x ,2 with s1 ( Q-1 ) = s1 ( 0'1 ) , grouping Q-1 , 0' 1 
does not change the saddle point value, thus player Y can use the same strategies on 
these histories and their matched successors (with relationship ~) without getting 
worse payoff. 
Consider a "cost-to-go" game G2 ({31 ) with player X's initial information set as 
Ix·2 . Given the behavior strategies u, von the game. We can calculate the expected 
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payoff for any node a 1 >-- Ix·2 as 
T 
p( a 1 ) := L II UJX,r(uT),ar(uT)VJY,r(uT) ,dT(uT)rlz,r(uT),sT(uT)C~~; (7.9) 
17T .,_17 1 T=2 
where c~~ := 2:~=2 cT(sT-1(aT), aT(aT), dT(aT)). Let a-1, £71 be two histories within 
I x ·2 such that s1(a1) = s1 (£71). By lemma 7.2.1 , for any history a-T>-- al, there must 
be another history a-T >-- £7 1 , such that a-T~ a-T. Therefore, for any T > 1, 
Thus u1x,r(iTT),aT(iTT) = u1x ,T(iTT),ar(o-r); c~~ = c~;, . Furthermore, by the property of 
Markov Transition Probability, we have 
As a result, the difference between p( a1) and p( £7 1) totally depends on player Y 's 
strategy v. The following lemma summarizes the above result. 
Lemma 7.2.2 In G2((31 ) , let al,£71 be two histories within Ix·2 such that s 1(a1 ) = 
s1 ( £7 1) , then the difference of their expected payoff values totally depends on player 
Y 's strategy v. That is, if 
Lemma 7.2.3 Denote the saddle point strategies of G2 ((31 ) as u*, v*. Let p* ( a 1 ) be 
the expected payoff on node a 1 given u*, v*. Let a 1 , £7 1 be two histories within I x,2 
suchthats1 (a 1 )=s1 (£7 1 ). If (3~ 1 ,{3~ 1 > 0, thenp*(a1 )=p*(i71 ). 
Proof: Assume p* ( (J-1) > p* ( £7 1), then player Y can change its strategies such 
that VfY,t ,dt +-- VjY,t,dt if fY,t ~jY,t . By lemma 7.2.2, the difference of expected values 
on (J- 1 and £7 1 totally depends on player Y's strategies. Notice after that change, 
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these strategies are the same, then the new expected payoff on 8- 1 should be equal 
to p* (a-t). Since f3; 1 > 0, player Y can decrease the expected payoff to player X by 
the amount of f3; 1 (p* ( 8-1) - p* ( a1)), which contradicts with v* is the saddle point 
strategy. Therefore, the assumption is false. With the same argument, one can rule 
• 
Assume we have the saddle point strategies u*, v* for the subgame G2 ((3 1). For any 
histories within the initial information set I x ,2 of the game that share the same current 
state s1 , by lemma 7.2.3, player Y can make these strategies to be the same without 
getting worse payoff. As discussed before, these histories are naturally indifferent to 
player X. Therefore, we have 
Theorem 7.2.4 In a "cost-to-go" subgame G2 ((3 1), by restricting playerY 's strategy 
on any histories in its initial information set that have the same latest underlying 
state s1 (and their successors with mapping ~), player Y does not get worse payoff. 
By theorem 7.2.4, any histories in JX, 2 in the subgame G2 ((3 1 ) can be grouped ac-
cording to s1 . Specifically, for any 31 we merge { 0"1 1 s 1 ( 0"1 ) = 31 } as a node. The 
corresponding distribution is changed to (3 1 := {(3;11(3;1 := L,B1>-s1 f3;.1, \fs1 }. After 
merging, the number of nodes within Ix, 2 is lSI. One can repeat the same process 
in subgame GH1 ((3t) fort> 2 and keep the number of nodes within JX ,t+ 1 constant-
ly being lSI. Combined with the result of the common "cost-to-go" subgame, the 
computation for games with Markov structure is reduced exponentially. 
7. 3 Numerical Results 
In this section we use our method to solve multi-stage network interdiction games 
with nested-information and compare with the method (called Large LP) in (von 
Stengel, 1996), which solves the bilinear problems (6.6), (6.7) of the multi-stage game. 
Numerical results show that our method is about 2 to 3 orders of magnitude faster. 
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Figure 7·2: The underlying networks for the nested information game. 
For each arc, the first number is the capacity, and the second number (if 
any) is the probability of broken if attacked. Arcs without this number 
are not interdictable. 
More important, when the problem size increases and the Large LP fails to output 
solution, our method can still solve the problem within a short time. 
Consider an interdiction game on the network shown in Fig. 7·2, where at the 
beginning each interdictable arc exists with probability of 50%, which are indepen-
dent across arcs. At each stage the attack randomly selects an arc to attack. After 
observing the attacker's action, the defender decides whether to send flows on the at-
tacked arc if it's available. If it chooses not to send flow, i.e. to deceive the attacker, 
the defender needs to pay the deception cost as 1/10 of the difference between the 
maximum flow when it uses the attacked arc and the maximum flow when it does 
not use this arc. At the final stage, the payoff to the defender is the max-flow of the 
resulting network, i.e ., the defender 's cost is the negative of the maximum flow. The 
attacker is to maximize the defender's total cost, the sum of the costs in all stages. 
The network state depends on the previous network state as well as players ' current 
actions. As a result , the game has Markov structure. 
The number of attackable arcs and the number of interactions can inflate the 
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Table 7.1: The number of states and the number of players' actions 
grow with the number of attackable arcs (A), assuming the game has 
constant action sets over time. 
A States X actions Y actions 
3 23 = 8 3 2 
4 24 = 16 4 2 
5 25 = 32 5 2 
6 26 = 64 5 2 
problem size exponentially. Table 7.1 shows that the possible states of the network 
grow exponentially with the number of attackable arcs. Consider the LP problem 
(6.14) 
max min x'Cy. 
x?'_O,Ex=e y?'_O,Fy= f 
In the case where the number of actions are constant over time, let na, nd , n8 be the 
number of actions for player X, player Y and Nature respectively. Denote t as the 
total number of interactions in the game. Then the size of E , F, C have the following 
relationship with na, nd, ns and t 
(E;,E~) = (1,na);(F/,Fc1 ) = (na*ns,na*nd*ns);(c;,c~) = (E~,Fc1 ); 
(E;+l, E;+1) = (E; * na * nd + 1, (E;nd + 1) * na) , 
(F;+l , F:+ 1) = ((F; * nd + 1) * na * n8 , (F: + 1) *nand* ns), 
where Mn Me are the row number and the column number of the matrix M with 
M = E, F, C. Table 7.2 shows that the sizes of x, y, C, E, F grow exponentially with 
the number of interactions T and the number of attackable arcs. 
The running times (in terms of seconds, if not specified) are shown in Table 7.3. 
The second column is the number of support vectors of the expected payoff functions 
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Table 7.2: The size of optimization problems grows exponentially with 
the number of interactions (T) . 
(A,T) X y E F c 
(3 , 1) 3 48 1 X 3 24 X 48 3 X 48 
(3 , 2) 21 2352 7 X 21 1176 X 2352 21 X 2352 
(3,3) 129 112944 43 X 129 56472 X 112944 129 X 112944 
( 4, 1) 4 128 1 x 4 64 X 128 4 X 128 
(4, 2) 26 16512 9 X 36 8256 X 16512 36 X 16512 
(4, 3) 292 2113664 73 X 292 1056832 X 2113664 292 X 2113664 
Table 7.3: Compare subgame decomposition method and the Large 
LP method in (von Stengel, 1996). Tis the number of interactions and 
A is the number of attackable arcs within the network. 
(A,T) subgame Large LP 
Sup. Vee. Time Var. Const . Time 
(3 , 2) 30 0.109 1197 2359 0.031 
(3 , 3) 211 0.218 56601 112987 150.947* 
(4, 2) 61 0.297 8292 16521 1.825 
(4, 3) 574 0.826 1057124 2113737 > 24h 
found in the estimation phase. Columns 4 - 5 are the number of variables and the 
number of constraints in the large LP problems. For the cases where there are only 
3 attackable arcs in the network, we restrict arc (3, 7) is not attackable. When the 
problem is very small, the Large LP approach is faster than our algorithm. However, 
when the interaction T increases to 3, as in the case of (A, T) = (3, 3), the LP size 
has 56601 variables and 112987 constraints. The Large LP method solves it with 
more than 150 seconds, where the subgame decomposit ion method just needs 0.218 
second, about 2 to 3 orders of magnitude faster. In the case of (A, T) = (4, 3) , the 
Large LP method fails to solve within 24 hours while our method requires less than 
one second. 
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Table 7.4: The computation versus error in subgame decomposition 
method. 
M (A, T) = (3, 2) (A, T) = (4, 2) 
time vee pt. err time vee pt. err 
50 0.052 27 2.50% 1.33% 0.151 53 1.75% 0.36% 
100 0.109 30 1.25% 0.21% 0.297 61 1.50% 0.09% 
200 0.202 33 0% 0 0.639 71 0.75% < 10-5 
The subgame decomposition method is an approximation method since it esti-
mates the expect payoff functions (or cost-to-go functions for Markov games) with 
randomly sampled distributions. Statistically speaking, the more it samples, the 
more accurate estimation it achieves. Table 7.4 compares the computation and the 
errors of the method for different sampling numbers, which are M times the num-
ber of network states. For example, in the case of (A, T) = (3, 2), the number of 
network states is 2IAI = 8, it randomly samples M8 initial distributions to estimate 
each function. The running times are measured in terms of seconds. "vee" is the 
number of support vectors that the method obtains. We randomly sample another 
400 distributions and compare the estimated values with the true values (obtained in 
the large LP method). "pt." is the percentage of these distributions that have relative 
error (defined as 1- est.val.jtrueval.) greater than 10-6 . "err" is the maximum of 
these relative errors. No surprising, the running time is linear with M and the error 
decreases on M. 
Next we increase the number of stages T and use the subgame decomposition 
method to solve these problems which can not be solved by the Large LP method due 
to the problem sizes. The numerical results are shown in Table 7.5. Notice that the 
large LP method is not available to output the exact equilibrium payoffs, we compare 
decomposition method with different sampling multipliers M and take the most accu-
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Table 7.5: Decomposition method for larger problems. 
M A=3 A=4 
time vee err.avg err.std time vee err.avg err.std 
T=4 LP = (2 .71106 , 5.42106 ) LP = (1.35108 , 2.70108 ) 
50 0.23 230 0.10% 0.12% 1.33 638 0.44% 0.36% 
100 0.52 412 0.07% 0.09% 3.52 1389 0.31% 0.28% 
200 1.11 629 0.04% 0.06% 11.73 2458 0.23% 0.19% 
400 2.51 1084 N/A N/A 151.69 4469 N/A N/A 
T=5 LP = (1.30108 , 2.60108 ) LP = (1.731010 , 3.461010 ) 
50 0.37 235 0.26% 0.11% 2.62 764 1.31% 0.59% 
100 0.98 415 0.09% 0.07% 9.34 1475 1.19% 0.59% 
200 2.45 1042 0.07% 0.07% 111.28 2884 0.34% 0.29% 
400 6.65 1867 N/ A N/ A 533.12 5913 N/ A N/ A 
T=6 LP = (6.25109 , 1.25 * 1010 ) LP = (2.21 * 1012 , 4.431012 ) 
50 0.53 278 0.28% 0.10% 4.32 774 1.49% 0.56% 
100 1.44 564 0.18% 0.09% 40.40 1580 1.22% 0.48% 
200 4.30 1067 0.08% 0.07% 226.04 2894 0.34% 0.28% 
400 43.71 2038 N/ A N/ A 1104.12 6080 N/ A N/ A 
rate one (i.e. the implementation with the maximum M) as the proxy of the exact val-
ue to estimate the average relative error "err.avg" and its standard deviation "err.std". 
"vee" is the number of support vectors found by the method. To give a sense of the size 
of problems we're dealing with, Table 7.5 also provide the sizes of equivalent LP prob-
lems for the Large LP method with LP = (variables number, constraint number). 
In all cases, the number of support vectors increases when we raise the number of 
samples in estimation, meaning that we can better capture the shape of the payoff 
function. The numbers of support vector can be quite different. For example, in 
the case of (A , T) = (3 , 4) , the method can find 278 support vectors with M = 50, 
compared with 2038 support vectors found with M = 400. However , with so many 
additional support vectors, the accuracy is just improved by about 0.28% in average. 
At the same time, the computation increases from 0.53 second to 43.71 , about two 
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orders of magnitude. One can make a balance between computation and accuracy 
based on the computation resource and the solution requirement. 
Another interesting observation is that when the number of interaction increas-
es, the error increases as well as the computation. Compare the case of (A, T) = 
(4 ,4),M = 200 with the case of (A ,T) = (4, 6) , M = 200, the error increases from 
0.23% to 0.34%. This is because in the subgame decomposition method, the error 
accumulates from stage to stage, from the lower level subgames to the upper level 
subgames. The network size (i.e., the number of attackable arcs) or the total number 
of states can affect the errors too. Compare the case of (A, T) = (3, 5) with M = 400 
to the case of (A , T) = (4, 5) with M = 400, the computation increases from 4.30 
seconds to 226.04 seconds and the error increases from 0.08% to 0.34%. Notice the 
number of network states is doubled from 23 = 8 to 24 = 16, the size of LP problem 
in each subgame is also doubled. Therefore both computation and error increase. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation focuses on stochastic network interdiction problems where an at-
tacker selects a set of arcs in a network to interdict with limited resource, with the 
purpose of minimizing the maximum flows on the resulting network between source(s) 
and destination(s). The interdiction has random outcome, i.e. , the attacked arcs may 
be completely removed or remain in the network with full capacities under with a giv-
en probability. We investigated three classes of such network interdiction problems 
motivated by specific applications. 
The first problem is the one-stage interdiction problem studied in chapter 3. In 
this model, there is only one round of attack on the network which has random out-
comes. The attacker minimizes the expected maximum flows between a source and 
a destination in the network. Cormican et al. (Cormican et al. , 1998) studied this 
problem before and developed a sequential approximation method (SAA). Borrow-
ing their idea of iteratively increasing the approximation accuracy by considering the 
average effects of random outcomes, we developed a new solution method (MBB) 
that integrates the branch and bound techniques with increasingly accurate approx-
imations. Numerical experiments show that MBB is about two orders of magnitude 
faster than the previous algorithms. 
We extended the basic model to incorporate different types of networks, including 
undirected networks, multi-source/destination networks and networks with uncertain 
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source/ destination. We developed lower and upper bounds separately for each of 
these extensions and extended our MBB algorithm to solve these problems. 
In chapter 5, we extended one-stage interdiction problems to multi-stage inter-
diction problems where the attacker can interdict the network several times and can 
adapt sequential strategies based on observing the outcomes of previous attacks. This 
is a new formulation for multi-stage interdiction problem, which emphasizes the ob-
servation of the updated network can affect consequent attacks. We developed a 
model-predictive approach as in (Castanon and Wohletz , 2009). Instead of solving 
the exact model, we first solve a lower bound approximation allows for non-integer 
attack allocations in the second and subsequent waves, but requires integer alloca-
tions in the first stage. The optimal solution to the lower bound problem is a binary 
strategy for the first attack. After carrying out that strategy and observing the result, 
the attacker has an interdiction problem with one less stage. By doing this iteratively, 
one can generate binary strategies for all stages. With concrete numerical results , we 
show that the model-predictive approach often finds the optimal solution. To solve 
the approximation method, we developed a new set of performance bounds, which are 
integrated into a branch and bound procedure that extends the single stage approach 
to multiple stages. Numerical examples show that our method is the best among 
available methods that can be applied for this problem. 
A third class of problems that we studied in this thesis is the interdiction problem 
where the attacker has only statistical information about the network state, referred 
as partial information. For instance, the attacker may not observe the result of all 
attacks, or the attacker may be uncertain about the existence of certain arcs. In 
these problems, the attacker may gather information from observing the actions of 
the network. This raises the possibility for the network to deny information to the 
attacker. We formulated this problem as a zero-sum game with nested information. 
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To find its equilibrium behavior strategy, we adopted the Linear Programming (LP) 
formulation developed in (von Stengel, 1996). Notice the size of the LP problem 
grows exponentially with the number of interactions. To tackle this difficulty, we 
developed a method, which exploits the nested information structure of the game 
and decomposes the multi-stage game into a sequence of one-stage subgames. The 
method estimates the expected payoff of each subgame as a function of its initial 
conditional probabilities. We showed that the original equilibrium strategies can be 
found by solving these subgames. For games with Markov structure, we developed 
an aggregate algorithm that reduces the computation exponentially. Experiments 
shows that our method is several orders of magnitude faster than the comparable 
LP approaches of the method in (von Stengel, 1996). More important, for larger 
problems where the LP approach fails to solve, our method can output high quality 
solutions within a short time. 
8.2 Future work 
Many questions are interesting for future research topics. 
One of the problems of interest is where the attacker's impact on the network 
can vary. One can allow multiple attack per arc, or stochastic outcomes that are 
continuous random variables instead of binary random variables. This would happen 
when an attack may reduce the capacity arbitrarily, to allow for partial success. 
Under these conditions, the set of future network states resulting from attacks may 
not be finite. Our lower bound was based on finite partitions of the network state 
that exploited the binary outcomes. New sets of bounds would be required, along 
with a branch-and-bound scheme to exploit these bounds. 
Another interesting direction is to consider a network with multiple commodities, 
where the flows are heterogeneous, meaning that each commodity has its own source 
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and destination, unlike the multi-source/destinations problem in our extension. The 
attacker is to minimize the total flows of these commodities. One can tackle this 
problem by separating the flow on each arc into different commodities' flows , the sum 
of which subjects to the capacity constraint. 
We studied a zero-sum game where the attacker has partial information about 
the network and developed solutions based on the nested information structure of the 
game. What if the defender also has partial information? It's reasonable to assume 
that the defender may not completely observe the attacker's actions. This assumption 
breaks the nested information structure and poses a challenge in developing new 
efficient algorithms to solve this problem. 
Our branch and bound approach developed for stochastic network interdiction 
problems can be applied to more general mixed-integer stochastic problems. Notice 
our method just requires a lower bound approximation, which can be increased and 
eventually equivalent to the original problem by refining the partitions of the space 
of random outcomes. Therefore our method can be extended to solve any mixed-
integer stochastic problems that have the objective function being convex on the 
random outcomes. It's meaningful to check whether our method can compete with 
the methods designed specifically for these problems. 
The foundation and the premise of our subgame decomposition method is the 
nested information structure. For games with Markov structure, the computation 
can be enhanced dramatically. One can apply this method to more general zero-
sum games that possess such structures. They can be problems beyond the network 
interdiction domain. It's interesting to see whether our method can help to solve 
those problems. 
Appendices 
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Appendix A 
The proof of Theorem 6.2.9 
Theorem A.O.l Let u, v be the strategies obtained in procedure (ll), then u, v are 
the saddle-point strategies of the original game. 
Proof: Denote the corresponding part of strategy v in the subgame G(Ix,t, f3t) 
(not just the first interaction in G(Ix ,t, f3t)) as v(Ix,t), similarly denote the corre-
sponding part of strategy u in the subgame G(Ix,t, f3t) as u(Ix,t). 
Fix player Y 's strategy v and allow player X change its strategy u. According to 
(6.30) where 
the conditional distribution f31x ,t+l for subgame G(IX,t+l, f31x,t+I) is NOT affected by 
player X 's strategy u. Therefore, when v is fixed, the conditional distribution f3 1x,t+l 
on every information set I x,t+l are fixed . 
At the bottom level subgames G(Ix,T, /3 /X,T), by theorem 6.2.3, u(IX,T) and 
v (Ix,T) are the saddle point strategies with the value V(f31x,T). For a subgame 
G(Ix,t, f3 1x,t) , assume we have shown that u(IX,t+I) is the best response to v in the 
lower level subgame G(IX,t+l , f31x,t+1 ) for all JX,t+l >- JX,t, meaning Player X can 
not get better payoff in subgame G(IX,t+I, f31x,t+I) by changing u(JX,t+ l) for any 
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JX,t+l >- Ix,t. According to problem (6.18) where 
the expected payoff in the subgame G(Ix,t , {Jlx ,t ) is the weighted sum of the expected 
payoffs of its lower level subgames G(IX,t+I, {Jlx ,t+l) with the weight is calculated as 
By theorem 6.2.3, urx,t,at (or equivalently xt) is the saddle point strategy for the one 
stage game, therefore it optimizes the weight of Prx,t+l for all JX,t+l >- Ix,t . As a 
result , player X can not get better payoff by changing u(IX,t+l) for all JX,t+l >- JX,t 
and urx,t,at at current information set I x ,t. Therefore, u(JX, t) is the best response to 
ii in the subgame G(Ix,t ,/Jfx ,t ). By induction from t = T , . .. , 1, we show that u is 
the best response to ii. 
Next we will show that ii is the best response to u. According to procedure 
(11) , for any subgame G(Ix,t, (3rx,t), VrY,t,dt is the (part of) optimal solution of the 
corresponding problem (6.23) , which is converted from the min-max problem in (6.20) 
min max Jrx,t(u , v ), 
v EV uEU 
without changing v. Here lrx,t (u, v) is 
Notice in procedure (11), urx,t,at and ).lx,t+l in the one stage problem G(I x ,t , (3 rx,t ) 
are derived from w*rx,t. When player X 's strategy w*rx,t for all JX,t is fixed , urx,t,at 
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and .Vx, t+ l are also fixed. (note that if w*1x ,t is not obtained via (6.35) in procedure 
(11) , .A1x ,t+l is not necessary fixed , as shown in the last paragraph of subsection 
6.2.4.) By theorem 6.2.3, v1Y,t,dt is the saddle point strategy in the one stage subgame 
G(Ix,t, (3 1x ,t ). It must satisfy that, for any IY,t = [o-t- l , at] >-- Ix,t 
Note that this minimization does not depend on (3rx, t , which means even when (3 1x,t 
is changed by player Y 's past strategies on the subgames in the upper levels , the 
optimality of VrY,t,dt at IY,t still holds. For player Y , the only possible way to get 
better payoffs at IY,t is to change its future strategies after IX ,t+l to make the expected 
payoffs of nodes in the lower level information sets IX,t+l become better and then 
adjust v1Y,t ,dt based on these payoffs. Now we 're going to show by changing its future 
strategies after I x ,t+l alone, player Y cannot improve the payoffs on nodes in I x ,t+I. 
When t = T , this is trivial since nodes in IX,T+l are leaf nodes, where payoffs are 
given. Now we just need to show player Y can not get better payoffs for nodes in Ix,t 
by changing its strategy after Ix ,t. Let q1x, t,qcrt-l(w) defined in (6.37) and (6 .36), 
respectively. That is 
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For any at- 1 in I x ,t, 
K 1X ,t+1 
q(w)at-1 := l:.::rnin L V[at - 1,at ],dt L w{X,t+1 L T[at-1,at ,dtJ,st Qk ,[at-1 ,at ,dt ,st] · 
v 
at dt k= l st 
K 1 X,t+1 
=""'min ""' wk1X,t+ 1 ""' T[at- 1 at dt] 8 t Qk [at - 1 at dt 8 t]· 
,L..-t dt ,L..-t ,L..-t ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
at k= l st 
By these definitions, for nodes in JX,t, q1x ,t are their expected payoffs in the one-stage 
subgame G(IX,t- l ,f31x ,t - 1) given the saddle point strategy w*1x ,t-1 and Qat- 1(w*1x,t ) 
are their expected payoffs in the one-stage subgame G(Ix,t, f3 1x ,t) given the saddle 
point strategy w*1x ,t . The property Pl in theorem 6.2.8 states 
which means for each node a t- 1 with positive realization probabilities (i.e., {3~~_:_: > 0), 
its expected payoffs in the subgames G(IX,t- 1 , f3 1x ,t - 1) and G(Ix,t, f3 1x ,t) are the same. 
The property Pl in theorem 6.2.8 also states 
meanmg that for each node at-1 , its expected value m the lower level subgame 
G(Ix,t, j31x,t) is the upper bound of its expected value in the upper level subgame 
G(JX,t- I,{31x ,t - 1). Therefore, player Y will not choose a t- 1 based on qat-1(w*1x ,t) if 
it does not choose at- 1 based on q1x,t,at-1 .As a result , player Y can not get better 
payoffs on nodes in JX,t by changing its strategies after I x,t alone. By induction from 
t = T , .. . , 1, we show that v is the best response to u. 
Because u, v are the best response to each other in t he multi-stage game, u, v are 
the saddle point strategies. • 
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